TAPPING OUR POTENTIAL

DIASPORA COMMUNITIES AND CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

A Joint Initiative Of

THE MOSAIC INSTITUTE AND
THE WALTER & DUNCAN GORDON FOUNDATION

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INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

Canada has what is arguably the most international citizenry on the planet. By virtue of both our open, proactive immigration policies and our longstanding commitment to promoting multiculturalism, we now live in a country where approximately 20% of all Canadians were born outside of the country, including some 40% of those living in Vancouver and more than 45% of those living in Toronto.[1] And, compared to other countries with high levels of immigration, our fellow citizens come from a far greater variety of source countries.[2]

Yet while there has been considerable research undertaken and social service programming developed to consider and address the challenges represented by the settlement and integration of new immigrants into Canadian life, relatively little attention has been paid to improving our understanding of the transnational dimensions of today's immigrant experiences. While providing high-quality language or skills training to those newly arrived in Canada is of unquestioned value both to them and to the country as a whole, it is arguably no less important to consider how the ethnocultural diversity that results from our proactive immigration and multiculturalism policies affects who we are as a country, or our collective identity as Canadians. It is even less common to consider how our relationships with the rest of the world—especially those parts of the world from which our population derives—may be enriched, expanded or otherwise affected by the changing composition of our Canadian mosaic.

The Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation's Diaspora Program, launched in 2004, set out to amass knowledge of the implications for Canada's foreign and development policies of our country's diverse population and their ties to different parts of the world. Now, after almost seven years, the Foundation is winding down its work with diaspora communities with the publication of this report, the dual purpose of which is to review and summarize the extent to which Canada's foreign policy has been, is and should be informed and enhanced by the expertise and insights of Canada's many diaspora communities, and to encourage ongoing research and capacity-building in this area.

In publishing this paper, the Gordon Foundation is delighted to be partnering with the Mosaic Institute, whose work is largely focused on exploring and promoting these pressing issues. Launched in 2007, the Mosaic Institute works with Canada's ethnocultural communities to advance Canadian solutions and promote peace and development in conflict-ridden or underdeveloped parts of our world.[3] Both the Gordon Foundation and the Mosaic Institute believe that Canada's diversity can and should be harnessed to improve the content and reach of Canada's foreign policy; that the diversification of our population through decades of conscious effort and ambitious public policies—while valuable in and of itself—should also make a difference to the way Canada relates and responds to the rest of the world. In particular, we believe that Canada's ever-growing diversity uniquely positions it to play a significant role in helping to broker regional disputes and promote the practice of good government around the globe in a way that our traditional Anglo-French heritage alone does not.

WHY DOES THIS MATTER?

This area of research is important for many reasons. These include the following, *inter alia*:

1) **Canadian foreign policy could be improved as a result.**

   Tapping into the resources and expertise of diaspora communities matters because those communities may possess insights, experiences, and expertise that could inform and enrich both the content and the quality of Canadian foreign policy. This reflects the more general belief that the inputs of interested and experienced stakeholders from across a wide variety of public policy areas are valuable in enhancing the quality of the policy outputs relating to those same areas.

   We see this belief demonstrated, for example, when governments invite parents and teachers to weigh in on educational policies; healthcare practitioners to advise on health policy; or members of the country's research

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1 Statistics Canada, 2006.

2 A 2007 Migration Policy Institute study found that "no one group dominates Toronto's immigrant stock. Nine countries account for half of the foreign-born population, while the rest of the foreign-born come from nearly every country in the world."
   Marie Price and Lisa Benton-Short, "Counting Immigrants in Cities across the Globe," Migration Information Source (2007), http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID = 567

3 For more information about both the Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation and the Mosaic Institute, please see the Afterword to this paper.

community to contribute to the formulation of policies related to science and technology. This common practice is not merely political expediency designed to curry favour with politically important groups of voters; rather, it reflects a general belief and perception that those with unique experiences and expertise related to these various areas of public policy will serve as a sort of "reality check" on others' policy ideas, and ultimately improve the quality of the resultant policy outputs.

The inputs of farmers do not automatically become the policy outputs of governments any more than the inputs of bankers automatically dictate the direction of economic policy, but the former's experience harvesting crops and managing farm enterprises and the latter's experience managing large investment portfolios are typically valued and weighed alongside a range of other policy considerations whenever agricultural and economic policies are made. The fact that such contributors have a vested interest in the content of the government's final policy outputs does not disqualify them from participating in the public policy discussion. Any concerns about entrenched interests are outweighed by the tacit assumption that agricultural policy will be better as a result of input received from farmers and economic policy will benefit to some degree from the input of the banking community.

By the same token, the Mosaic Institute and the Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation believe that diaspora communities have legitimate experiences and expertise to contribute to Canada's official foreign policy and its international activities. However, unlike farmers or bankers or parents contributing to the development of public policy in their respective areas of specialization, it is not well known or well understood how and to what extent diaspora communities currently understand, have access to, or influence the content of Canadian foreign policy as it relates to countries, regions, issues or disputes of which they have extensive knowledge.

If it is indeed the case that some diaspora communities—most likely those that are small in size or not yet well-established in Canadian life—typically have less relative access to the foreign policy establishment than Canadians from larger communities or those of longer standing, then to explore ways of enhancing the contribution of such diaspora communities to the formulation of Canada's foreign policy also matters because it levels the playing field between those who have more access to the foreign policymaking process and those who have relatively less.

2)   **Canada's foreign policy interests are too important to avoid empirical inquiry into the actual and potential role of Canada's diaspora communities.**

Careful research in this area matters because the potential repercussions of making uninformed assumptions about the ability of transnational Canadians to enhance Canadian foreign policy—whether favourable or unfavourable—could be serious. This is a new enough field of inquiry, and the potential stakes high enough, that a careful, empirically sound investigation is warranted. We must take the time first to define those Canadian values that help underpin our global priorities as a country—such as strengthening democratic governance, reinforcing the rule of law, advancing the cause of pluralism or protecting fundamental human rights—and then explore how best to invite, receive and assess policy inputs from individuals, organizations and communities that might be able to help Canada imbue its foreign policy with those values in areas of the world of strategic and humanitarian interest to Canada.

Taking the time to carefully explore and assess the capacities, the views and the priorities of diasporic Canadians and their communities with respect to pressing issues outside of Canada, and comparing their ideas and inputs against the straight edge of Canadian values and interests, will help increase the possibility that ideas and inputs that compare favourably to that straight edge will find their way into Canada's official foreign policy. At least as importantly, it will also reduce the likelihood that policy suggestions that are not reflective of core Canadian values will find their way into Canada's policy outputs, and thereby reduce the risk of undermining Canada's global reputation or weakening its credibility among key strategic partners in regions of geopolitical importance.

Put another way, just as we have suggested that the quality of Canada's foreign policy may be enhanced through the more systematic inclusion of the inputs of transnational Canadians, we are also suggesting that the automatic, rote inclusion of such inputs in our official foreign policy simply because they originate from individuals or communities with more obvious direct experience in or knowledge of the regional issues in question is ill-advised. While it would be foolhardy to exclude the inputs of transnational Canadians from Canadian foreign policy *ex ante*, it would be just as foolhardy to include them without considering them in the full light of Canada's values and interests. A careful, empirical approach is therefore recommended.

3)   **Including more citizens in the consideration and formulation of Canadian foreign policy is itself consistent with Canadian values.**

As noted in Section 2) above, one of the core Canadian values against which the foreign policy inputs of transnational Canadians should to be compared is our commitment to pluralism. That very commitment should lead to the conscious broadening of the membership of Canada's foreign policy community to include newer Canadians, and particularly those from countries and regions of ongoing geopolitical interest to Canada.

The terms "pluralism" and "diversity" are often used interchangeably. But whereas "diversity" in a society is generally used to refer to the mere fact of there being a variety of different types of people living in it, "pluralism" also implies that the resultant society is better off because of the variety of its people. In science, the notion of pluralism suggests that it takes more than one theory to properly account for certain naturally-occurring phenomena, and that the various theories actually *need* one another in order to collectively offer a satisfactory explanation of the phenomena in question. Similarly, in our opinion, pluralism, as reflected in Canadian society, is the belief that we all contribute essential elements to our collective identity. This is the true meaning of Canada's mosaic.

Accordingly, just as each individual who has chosen to make Canada his or her home is an essential tile in that mosaic, the *pro forma* exclusion of any individual or group of individuals from contributing to the determination and pursuit of Canada's international interests leaves Canada's foreign policy unfinished, incomplete, and intrinsically non-representative of all Canadians.

4)   **Including transnational Canadians in the consideration and formulation of Canadian foreign policy has the potential to strengthen Canada's social fabric.**

Inviting all Canadians—including Canada's Aboriginal peoples, those whose families immigrated to Canada generations ago, and those more recently arrived in Canada—to inform or otherwise provide meaningful input to the formulation, enrichment or review of Canadian foreign policy may be a way of fostering a greater sense of attachment to Canada and strengthening our collective social fabric. The converse is also likely true: the wholesale exclusion of particular groups of Canadians from contributing to the identification and expression of Canada's foreign policy priorities can only serve to weaken Canada by segmenting its population into those who inform Canada's international policies and those who do not. Moreover, such segmentation may even work to strengthen the allegiances of some residents or citizens of Canada to governments, issues or causes originating outside of Canada that are not necessarily compatible with all of Canada's fundamental values.

Canada's diversity is a fact—one that most Canadians are proud of—and the diversity of our population is projected to increase substantially over the next 20 to 40 years. Accordingly, while the question of how to identify and benefit from the expertise of our diasporic citizenry is timely now, it will prove imperative for building a cohesive society as our diversity increases in the coming decades.

Broad inclusion can strengthen the participatory and deliberative elements of our democracy. It can provide another avenue for greater citizen engagement, and it may also lead to greater inclusion and integration of Canada's immigrant communities. Of course, part of cultivating an inclusive, plural society involves recognizing that Canadians with diasporic ties, like all Canadians and indeed all humans, have and hold multiple identities, experiences and knowledge. Our emphasis on foreign policy in this report is not intended to suggest that our immigrant communities are exclusively or even primarily assets to be tapped in the furtherance of strengthening Canada's role on the world stage, but that this is one important aspect of the panoply of contributions that diasporic Canadians can and do make to Canadian society.

And, just as we all stand to benefit from a stronger Canada on the world stage, we believe that it is a collective responsibility of all Canadians to wrestle with the difficult questions of how best to ensure the appropriate amount, quality, and means of providing diasporic input into Canada's foreign policy development process.

ABOUT THE REPORT

This report considers how Canada's role in the world, particularly our foreign policy priorities, policies, and program commitments, can be informed, shaped, and strengthened through the facilitation of a broader inclusion of transnational Canadians whose expertise and advice is rooted in a deep knowledge of the political, economic and social realities of international peacebuilding and development needs.

It gathers existing knowledge and lessons learned on the capacity of diaspora communities in Canada to inform policy development on international issues and the existing structures and barriers to doing so. Further, it identifies specific

existing and potential mechanisms through which transnational Canadians might contribute constructively to Canada's global peacemaking and development activities. To ground this review, this report also includes a number of case studies designed to highlight the capacities of a select group of Canadian diasporic communities to provide meaningful input into the foreign policy process.

The report provides additional knowledge and information on these important questions, drawing on existing literature and on the work supported and initiated by the Mosaic Institute and the Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation. Our overall aim is to provoke discussion: we don't claim to have all the answers, and we have not even asked all of the questions. Our hope, however, is that this report will help stimulate healthy dialogue, essential to a healthy democracy, about how best to realize the possibilities that our increasingly diverse society holds for improving Canada's role in the world.

This paper is primarily intended to be read by Canadian government officials who are charged with the challenging but extremely important task of considering how Canada's transnational citizenry can become more involved in the enhancement of Canada's international policies and activities. However, we believe that it might also be of interest to academics, non-governmental organizations involved in promoting or enhancing the content and direction of Canadian foreign policy, and ethnocultural organizations representing the interests or the views of particular communities or sub-communities of Canadians. The questions it raises might also be of somewhat broader interest among Canadians, and help to spark and contribute to an important public discussion about the issues it raises. Similarly, it might resonate with policymakers in other countries who are also beginning to grapple with related questions of citizen engagement and public participation in policymaking.

METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

The rest of this report consists of three main sections:

1) an overview of current thought and practice (both Canadian and international) with respect to diaspora engagement in foreign policymaking;
2) an overview of existing mechanisms for facilitating the receipt of diaspora inputs into the process of making foreign policy decisions in Canada; and
3) a short series of recommendations based on this work.

In addition, we commissioned and have included as Appendices to this report a number of short case studies summarizing the organizational capacities and resources of five particular diaspora communities: Afghanistan, China, Eritrea, Sri Lanka and Sudan. Each report was written by a different author with a different relationship—whether personal, professional or academic—to the community being considered. This diverse group of authors included community activists, a post-doctoral fellow, a policy professional, and a senior undergraduate.

Despite these differences in background or training, the authors of the case studies were each asked to address the following list of topics and questions:

Demographic profile of the community. Size, demographic make-up, waves and timing of migration to Canada, ties to country of origin (remittances, trips, family, work, etc.)

Existing organizational structure and capacity. What organizations exist that bring together members of a particular diaspora? Are they divided along ethnic, regional, or other lines? Are they primarily cultural or religious organizations? Are they focused on settlement and integration issues? Do they have an interest in or attempt to influence Canada's foreign policy development?

Roster of principal issues. What are the key foreign policy issues of concern to the diaspora community in question? What are the substantive foreign policy positions taken by organizations representing the diaspora community?

Canada's role in the country of origin. What is the extent of Canada's involvement in the country of origin (aid, foreign policy positions, strategic considerations)?

Interface between the diaspora community and the foreign policy community. What are the avenues for exchange and consultation between the diaspora community and the foreign policy establishment? Are these formal or informal?

Assessment of substantive policy inputs and gap analysis. Are the substantive policy inputs consistent with Canada's humanitarian interests and international commitments? Do the inputs advance the goals of peace, development and good governance? What are the barriers or capacity gaps for diaspora communities to more effectively engage in shaping Canada's foreign policy development?

These communities were chosen for a number of different reasons, including the importance of the home countries to Canada's existing foreign policy, the relative degree of political organization within the communities, and the size—both very small and very large—of their populations within Canada. Another important factor was the degree of relevance of the community or country in question to the existing work of the Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation and the Mosaic Institute, as some of this work provided a useful foundation for the development of a case study.

For instance, the Mosaic Institute's 2009 study for Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade on the Sudanese diaspora in Canada was an important source of information used in the drafting of this paper's case study on Sudan.

It should be noted that we consciously decided early on not to include a case study of any community of the Middle East. This decision was *not* taken in order to simply avoid dealing with one of the most challenging foreign policy concerns for Canada involving diaspora communities. Rather, we have made the conscious decision not to include a Middle East-focused case study in order to broaden the discussion of how to better involve transnational Canadians in the expression of Canada's global interests, and to encourage those reading this paper to explore the general relevance of these issues beyond the well-worn parameters of the conflict between Israelis, Palestinians, and their neighbours.

It should also be noted that most of these case studies were largely completed in the last quarter of 2010. Consequently, certain significant political events or geopolitical changes that one might otherwise expect to be included from a report released late in 2011—such as the election of a majority federal government in Canada in May 2011; or the referendum in Southern Sudan in January 2011 that saw overwhelming support for the creation of the separate state of South Sudan; or the final departure of Canadian troops from Afghanistan—are absent. Nevertheless, these case studies do contain essential background information on the size, organization, leadership and long-term priorities of key diaspora communities in Canada.

Finally, we have chosen to use the term "diaspora communities" (rather than "immigrant" or "ethnocultural communities") in this report to emphasize the ties that some of our citizens hold to other parts of the world. Some of Canada's immigrants and refugees may have little interest in maintaining connections with countries of origin, and some members of ethnocultural communities, after many generations in Canada, may have little or no connection with their regions of ethnic origin. As such, this report, following Rima Berns-McGown's definition of diaspora as a "space of connections,"[4] uses the term diaspora to distinguish our approach from the concerns of multiculturalism, immigration and settlement in Canada to focus instead on the opportunities and implications of the deep ties and connections to different parts of the world maintained by our diverse citizenry. To be sure, the degree to which an immigrant community is integrated into the Canadian mosaic is an important variable in their ability to provide input into policymaking, but our focus remains on the transnational dimensions of our ethnocultural diversity.

It should also be noted that the principal concern of this paper is the degree and means of inclusion in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy of Canadians who are resident in Canada, and who self-identify as members of specific diaspora communities to which they belong by virtue of their birth or their family heritage. That is *not* to suggest that the foreign policy inputs of Canadians who are living outside Canada, perhaps even in the country of their own birth or their parents' birth, and who now comprise, in effect, a Canadian diaspora living abroad, might not also have the potential to enhance the quality of Canada's global relationships. While such a significant group of individuals merits consideration all its own, our focus for the time being is on exploring ways of ensuring that the commitment and mechanisms exist for converting the quantitative diversity of Canada's resident population—those who interrelate within the Canadian polity on a day-to-day basis—into an inclusive and pluralistic foreign policy.

WHAT THIS REPORT IS NOT

Some readers may approach contentious topics such as these with some degree of preconception, or have various expectations about what policy reports should be. For that reason, we will conclude our introductory remarks by underlining explicitly what presumptions and purposes are *not* part of this report.

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4 Rima Berns-McGown, "Redefining 'Diaspora,'" International Journal, LXII no. 1 (2008): 8.

DIASPORA INDIVIDUALS AND COMMUNITIES

We do not presume that all persons who themselves, or whose ancestors, immigrated to Canada identify as members of a national diaspora or have any interest in maintaining active ties with another country of national origin. Nor do we presume that all groups that do constitute themselves around a shared national origin outside of Canada have any, or the same degree, of interest in foreign affairs. When we invoke diasporas in this report, however, we are referring to those individuals and communities who maintain transnational ties and take an interest in Canada's foreign policy with respect to their countries of origin. Their perspectives, we believe, do deserve recognition as distinctive contributions to the democratic process and as potentially offering special assets to policymakers.

DIASPORAS AS SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS

We are not arguing that diaspora groups merit the status of distinctively privileged contributors to the democratic political debate and to policymaking simply by virtue of their ancestral ties to countries with which Canadian foreign policy engages. Rather, we believe that they are one among a number of civil society groups justifiably seeking to have greater involvement in the policymaking process. It is certainly true that many if not all of those civil society groups feel that their voices are insufficiently heard; and we certainly endorse efforts to increase across-the-board civil society involvement in foreign policymaking. Our specific purpose in this report, however, is to advance the proposition that diaspora groups are legitimately part of this wider spectrum of civil society groups. That being the case, we believe efforts to boost their democratic participation are merited and should address their distinctive circumstances.

Similarly, this report does not presume that diaspora groups are unique in offering special assets of knowledge and connections to foreign policymakers. Other civil society and business groups do so as well, and of course their expertise should be drawn upon. Our purpose here is to establish that diaspora groups do have such expertise to offer, and that there are constructive ways for policymakers to tap this expertise despite the challenges in doing so.

SCHOLARLY DEPTH

This report is intended to be read and acted upon by elected officials, policymakers and civil society groups, and it is not intended to be read as a work of purely academic scholarship. Therefore, the conceptual premises about the nature of diasporas, democracy and foreign policymaking underpinning this report are not discussed or examined exhaustively; rather, they are assumed and used in ways that represent the current state of conversation within and among diaspora organizations and the policy community.

THE RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL POLICY ISSUES

Because of the particular mandates and programming foci of The Mosaic Institute and the Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation, this study does not survey the entire range of international policy issues and the potential benefits of diaspora engagement in them. Most prominently, perhaps, it does not address the role of diasporas in promoting Canada's economic relations with their countries of origin; other prominent organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Foundation (as well as certain trade-focused diaspora groups) already give this issue considerable attention. The focus of this report is limited to the areas of diaspora engagement in development and peacebuilding, areas that are arguably much more controversial and that correspond to the mandates of our organizations.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND REALITIES

The recommendations included in this report are based primarily on principle and on other countries' experience in engaging diasporas in foreign policymaking. Consequently, they are not necessarily intended to reflect a detailed analysis of current fiscal and organizational realities (i.e. the currently limited capacities of DFAIT as reflected in the Mechanisms section below). Nor do these recommendations purport to be the product of a detailed feasibility study; we leave it to others to cost out the steps we recommend and weigh them against competing fiscal and organizational priorities.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

DISCLAIMER

We have done our very best to listen to and implement the recommendations of our Expert Advisory Committee, as well as the researchers, authors, and various others who have read and commented on different versions of this paper. Collectively, they deserve our thanks for a job well done, and credit for any value that others may find in this final report. However, we alone bear ultimate responsibility for the content of this document, including full blame for any errors or omissions.

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TOWARD DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT IN FOREIGN POLICYMAKING: AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT THOUGHT AND PRACTICE

Natalie Brender

INTRODUCTION

Canada's multiculturalism—while a defining feature of our polity and a source of great pride—makes the task of articulating a single national interest much more complex. Immigrants to this county have multiple allegiances, are transnational in their ties, and pluralistic in their world view. I believe, however, that we should see this as a strength—rather than as an unhelpful intrusion into the business of foreign policy. Indeed, we could begin to see ourselves as innovators: just as we have been in the forefront of creating a multicultural society, so too could we be at the forefront of thinking through how to create a foreign policy that can respond to that reality.[5]

Over the past decade, policy experts, pundits, academics and citizen groups have been reflecting on the linkages that do and should exist between Canada's stunningly diverse populace and its foreign policy. Many observers see an enormous potential benefit to be gained by including diaspora[6] communities more fully in Canada's foreign policy. One basis for this conviction is the principle of democratic inclusiveness, which demands that citizen perspectives be incorporated into Canada's foreign policy along with other aspects of governance. Another reason often cited by advocates of greater diaspora engagement in policymaking is the notion that diasporic Canadians have special kinds of expertise, knowledge, skills and connections that can benefit their countries of origin, and which Canada can use to advance its international goals.

Alongside these arguments, there is the reality that even without formal governmental engagement, diaspora groups in Canada are already acting transnationally in ways that affect economic, political and social affairs in their countries of origin. They are, for instance, sending remittances on a scale that dwarfs Canada's foreign aid budget.[7] As well, they are paying for family members' educational expenses; funding community-improvement projects such as schools and clinics; investing in businesses; and contributing to political parties or movements. To be sure, not every effect of these activities coheres with the aims of Canada's foreign policy; but many do.[8]

The evidence of these positive transnational activities, and the potential for much greater contributions to come from diaspora communities, has given rise to a view that diasporas should be more systematically and fully drawn into formal channels of Canada's foreign policymaking. On such a view, it would be a welcome start for Canada to emulate existing international and European programs that facilitate the transference of diaspora members' assets, knowledge and skills to the benefit of their countries of origin. However, that in itself would not be seen as sufficient, since diaspora groups in Europe and Canada alike are seeking engagement in ways that go beyond program participation. Not until diasporas have input into the actual policymaking process, it is argued, will their potential contributions be fully realized. The report of a conference on diaspora participation in peacebuilding and development, for example, asserts an "incontestable need for governments at all levels to include diaspora and local civil society in

Some international and European programs enabling diasporas to contribute to development in their countries of origin:

- Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) is a UN initiative mobilizing diaspora members to undertake short term volunteering consultancies in their countries of origin.
- Africa Recruit is a joint venture of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the Commonwealth Business Council that supports African migrants in the UK who offer their skills and expertise to their countries of origin on a temporary or permanent basis.
- IntEnt is an initiative of the Dutch government that provides support to migrants wanting to establish small businesses in their countries of origin.
- The UK Department for International Development (DfID) has a "Send money home" website that helps diaspora communities send low-cost remittances to their countries of origin.

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5 Jennifer M. Welsh, "Canada's Foreign Policy: Does the public have a say?" (unpublished paper, Dal Grauer Lecture, Vancouver, September 15, 2007), 21.

6 Although the concept of 'diaspora' is much-disputed, for the purposes of this paper it is understood as "a self-identified ethnic group, with a specific place of origin, which has been globally dispersed through voluntary or forced migration" (Vertovec 2006, 1). It is admittedly problematic to apply the concept of diaspora, with its core notion of a single place of origin, to ethnic groups such as Muslims, who are increasingly becoming active pressure groups on foreign affairs issues in Canada and other countries based on their Muslim identity rather than a national one. See Radcliffe Ross (2009) for analysis of this phenomenon.

7 In 2008, remittances sent to other countries from Canada were estimated at $5-15 billion annually, in comparison with $3.6 billion spent on development assistance (Saxena 2008, 2).

8 Luin Goldring, Susan J. Henders, and Peter Vandergeest, "The Politics of Transnational Ties: Implications for Policy, Research, and Communities" (YCAR-CERLAC Workshop Report, York University, Toronto, 2003).

international and national policy development."[9] This imperative has echoed through multiple reports and position statements in the past decade.

On the part of governments, there has been an increasing acknowledgement of the potential contributions that diasporas can make toward achieving national ends. In the words of one European scholar, "governmental and non-governmental development actors have gradually recognised the high potential of migration and migrants for the development of countries of origin."[10] Another eminent expert on diasporic affairs notes that "governments are currently looking to establish and develop relationships with diasporic representatives from numerous key regions for a range of reasons to do with bilateral relations, security, trade and development."[11]

In Canada, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) has recently launched a Global Citizens Initiative presumably aimed at advancing such objectives, although the project currently consists of research being undertaken by policy staff, with any subsequent activities remaining to be publicly defined (the initiative is discussed in more detail in the Mechanisms section of this report). And for several years, the aim of diaspora inclusion in Canadian foreign policymaking has also been pursued by at least two Canadian NGOs: the Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation and the Mosaic Institute.

The Gordon Foundation's Global Citizenship program[12] has supported considerable research into the potentials and capacities of Canada's diaspora groups to contribute to foreign policy, and the barriers currently preventing them from doing so. It has also supported initiatives to engage members of diaspora communities in foreign policy discussions at the civil society level. As well, the Foundation has commissioned "Diaspora Diaries", profiles of first- and second-generation immigrants who have been exemplary in giving back to their countries of origin in ways that support Canada's goals abroad.

The Mosaic Institute, since its founding in 2007, has produced research and programming aimed at helping Canada's diaspora communities contribute to Canadian peacebuilding and development efforts in their countries of origin. Its activities have included peace dialogues involving Canada's Sri Lankan and Middle Eastern communities, and a foreign policy conference that brought diaspora groups and federal policymakers together to discuss the future of Sudan. It has also organized a series of seminars that brought together business and community leaders from pairs of Canadian diaspora communities whose countries of origin are engaged in longstanding conflicts (Armenia/Turkey, China/Tibet and Pakistan/India). These discussions (sometimes including consular or diplomatic officials from their countries of origin and DFAIT officials) have allowed the communities to discuss not just their interactions with each other and their countries of origin, but also specific courses of action for addressing the conflicts abroad.

Notwithstanding such developments, however, the virtually unanimous assessment of diaspora activists and commentators is that progress toward the goal of realizing diasporic potentials for foreign policymaking has been lamentably slow in both Europe and Canada. The author of a recent major report on the contributions of diaspora communities to Canada's international goals laments the "gaps between conference deliberations and development policy and practice" in this area.[13] In Europe, evidence to date also shows that "[d]evelopment actors find huge difficulties converting intentions to involve diasporas in development co-operation into concrete action."[14]

What tangible progress in diaspora engagement has been made thus far lies mostly in the sphere of development, in which policy debate and practice are relatively advanced. In other foreign policy spheres, diaspora engagement by governments has scarcely begun. Recognition of the positive potential for diaspora involvement in peacebuilding, for example, has only recently begun to emerge—and is often overshadowed by a focus on diasporas as supporters of conflict in their countries of origin.[15] At DFAIT, according to an inside observer, "[p]olicy makers consumed by finding solutions to complex ethnically-based conflicts," find that "conflict-generated diasporas rarely contribute to peaceful, equitable solutions."[16]

The present report aims to help overcome the lag between acknowledgement of diasporic potentials and concrete action in the area of diaspora engagement in foreign policymaking. To that end, this overview of current thought and practice has two main goals. The first is to understand the tangled web of issues bound up with the proposition that Canadian

9   University for Peace, "Capacity for Peace and Development: Roles of Diaspora" (UPEACE Expert Forum, Toronto, Canada, October 19-20, 2006), 31.

10 Hein de Haas, "Engaging Diasporas: How governments and development agencies can support diaspora involvement in the development of origin countries," Oxford: International Migration Institute (2006), 4, http://www.heindehaas.com/Publications/de%20Haas%202006%20-%20Engaging%20Diasporas.pdf

11 Steven Vertovec, "Diasporas Good? Diasporas Bad?" (COMPAS working paper no. 41, University of Oxford, 2006), 5, http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/pdfs/WP0641-Vertovec.pdf

12 For an overview of the Gordon Foundation's Global Citizenship program (which has now concluded its mandate), follow this link: http://gordonfoundation.ca/programs/other-programs/global-citizenship-program.

13 Rudi Robinson, "Beyond the State-Bounded Immigrant Incorporation Regime. Transnational migrant communities: their potential contribution to Canada's leadership role and influence in a globalized world," Ottawa: North-South Institute (2005), 211, http://www.nsi-ins.ca/english/pdf/transmigration_document_july_22.pdf

14 Hein de Haas, "Engaging Diasporas: How governments and development agencies can support diaspora involvement in the development of origin countries," Oxford: International Migration Institute (2006), 94, http://www.heindehaas.com/Publications/de%20Haas%202006%20-%20Engaging%20Diasporas.pdf

15 Päivi Pirkkalainen and Mahdi Abdile, "The Diaspora–Conflict–Peace Nexus: A Literature Review" (Diaspeace working paper no. 1, 2009), http://www.diaspeace.org/D-Working_paper_1_Final.pdf

16 Geislerova does, however, report that some at DFAIT have more positive assessments about the potential of diaspora groups in general to contribute to foreign policymaking; more broadly: "[S]everal policy makers insisted that diaspora oversight does make for a better foreign policy as long as it is adequately balanced."
    Marketa Geislerova "The Role of Diasporas in Foreign Policy: The Case of Canada," Central European Journal of International and Security Studies 1, no. 2, (2007): 103, http://www.cejiss.org/assets/pdf/articles/vol12/M.Geislerova_The_Role_of_Diasporas.pdf

policymakers should engage diaspora groups more systematically in foreign policymaking. Identifying what these issues are, and sorting out where the real conceptual challenges lie, may help to loosen some of the blockages between rhetoric and action. The second aim of this overview is to present potential avenues for constructive action on the part of government.

Part I focuses on examining why progress on substantial engagement with diasporas has been so slow, despite avowed governmental commitment to that goal. To a great extent, this revolves around the question of whether, and on what grounds, it is in Canada's national interest to involve diasporas in foreign policymaking. That question in turn gives rise to three major conceptual issues: first, the nature of the national interest in foreign policymaking and how it is determined; second, the role of democratic involvement in foreign policymaking; and third, the proposition that diaspora groups may have distinctive and substantive insights of value to policymakers.

Part II moves past the "why" questions of Part I to address the "how" questions dealing with what the Canadian government can do to engage diasporas more effectively in foreign policymaking. Drawing on the extant literature about governmental engagement with diasporas, it identifies two factors required to shape an approach to diaspora engagement: first, conceptualizing the dimensions of policymaking at issue, and second, identifying which diaspora groups and individuals to engage with. It concludes by surveying concrete actions that government can take to promote conditions favourable to the engagement of diaspora groups in foreign policymaking.

Although the focus of this essay is primarily on Canadian realities and potentials, the analysis that follows is informed by a review of relevant international policy and scholarly literature (much of which comes from northern European countries).

PART I: DEBATING THE PROPOSITION OF DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT

The proposition that diasporas should be engaged more fully in foreign policymaking demands consideration of several complex issues:

- whether the involvement of diaspora groups in foreign policymaking is compatible with or intrinsically opposed to Canada's national interest;

- whether the principle of democratic participation justifies a role for civil society groups and individuals—including those belonging to diaspora groups—to participate in foreign policymaking; and

- whether diaspora groups have special assets to contribute to foreign policymaking, which in turn justify special efforts to engage their input.

The tenor of media commentary, as well as anecdotal reports from observers and participants in the field of Canadian international affairs, shows considerable misgivings on each of these fronts. There is a suspicion that diaspora engagement in foreign policymaking is a matter of vote-currying by politicians or an attempt by diasporas to import ethnic conflicts onto Canadian soil—and in either case, is inimical to true national interests. There is a general scepticism on the part of some pundits and diplomats that citizens have sufficient insight into national interests to be substantively involved in matters of foreign policymaking—a view, in other words, that foreign policy is best left to the experts. And there is a more specific scepticism about the notion that diaspora groups have any unique expertise or knowledge that could be an asset to sound foreign policymaking.

Each of these issues will be examined in turn below, with the goal of making the case that Canada does indeed stand to benefit by making greater efforts to engage diaspora groups in foreign policy discussions.

I) IS DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST?

In Canada today, the thesis that government should seek out diaspora perspectives on foreign policymaking is a contentious and politically charged proposition. Every year, immigrants from a vast range of nations pour into this country, resulting in a vast number of foreign-born citizens. According to the 2006 census, nearly one in five Canadians was born abroad, the highest proportion in 75 years.[17] As these immigrants become citizens, their support is being fought over by various political parties—sometimes on the basis of diaspora communities' attachments to identities and issues bound up with their countries of origin. To many observers, this state of affairs embodies a positive manifestation of democratic

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17 Statistics Canada (2009), 2006 Census: Immigration in Canada: A Portrait of the Foreign-born Population, 2006 Census: Highlights, http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/as-sa/97-557/p1-eng.cfm

inclusion in a diverse society. Others, however, worry that politicians who promise to shape foreign policy according to the concerns of diasporic citizens are pursuing partisan electoral advantage at the expense of Canada's national interests.

These divergent perspectives can be seen, for instance, in the opposing positions that pundits Jack Granatstein and John Ibbitson adopt on the broadening of Canada's foreign policy priorities. Ibbitson believes that Canada's increasing diversity is rightfully producing new foreign policy priorities: "They reflect our demographic transformation, from predominantly European to truly multinational. Problems in India and China and Haiti are *our* problems because India and China and Haiti are *our* motherlands."[18] Granatstein, by contrast, rejects Ibbitson's inclusive view of foreign policymaking, perceiving a more worrisome scenario behind Canada's new policy priorities: "Understanding what our national interests are is the way to make foreign policy, a better way than pandering to opinion polls and ethnic polls, a better way than—*pace* Ibbitson—looking for new motherlands."[19]

Given such politically inflammatory charges about ethnic politicking as the rationale behind Canada's evolving foreign policy priorities, government officials may be reluctant to seek out diaspora communities' input into policymaking.[20] This would be particularly true when the countries at stake are connected with politically sensitive issues and significant voting blocs.

However, it would be a mistake for any parties involved in the making and evaluation of Canada's foreign policy to identify diaspora engagement with ethnic politicking and, for that reason, reject it. It is undeniable that ethnic politicking has been and will continue to be a feature of Canadian politics, one that on occasion contributes to unsound foreign policy positions. But for pundits therefore to depict diaspora influence on foreign policymaking as malign because of its entanglement with politics, or for government officials to avoid engaging with diasporas altogether for fear of political entanglements, is an overreaction. There is no branch of governmental policymaking that is immune from occasionally being misdirected by politically-motivated considerations. That fact is not generally taken to dictate that policy is better made when hermetically sealed off from the political sphere; neither should it when foreign policymaking is at issue.

A further question is whether a foreign policy reflecting diaspora communities' concerns is intrinsically at odds with Canada's national interest. In the view of some, national interests—as opposed to values—are most readily and objectively discerned by experts, to whom foreign policymaking should be left. The input of diaspora communities, on this view, can only muddy the waters by introducing emotional concerns that appeal to values, and often would push Canada in directions opposed to the national interest. In fact, members of diaspora communities in Canada have occasionally advocated positions egregiously at odds with what Canada stands for and pursues in world affairs. Yet such instances cannot plausibly be taken to define the norm of diaspora engagement in foreign policy.

Neither do such instances define whether diaspora engagement is intrinsically opposed to the promotion of national interests. The longstanding values-versus-interests debate among pundits and practitioners of Canadian foreign policy is of course much larger than this particular issue; but endorsing the proposition that diasporas should be engaged in foreign policymaking does bear on central elements of that debate. Those who decry diaspora engagement as antithetical to national interests tend to have a strongly realist picture of a self-evident set of hard interests such as security, prosperity and sovereignty—in contrast to which the recognition of social diversity is allegedly a mere value of secondary importance.

Perspectives articulated by international affairs scholar Jennifer Welsh lay out important theoretical underpinnings for the proposition that diaspora communities' involvement is part of sound foreign policymaking in a diverse country such as Canada. One is the notion that in democratic societies, foreign policy is bound up with the expression of national identity: "the values and principles we stand for will inevitably form part of our activities on the international stage."[21] In the case of Canada, our immigration policy and the increasingly diverse origins of our citizens contribute to global concerns and responsibilities that in turn will shape our foreign policy.[22]

This perspective, which sees the concerns of diasporic Canadians as legitimate fodder for Canada's foreign policy, entails a rejection of the purportedly realist view that would see such concerns as extraneous to national interests.[23] In its place is the view that national interests "are constructed by particular processes, people, and institutions."[24] This link between endorsing the potential role of diaspora groups in foreign policymaking, on one hand, and endorsing a constructivist view of national interests on the other, is echoed in a recent article on the democratic dimension of Canada's foreign policymaking:

18 J. L. Granatstein, quoted in "Multiculturalism and Canadian Foreign Policy," in The World in Canada: Diaspora, Demography, and Domestic Politics, eds. David Carment and David Bercuson (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008), 79.

19 Ibid., 89.

20 Marketa Geislerova "The Role of Diasporas in Foreign Policy: The Case of Canada," Central European Journal of International and Security Studies 1, no. 2, (2007), http://www.cejiss.org/assets/pdf/articles/vol12/M.Geislerova_The_Role_of_Diasporas.pdf

21 Jennifer M. Welsh, "Canada's Foreign Policy: Does the public have a say?" (unpublished paper, Dal Grauer Lecture, Vancouver, September 15, 2007), 36.

22 Ibid., 39-41.

23 For a critique of the so-called 'realist' understanding of Canada's national interests, see Welsh (2006).

24 Jennifer M. Welsh, "Canada's Foreign Policy: Does the public have a say?" (unpublished paper, Dal Grauer Lecture, Vancouver, September 15, 2007), 37.

> If there were an unambiguous national interest on issues such as ODA or peacekeeping, then interest groups may be of less interest in the study of foreign policy. On most global issues, however, there is no clear national interest. In a democracy the national interest is what it is judged to be after debate and discussion[.][25]

Embracing a constructivist account of how national interests are defined does not entail that any and all voices carry equal weight in the civic discussion. This is where national values come in as limiting conditions. It is (or should be) understood by all participants that only positions and attitudes consistent with Canadian values such as democracy, human rights, mutual respect and gender equality are candidates for shaping the national interests that Canada pursues abroad. According to this criterion, a civic group has no place in the national conversation about foreign policy if it advocates causes or means contravening those values.

Once certain bedrock values are defined as limiting conditions on national discussions, it is possible to say that diaspora groups advocating violence or an intolerance of opposing voices are clearly out of step with national interests. This criterion leaves the field open to the vast majority of diaspora groups who do embrace the values of non-violence and dialogue, and whose contributions therefore have as much legitimacy as any other voices in the national discussion over Canada's foreign policy interests.

II) DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT AS DEMOCRATIC CITIZEN INCLUSION

After debunking the notion that the discernment and promotion of national interests is a matter for experts, then the field is open for more participants—indeed, citizens as such—to engage in dialogue about foreign policy matters.

The notion that Canadian foreign policymaking should be democratized has found a place in Ottawa—at least in rhetoric, if less so in reality—since the early 1990s.[26] In-person and electronic consultations and discussions have periodically occurred; a centre devoted to public consultation and outreach existed for a while within DFAIT; and the 2005 International Policy Statement asserted that "the sustainability and success of our international policy depends on both leadership by the Government of Canada and the active involvement of Canadians."[27] These steps have been seen by many observers as disappointingly small, and many questions remain about who should participate in foreign policymaking and what form that participation should take. Nonetheless, the notion that Canada's foreign policy should reflect the views of Canadian citizens has at least some currency as an ideal within governmental departments, as well as in national conversations more generally.

The idea that diaspora perspectives should inform Canada's foreign policy follows from the thesis that all Canadians—even those identifying themselves in part by their attachment to other countries of origin—have a democratic right to participate in public policymaking. Such a view is defended in a discussion of ethnic lobbying on foreign policy issues: "Given that [diaspora] groups are part of the Canadian cultural mosaic, help form and are formed by a broad set of Canadian values, and have become part of the landscape of citizenship, their views and ideas must be taken into account in the policymaking process[.]"[28] This democratic principle entails that the views of diaspora groups are on an equal footing with those of all other Canadians. (And as the above quotation suggests, a limiting condition for equal standing is that the views and ideas at issue are consistent with a broad set of Canadian values that help define Canada's identity at home and abroad).

Notwithstanding this equality in principle, however, the reality is that different groups of citizens have widely varying abilities to exercise their right to democratic participation. Diaspora groups face considerable barriers in this respect, on two distinct fronts. The first is a lack of organizational capacity on the part of many diaspora groups to participate effectively in public life. The rigours of settlement and employment often place a crushing burden on the time and attention of recent immigrants; and these factors, combined with unfamiliarity with the Canadian system, can pose formidable obstacles to immigrant participation in public life.[29] Secondly, as already suggested, the efforts of diaspora groups to get involved often meet with little receptiveness on the part of government officials.

For these reasons, a deliberate effort by policymakers to foster input by diaspora groups may be warranted in order to bring these groups into the democratic conversation. If government sought out the input of diasporic citizens on matters related to their

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25 Christian Leuprecht and Todd Hataley, "Just How Liberal and Democratic Is Canadian Foreign Policy?" in The World in Canada: Diaspora, Demography, and Domestic Politics, eds. David Carment and David Bercuson (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008), 146.

26 Gerald J. Schmitz, "Accountable Governance and International Reviews: Canadian Foreign Policy as if Democracy Matters?" (paper presented to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, York University, June 3, 2006), http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2006/Schmitz.pdf

27 Government of Canada (2005), Canada's international policy statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, http://www.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/documents/IPS-EPI/policy-politique.aspx?lang=eng

28 Brent E. Sasley and Tami Amanda Jacoby, "Canada's Jewish and Arab Communities and Canadian Foreign Policy," in Canada and the Middle East: In Theory and Practice, eds. Paul Heinbecker and Bessma Momani, (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007), 199-200.

29 Krista Koch, "Capacity Building for Peace and Development: The Afghan Diaspora in Toronto," (Discussion paper for the Expert Forum on "Capacity Building for Peace and Development: Roles of Diaspora" in Toronto, October 19-20, 2006), http://www.gordonfn.org/resfiles/GC-Afghan%20Diaspora.pdf, 20;
Eunice N. Sahle and Wisdom J. Tettey, "Transnationalism and the African Diaspora in Canada: An Examination of the Diaspora-Development Nexus," (unpublished paper 2009), 48.

The Public International Law and Policy Group (PILPG) is an NGO that provides "free legal assistance to states and governments involved in conflicts," as well as policy formation advice and training in conflict resolution. It "has advised over two dozen states and governments on the legal aspects of peace negotiations and post-conflict constitution drafting, and over two dozen states and War Crimes Tribunals in Europe, Asia and Africa concerning the protection of human rights, self-determination, and the prosecution of war crimes." Its volunteers include former international lawyers, diplomats and foreign relations experts, in addition to pro bono help from major international law firms. PILPG monitors, and on occasion involves, diasporas as part of its activities in the areas of peace negotiations, transitional governments and war crimes tribunals. In 2005, PILPG was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize.

[Source: http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/]

homelands, and provided resources enabling diaspora groups to represent community concerns effectively, members of diaspora communities would be better able to overcome barriers to the exercise of their democratic citizenship in public policymaking.

III) DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT AS A MATTER OF SPECIAL ASSETS

Thus far, this overview has proposed that diaspora engagement in foreign policymaking is not harmful to the national interest; that citizen engagement does have a legitimate role in foreign policymaking; and that fostering the input of diaspora groups in particular is part of levelling the playing field of democratic citizenship. However, much of the past decade's discussion of diaspora engagement in foreign policymaking does not appeal to the principled idea of democratic citizenship *per se*. Instead, it rests on the more specific and pragmatic notion that diasporas possess special assets of expertise, knowledge and resources that have a distinctive potential to enrich Canadian foreign policymaking.

The literature advocating greater diaspora involvement in foreign policymaking describes various ways of conceptualizing the assets that diaspora communities have to offer. An influential 2004 article by a U.S. think tank summarizes the unique strengths of diasporas as "keen cultural awareness of communities of origin, ease of working in both cultures, trust of communities of origin, better awareness of specific needs and/or potential pitfalls, [and] long term personal commitment to projects and communities."[30] Those claims are echoed in a Canadian report:

> Diaspora groups are able to generate information about their country of origin that surpasses anything that could be "discovered" through second-hand research. Their familiarity with customs, language, tradition, and a host of unwritten rules has the potential to make a sizeable difference in Canada's efforts at international development.[31]

Other accounts emphasize a broader range of assets that diasporas can contribute to the development of their countries of origin:

> The unique resources of diaspora organizations extend beyond their language skills and cultural knowledge. Through their networks in and understanding of institutions in countries of origin and settlement, diaspora organizations can build bridges between institutions. There is a wealth of human, social and financial resources present in diaspora groups. As well, diaspora groups often have organizational structures and support bases that go beyond national frameworks.[32]

It is also asserted that the potential of diaspora citizens to contribute to foreign policymaking rests on assets gained not just through ongoing ties to countries of origin, but also through integration into current home countries: "[S]uccessful and 'integrated' migrants generally also possess the attitudes, know-how, rights and financial capacity for setting up enterprises, participating in public debates and establishing development projects in their regions and countries of origin."[33]

Most of the extant literature on potential diaspora contributions to policymaking focuses on the area of development. Nonetheless, other areas of valuable input by diaspora groups can also be envisioned. For instance, the Public International Law and Policy Group has conducted many engagements with diaspora groups in the area of peacebuilding, and summarizes the potential of such engagement in these terms:

> The diaspora may add substantive knowledge to the peace process by producing recommendations or identifying their priorities in resolving the conflict. Many diaspora members leave their home states to pursue careers or

30 Kathleen Newland, "Beyond Remittances: The Role of Diaspora in Poverty Reduction in their Countries of Origin," Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute (2004), 34, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Beyond_Remittances_0704.pdf

31 Alaa Abd-El-Aziz, et al., "Scoping the Role of Canadian Diaspora in Global Diplomacy and Policy Making," University of Winnipeg Global College (2005), 5, http://www.gordonfn.org/resfiles/Scoping_Role_Canadian_Diaspora.pdf

32 Cindy Horst, "Diaspora Engagements in Development Cooperation," PRIO Policy Brief. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, (2008), 4, http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-1591888123/Diaspora%20Engagements%20%28PRIO%20Policy%20Brief%208-2008%29.pdf

33 Hein de Haas, "Engaging Diasporas: How governments and development agencies can support diaspora involvement in the development of origin countries," Oxford: International Migration Institute (2006), 2, http://www.heindehaas.com/Publications/de%20Haas%202006%20-%20Engaging%20Diasporas.pdf

academic degrees abroad, resulting in well-educated diaspora communities capable of developing informed recommendations. These recommendations and issues may provide a basis for peace negotiations among the parties to a conflict.[34]

Despite these assertions, however, claims of useful diaspora expertise are far from being widely or uncritically accepted by the larger community of international policymakers. Many officials within government and NGOs are sceptical of the notion that diaspora groups bring unique and indispensable assets to the development enterprise. A study of African diaspora groups in Canada notes that CIDA representatives fail to see why government should fund capacity-building projects aimed at making diaspora groups more viable partners in development activities:

> The most commonly raised argument against provision of such assistance is to question why CIDA or any other donor would disburse development funds to build the organizational capacity of diaspora organizations to implement a development project when experienced NGOs, who already have the capacity, can undertake it. Again, this is a matter of perspective on the added value that diaspora organizations may bring to Canadian international development work in their countries of origin.[35]

The failure to perceive value in the potential contributions of diaspora groups is echoed in the findings of another project examining the extent of engagement with diaspora groups by Canadian international development organizations. It finds that such organizations prefer to engage directly with their well-established partners in developing countries because they see no need for the mediation of Canadian diaspora groups[36]—in other words, because the NGOs surveyed fail to perceive any unique assets that diaspora involvement might contribute.

Part of this institutional scepticism about diaspora contributions is undoubtedly attributable to ingrained habits of thinking about where informed knowledge can be found. However, institutional reluctance to tap potential diaspora contributions is due to other reasons as well. An obstacle that governments and other agencies find particularly difficult to deal with is the diversity of perspectives within diasporas. In the words of a Canadian analyst, "diaspora groups are not homogenous and are often characterized by political, ethnic, religious, linguistic, and regional divisions to contend with as host countries seek to engage specific communities."[37] When the resulting diversity of perspectives is encountered by government officials interacting with diaspora groups, it gives rise to confusion and scepticism about whether any of the varied viewpoints being aired can offer a reliable basis for policymaking.

Another ground for doubt about the claim that diasporas offer insider knowledge of their communities of origin lies in the fact that perception of their source countries by diaspora groups may reflect past realities rather than present ones. As a proponent of greater diaspora involvement in development acknowledges, "[o]ne cannot assume that migrants, some of whom have not lived in the country of origin for many years, have a perfectly updated understanding of the situation on the ground."[38] Likewise, as observed by participants at a Canadian forum on peacebuilding, "the distance of diaspora from homeland conflict can at times decrease their level of sensitivity and real knowledge of the needs of their homeland communities' historical, economic and social contexts."[39]

A further concern for policymakers is the possibility that the priorities of diaspora groups may be out of step with those of people currently living in the country of origin. A European briefing warns against the assumption "that the interests and agendas of diasporas are consistent with those of home-country populations, as these may vary considerably."[40] This divergence may sometimes be attributed to the phenomenon of "long distance nationalism" identified by sociologist Benedict Anderson, which leads diasporas to adopt identities and perspectives out of keeping with present-day realities in their countries of origin.[41] It is not uncommon for diaspora communities to adopt positions on conflict in their countries of origin that are considerably more hard-line and intransigent than those held by people actually living in the conflict zones.

Worries about the accuracy and trustworthiness of diaspora perspectives also arise from the reality that the composition of diaspora groups can differ greatly from the demographic makeup of the country of origin. Because immigrants often come from specific regional, class or ethnic subgroups within a country of origin, those particular identities are reflected in

34 Public International Law & Policy Group (2009), Engaging Diaspora Communities in Peace Processes, 8, http://www.diasporacentre.org/DOCS/PILPG_Engaging_Dia.pdf
35 Bathseba Belai, Enabling Diaspora Engagement in Africa: Resources, Mechanisms and Gaps. Case Study: Ethiopia (Ottawa: The Association for Higher Education and Development, 2007), 94, http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/34402/1/126427.pdf
36 Razmik Panossian, "Do Diasporas Really Matter? Civil Society Organisations, Policy Makers, and Ethnic Community Organisations," (Presentation at the International Symposium on Diaspora Politics, 27-29 April 2006, Reno, Nevada), 4.
37 Bathseba Belai, Enabling Diaspora Engagement in Africa: Resources, Mechanisms and Gaps. Case Study: Ethiopia (Ottawa: The Association for Higher Education and Development, 2007), 110, http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/34402/1/126427.pdf
38 Cindy Horst, "Diaspora Engagements in Development Cooperation," PRIO Policy Brief. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, (2008), 4, http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-1591888123/Diaspora%20Engagements%20%28PRIO%20Policy%20Brief%208-2008%29.pdf
39 University for Peace, "Capacity for Peace and Development: Roles of Diaspora" (UPEACE Expert Forum, Toronto, Canada, October 19-20, 2006), 31.
40 Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty, "Diaspora and Development: Building Transnational Partnerships" (Briefing no. 19, Brighton, U.K.: University of Sussex, 2009), 1, http://www.migrationdrc.org/publications/briefing_papers/BP19.pdf
41 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983).

the causes that the diasporas advocate. The result, as noted in a report on African diaspora groups in Canada, is that civil servants and NGOs face "the difficulty of separating partisan and parochial development agendas from more inclusive ones."[42]

These concerns about the reliability of diasporic claims to special knowledge of their countries of origin undoubtedly inform attitudes within Canada's foreign policymaking establishment. They may be responsible for what some diaspora members in Canada describe as an "exclusionary development culture … premised on the notion that members of the Diaspora from the global South are not 'objective observers' of development issues in their countries of origin."[43]

Clearly, there are real grounds for caution in bringing the special assets of diaspora groups into the foreign policymaking arena. Yet while acknowledging these caveats, advocates of greater diaspora engagement in foreign policymaking believe that they are not insuperable barriers. Such advocates observe that the expectation of an exalted notion of objectivity from diasporans is unwarranted; many others who collaborate with government on international issues—NGOs, multinational corporations and religious groups, to name a few—are hardly objective in their interests and inputs.[44] Further, the internal diversity of diaspora groups is hardly unique among those in the field of international affairs. As a scholar of diasporas observes, "[D]isputes, divisions and diverging interests occur not only within diaspora groups, but also between various governments, government bodies and civil society actors."[45] If conflicting views and claims from those other sources can be sorted out in the policymaking process, so too can the input of diasporans.

A reasonable conclusion for policymakers is that the value of particular diasporan inputs should be assessed by drawing on a detailed knowledge both of diaspora groups within Canada and of local realities within the country of origin. A report on diaspora engagement commissioned by the UK Department for International Development advises that the agency should avert diaspora inputs skewed to the interests of a particular subgroup or region by "rigorously research[ing] the composition and character of the diaspora and the organizations with which it seeks to engage."[46] Similarly, alignment between diaspora priorities and ones within the country of origin can be ensured by using both "local expertise" and a "needs assessment that includes all of the different actors involved" to test the soundness of diaspora inputs.[47]

An important element of this alignment of priorities criterion will be the compatibility of the causes and methods of diaspora groups with Canadian values. Applying the litmus test of whether a diaspora group's internal workings and public positions embody values such as mutual respect, dialogue, democracy and human rights is one way of tackling the problem of intransigent hard-liners on issues of inter-community relations within Canada or conflict abroad. The Mosaic Institute takes exactly this approach in the peace dialogues it conducts among and within various diaspora groups in Canada. Prior to each dialogue exercise, it convenes organizers to discuss foundational Canadian values; out of that discussion a "Statement of Values" is produced, intended to govern the subsequent peace dialogue. For a 2010 peace dialogue on Sri Lanka, for instance, the Statement of Values declares that the organizers subscribe to the Canadian values such as peace, diversity and mutual respect, and expect other participants to do so as well (or else be excluded from participation).[48]

The above discussions will likely fail to convince all sceptics about the legitimacy and value of diaspora engagement in foreign policymaking. Nonetheless, articulation of the issues at stake may go some way toward breaking down existing barriers between rhetorical commitment to that goal on the one hand, and concrete action on the other. Part II of this overview now turns to consider what steps governments might take once they have made a commitment to action.

PART II: STARTING POINTS FOR ENABLING DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT IN POLICYMAKING

I) SHAPING AN APPROACH

A) Assessing Representativeness Vs. Complementarity As Bases For Engagement

Once governments or NGOs commit to engaging diasporas in foreign policymaking and begin considering how to shape their approach, they will encounter an often-mentioned problem: how to identify appropriate groups or individuals to engage in dialogue. As discussed above, two important grounds for engaging diasporas in foreign policymaking are the principle of democratic inclusiveness and the capacity of diasporans to contribute special assets to policy design.

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42 Eunice N. Sahle and Wisdom J. Tettey, "Transnationalism and the African Diaspora in Canada: An Examination of the Diaspora-Development Nexus," (unpublished paper 2009), 37.
43 Ibid., 35.
44 Eunice N. Sahle and Wisdom J. Tettey, "Transnationalism and the African Diaspora in Canada: An Examination of the Diaspora-Development Nexus," (unpublished paper 2009), 37.
45 Cindy Horst, "Diaspora Engagements in Development Cooperation," PRIO Policy Brief. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, (2008), 2, http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-1591888123/Diaspora%20 Engagements%20%28PRIO%20Policy%20Brief%208-2008%29.pdf
46 Nicholas Van Hear, Frank Pieke and Steven Vertovec, "The contribution of UK-based diasporas to development and poverty reduction," Report by the ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford, for the Department for International Development, (2004), 27, http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/pdfs/Non_WP_pdfs/Reports_and_Other_Publications/ DFID%20diaspora%20report.pdf
47 Cindy Horst, "Diaspora Engagements in Development Cooperation," PRIO Policy Brief. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, (2008), 2, http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-1591888123/Diaspora%20 Engagements%20%20%28PRIO%20Policy%20Brief%208-2008%29.pdf
48 Mosaic Institute (2010), Statement of Values for the Mosaic Institute's Young Canadians' Peace Dialogue on Sri Lanka.

Because these two distinct rationales exist, policymakers face the challenge of identifying which ground for engagement is appropriate in given instances, and how to proceed in translating that rationale into action.

When policymakers seek to engage diasporas out of the principle of democratic inclusion, the question of representativeness—that is, whether individuals consulted actually reflect the composition and views of the diaspora communities in whose name they speak—is of paramount importance. Representativeness is also of acute pragmatic importance in specific foreign policy endeavours such as peacebuilding, where progress can be undermined by "spoilers" within a community who do not feel their positions are adequately reflected in a negotiated process. In the words of a European policy analyst, "[f]or external actors, it is crucial that individuals and organizations they support are seen as legitimate actors by the migrant communities they represent. In facilitating diaspora engagements, Western government bodies and NGOs ideally would like to work with diaspora representatives that embody the collective voice of 'the diaspora.'"[49] Similarly, a Canadian commentator asserts that, "[a]ny agency interested in engaging diasporas would have to think about which group—or individual, for that matter—speaks for a specific diaspora community."[50]

This goal of representativeness is often difficult to meet because of the considerable ethnic, religious, class and other forms of diversity within many diaspora groups. Addressing the problem of who speaks for the community is a vexing one because diaspora groups—like most other civil society groups—are shot through with internal power dynamics. As a scholar of gender and diaspora observes, there is a "tendency to portray elder male political leaders as representative of the communities' views, politics and aspirations."[51] Another prominent scholar of transnationalism notes that "opposing factions and dissenting voices" within diasporas "are often muffled by better organized, networked, and financed actors, who are often the ones pushing nationalist or ethnic agendas."[52] It is therefore incumbent on policymakers seeking engagement with diasporas to ask "who speaks, with any kind of authority or democratic representation, on behalf of given diasporas?"[53]

How to address this question successfully is often far from clear. Part of the answer, as proponents of diaspora engagement acknowledge, is for diaspora groups "to present a united front so as to have more weight with policymakers and programimplementers."[54] Capacity-building resources (which are discussed below) can help groups get better organized to present a united voice; but that step alone cannot ensure that the resulting positions endorsed by groups reflect the true diversity of opinion within their communities. Hence, it is important for governments seeking diaspora engagement to be aware of the range of diversity within specific diasporas, and to consult multiple groups within them as required to arrive at a representative overview of community opinion.

Given all the complexities that the notion of representativeness brings, it can be questioned whether it is an appropriate basis for diaspora engagement. At least one writer on diasporas and development urges that it be rejected in favour of a different approach:

> Diaspora organisations do not 'represent' diasporas, and development agencies are not their spokespersons ... As long as they function democratically, organisations primarily represent themselves, their members and their own objectives ... Instead of identifying 'the right interlocutors' among organisations representing diasporas, a more fruitful step towards establishing effective cooperation seems to involve building alliances with truly engaged diaspora organisations sharing similar development objectives.[55]

In rejecting the notion of diaspora engagement as a matter of political representativeness, and instead seeing it as a matter of finding similar-minded working partners, this perspective embraces the special assets principle of diaspora engagement. It prescribes that governments or other agencies seeking diaspora engagement should begin with a clear sense of the goals and principles they want to advance, and then identify which diaspora partners have the assets to be suitable collaborators toward those ends (with suitability being assessed according to an organization's own goals and track record of activism and goals embraced).

49 Cindy Horst, "Diaspora Engagements in Development Cooperation," PRIO Policy Brief. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, (2008), 2, http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-1591888123/Diaspora%20 Engagements%20%28PRIO%20Policy%20Brief%208-2008%29.pdf

50 Bathseba Belai, Enabling Diaspora Engagement in Africa: Resources, Mechanisms and Gaps. Case Study: Ethiopia (Ottawa: The Association for Higher Education and Development, 2007), 110, http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/34402/1/126427.pdf

51 Nadje Al-Ali, "Gender, diasporas and post-Cold War conflict," in Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-makers or peace-wreckers? eds. Hazel Smith and Paul Stares (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007), 59.

52 Steven Vertovec, "The Political Importance of Diasporas" (COMPAS Working Paper no. 13, University of Oxford, 2005), 9-10, http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/pdfs/Steve%20Vertovec%20 WP0513.pdf

53 Nicholas Van Hear, Frank Pieke and Steven Vertovec, "The contribution of UK-based diasporas to development and poverty reduction," Report by the ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford, for the Department for International Development, (2004), 27, http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/pdfs/Non_WP_pdfs/Reports_and_Other_Publications/ DFID%20diaspora%20report.pdf

54 Bathseba Belai, Enabling Diaspora Engagement in Africa: Resources, Mechanisms and Gaps. Case Study: Ethiopia (Ottawa: The Association for Higher Education and Development, 2007), 111, http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/34402/1/126427.pdf

55 Hein de Haas, "Engaging Diasporas: How governments and development agencies can support diaspora involvement in the development of origin countries," Oxford: International Migration Institute (2006), 101, http://www.heindehaas.com/Publications/de%20Haas%202006%20-%20Engaging%20Diasporas.pdf

Such assessment is indispensable because some forms of transnational engagement by diaspora groups can be contrary to Canada's policy objectives in the political or development sphere.[56] Attentiveness to the complementarity of aims and methods is also important when only some members among a larger diaspora group are supportive of the foreign policy goals (such as gender equality or a democratic multiethnic society, for instance) that Canada aims to promote in their country of origin.

Perhaps in some areas of foreign policy (e.g. international development) the criterion of complementarity between government priorities and those of specific diaspora organizations should be paramount. But given the realities of conflict and division both within diaspora communities and in regions of origin abroad, the criterion of representativeness is too important to jettison. Were government to adopt a highly selective approach of engaging only with diaspora partners who are already like-minded, it would rule out the possibilities of achieving mutual understanding and compromise with outlier groups. More generally, it would foreclose possibilities of building trust and co-operation between government and diaspora groups. Engagement with the full representative spectrum of groups within diaspora communities—subject to the litmus test criterion of minimal adherence to bedrock values—must hence be pursued alongside the goal of compatibility.

B) Identifying A Range Of Policy Arenas

A second foundational issue that government must address in shaping an approach to diaspora engagement in foreign policymaking is defining the sphere of policymaking at issue. The limited literature on this topic construes policymaking in diverse ways; diaspora groups themselves have various understandings of the kind of policy engagement they seek; and various areas of foreign policy lend themselves to differing kinds of policy engagement.

A relatively modest or entry level interpretation of policy involvement might focus on building co-operation with respect to initiatives of mutual interest to diaspora groups and government. This model would encourage diaspora groups engaging with government to formulate policies or programs that support existing transnational diaspora activities, where such activities complement the government's existing foreign policy goals. In the area of international development, for example, it would mean engaging diaspora input into how the Canadian government could establish programs that support diaspora-led development projects; enable diaspora professionals to contribute expertise toward government- or NGO-led development in their countries of origin; and make it easier for immigrants to send remittances back to their homelands. In other areas, such as peacebuilding or human rights, similar programs to support diaspora initiatives complementary to government policy goals might be envisioned, and diaspora input could do much to shape such programs. Achieving just this level of policy engagement between diasporas and the Canadian government would be a welcome goal.

However, many diaspora activists urge diasporas and governments alike to move beyond a complementary initiatives level of engagement towards a more ambitious policy dialogue. According to a report by the Netherlands-based African Diaspora Policy Centre, such an aim is important because "[d]iasporas are not only implementers of projects but are also thinkers with visions and ideas who can play active roles in the generation of ideas, information and more policy-relevant knowledge in the field."[57] A more ambitious level of policy engagement would involve diasporas in defining the goals and means of governmental foreign policy.

There are any number of ways this might be achieved. In a traditional way of thinking about foreign policymaking, diasporas could inform policies in areas for which the government has sole and sovereign responsibility. But in the present era of multi-actor, multi-level and transnational policy initiatives, there is room to imagine much more. As international politics scholar Jennifer Welsh observes, it is possible to envision government engaging very substantively with the public on "sustained partnerships of policy advocacy" such as that which produced the Landmines Convention.[58] Diaspora engagement in such partnerships offers many areas of potential policy dialogue. A similar message is articulated by a Canadian foreign policy analyst:

> Transnational activities will continue to blur territorial boundaries and diminish state monopoly over foreign relations. Foreign Ministries around the world, many of which are already seeing their influence in international relations diminished, are re-evaluating their role. Among the options they have before them is to harness the dynamic trans-national networks diasporas weave in order to become more relevant and effective. Facilitating and enhancing constructive activities diasporas undertake on behalf of their homelands and kin could strengthen Canada's multi-track diplomacy and make DFAIT more relevant to all Canadians.[59]

56 Luin Goldring, Susan J. Henders and Peter Vandergeest, "The Politics of Transnational Ties: Implications for Policy, Research, and Communities" (YCAR-CERLAC Workshop Report, York University, Toronto, 2003), 9.
57 A.A. Mohamoud, The Contribution of African Diaspora to Policy Dialogue (Amsterdam: African Diaspora Policy Centre, 2007), 5, http://www.diaspora-centre.org/DOCS/Migration_Developm.pdf
58 Jennifer M. Welsh, "Canada's Foreign Policy: Does the public have a say?" (unpublished paper, Dal Grauer Lecture, Vancouver, September 15, 2007), 23.
59 Marketa Geislerova "The Role of Diasporas in Foreign Policy: The Case of Canada," Central European Journal of International and Security Studies 1, no. 2, (2007), 105, http://www.cejiss.org/assets/pdf/articles/vol12/M.Geislerova_The_Role_of_Diasporas.pdf

As well as flexible thinking about the content of foreign policy engagement, there is also room for creative thinking about styles of engagement. In addition to consulting diaspora communities for their input on particular policies, for instance, government might also hold open-format dialogues with the simple aim of gathering nuggets of insight that might usefully shape policymakers' reflections. (This approach was used, for instance, in DFAIT's funding of a policy conference with the Canadian-Sudanese community in September 2010, which was organized on the government's behalf by the Mosaic Institute).[60]

II) CONCRETE ACTIONS GOVERNMENT CAN TAKE

A) Help Immigrants Succeed

Many observers note that the most fundamental way in which government can encourage diasporas to become citizens capable of contributing to its foreign policy is to establish conditions for immigrants to integrate successfully into the economy and society. In the words of a Canadian report, "a host-country's public policy, labour market and business environment that enable immigrants to utilize their skills, knowledge and experience effectively and productively is an environment that empowers them with the capacity to more strongly contribute to the host country's domestic economy and, consequently to the strength of its foreign policy."[61]

B) Understand The Composition Of Diaspora Groups

As noted above in the discussion of the "special assets" that diasporas can contribute toward foreign policy objectives, a detailed understanding of diaspora communities is important for evaluating the objectivity and soundness of the inputs that particular sub-groups or members of each community have to offer. A fine-grained understanding of community dynamics is also essential for ensuring the representativeness of participants in policy areas such as peacebuilding, in which internal dissenters within a group could otherwise act as spoilers perpetuating the sources of conflict.[62]

A recent European paper on best practices for engaging diasporas in peacebuilding suggests an extensive range of information that governments and agencies should research about diaspora organizations in order to select suitable partners for peacebuilding activities. Recommended selection criteria for prospective partners include:

- transparency with respect to organizational structure and governance;
- inclusiveness of membership—or barring that, clarity about which diaspora constituency an organization represents;
- accountability, as demonstrated by well-documented processes, procedures and reports;
- the nature and extent of co-operation with other actors and institutions;
- co-operation within the diaspora, and its transnational ties;
- the organization's perceptions on peace and conflict in the homeland; and
- the organization's engagement strategy, i.e. its platform and methods.[63]

Achieving this fine-grained level of understanding with respect to myriad newer and less organized diasporas in Canada would be a daunting task. However, it is indispensable for making an effective choice of partners; and if done well it would probably help to reduce the levels of negative experiences that policy officials have encountered in engaging with diaspora groups.

C) Implement Measures That Support Diasporan Initiatives

As previously noted in the discussion of an "entry level" conception of how diasporas could be engaged in foreign policymaking, the Canadian government could act to support transnational initiatives by diaspora groups that complement the government's existing international policy goals. A relatively well-known set of initiatives has been undertaken by European governments seeking "to play an enabling role in removing barriers to diasporas taking part in development."[64] Such measures include facilitating remittance transfers; helping to identify opportunities for diasporas to invest in their home countries; and establishing or supporting programs to enable diaspora members to volunteer their skills and expertise toward home country development. These programs do not involve diaspora groups or individuals in broader

60 The Mosaic Institute, Sudanese-Canadians and the Future of Sudan: A Report on a Conference held in Winnipeg, September 2, 2010 (Toronto: The Mosaic Institute, 2010), p. 3.

61 Rudi Robinson, Beyond the State-Bounded Immigrant Incorporation Regime. Transnational migrant communities: their potential contribution to Canada's leadership role and influence in a globalized world, (Ottawa: North-South Institute 2005), 177, http://www.nsi-ins.ca/english/pdf/transmigration_document_july_22.pdf

62 Public International Law & Policy Group (2009), Engaging Diaspora Communities In Peace Processes, http://www.diasporacentre.org/DOCS/PILPG_Engaging_Dia.pdf, 27.

63 Giulia Sinatti, Key criteria of "good practice" for constructive diaspora engagement in peacebuilding (The Hague: African Diaspora Policy Centre, 2010), http://www.diaspora-centre.org/DOCS/ADPC_Paper_June201.pdf

64 Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty, "Diaspora and Development: Building Transnational Partnerships" (Briefing no. 19, Brighton, U.K.: University of Sussex, 2009), 3, http://www.migrationdrc.org/publications/briefing_papers/BP19.pdf

dimensions of the policymaking process; however, they are a much-called-for step by Canadian diaspora groups.[65] Designing appropriate programs and policies would be a welcome arena for policy discussion between the Canadian government, diaspora groups, and potentially NGOs as well.

D) Build Governmental Capacity

A third step to foster diaspora engagement in foreign policymaking is for government to assess its own capacities. Among other things, this can entail assessing organizational structures and mechanisms within government that may or may not exist to enable such engagement (that topic is examined in the following "Mechanisms" section of this report).

Another important element of governmental capacity-building consists in making a wholehearted commitment to diaspora engagement at the corporate level. To this end, a European proponent of diaspora engagement recommends ensuring "that policy engagement is clear, well known and secured at senior governmental level in order to build dialogue with diasporas and the legitimacy for the policy targeting diasporas."[66] The notion of a governmental strategy for diaspora engagement has been recently fleshed out in a comprehensive study by the Washington DC-based Migration Policy Institute on the topic of diasporas in global development policy. It specifies four main elements required for such a strategy: "identifying goals, mapping diaspora geography and skills, creating a relationship of trust between diasporas and governments of both origin and destination countries, and, ultimately, mobilizing diasporas to contribute to sustainable development."[67]

A considerable gulf exists between this recommendation and current realities within the Canadian government. As one report notes, "an official Canadian policy on diaspora engagement does not exist. For instance, although CIDA informally recognizes the positive contributions that diaspora organizations may make to international development and, in some instances, has expressed increased interest in involving diaspora organizations in its operations, there is nothing in place exclusively to guide their engagement in a systematic manner."[68] Another Canadian analyst confirms this lack of a general policy commitment within government to engaging diasporas as such: "The approach of governmental agencies is that 'We work with Canadians as Canadians, as citizens, not as diasporans *per se*.'… [O]n occasion, and on specific issues on a case by case basis, certain diasporans are targeted for information …"[69]

Depending on how the import of a diaspora engagement policy is understood, adopting such a policy within the Canadian government might presuppose a considerable degree of conceptual reflection on the nature of citizen engagement in foreign policymaking, and on the relationship of diaspora engagement to Canada's multiculturalism policy. Admittedly, such reflections would be all the more difficult given that globalization has produced the expansion of foreign policy into virtually every government department, with no single department clearly responsible for taking the lead on such a matter.[70]

A final dimension of governmental self-examination that would build capacity to engage diasporas in policymaking consists of understanding, and potentially changing, the attitudes of officials who interact with diaspora communities. As a representative of a major UK diaspora group observes, the magnitude of the potential challenge in this area should not be underestimated:

> [A]ttitudes within initiating organizations can … help or hinder the process of diaspora engagement. Development professionals, human rights activists, etc., may possess mindsets and worldviews that predispose them to be at very least wary of engaging with diasporas to achieve developmental ends. For many organizations, an engagement involving diasporas represents a step-change, which in itself may need to be treated as an integral part of a change process. Simply treating such a partnership as routine may be counterproductive.[71]

Some of the problematic mindsets and world views at issue might include the concerns about the diversity, motivation and objectivity of diaspora groups that have been discussed above. Overcoming the wariness that such concerns may create will require a readiness for sensitive and difficult conversation, as well as a commitment to learn by trial and error over the long term.

65 Eunice N. Sahle and Wisdom J. Tettey, "Transnationalism and the African Diaspora in Canada: An Examination of the Diaspora-Development Nexus," (unpublished paper 2009), 42.

66 Dina Ionescu, Engaging Diasporas as Development Partners for Home and Destination Countries: Challenges for Policymakers (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2006), 64, http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/published_docs/serial_publications/mrs26%20interior.pdf

67 Kathleen Newland, ed., Diasporas: New Partners in Global Development Policy (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute 2010), 15.

68 Bathseba Belai, Enabling Diaspora Engagement in Africa: Resources, Mechanisms and Gaps. Case Study: Ethiopia (Ottawa: The Association for Higher Education and Development, 2007), 78, http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/34402/1/126427.pdf

69 Razmik Panossian, "Do Diasporas Really Matter? Civil Society Organisations, Policy Makers, and Ethnic Community Organisations," (Presentation at the International Symposium on Diaspora Politics, 27-29 April 2006, Reno, Nevada), 8.

70 For a discussion of the multiple government departments involved in Canada's foreign aid decisions, see Johnston 2010, 6-9.

71 Chukwu-Emeka Chikezie, "Engaging diasporas and migration in development policies and programs" (Paper prepared for the Civil Society Days of the 3rd Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), Athens, 2-3 November, 2009), 11, http://www.gfmd2009.org/UserFiles/file/RT%201_2%20CHIKEZIE%20paper%20%28EN%29%5B1%5D.pdf

E) Build Diaspora Groups' Capacity

An important way for government to increase the ability of diaspora groups to engage in policymaking is to offer support for capacity-building in a range of relevant areas. As many diaspora groups themselves note, their organizations are often volunteer-based, with changing personnel who have little formal skills in organizing, research, conflict-resolution or alliance-building, and little exposure to the government's foreign policy priorities. Training in these areas might produce better-positioned interlocutors for written and in-person engagement with government policymakers. Helping diaspora groups become more organized and more cohesive might help lessen the intra-group conflict that is often cited as a barrier to successful engagement with policymakers. Training in how to build institutional linkages and share lessons learned among diverse diaspora groups would also add greatly to their individual and collective strengths.

Outside Canada, most current discussion and practice with respect to capacity-building does not focus on the goal of policy engagement *per se*. In the sphere of international development, capacity-building is envisioned chiefly as a means of helping diaspora groups get organized and become more effective at gaining funding for and undertaking development projects in their countries of origin. A particularly ambitious example of a governmental undertaking to conduct capacity-building toward this end is an annual ten-day workshop in Israel for women leaders of diaspora organizations, which is co-sponsored by the Israeli and German international development agencies and several international NGOs. Its curriculum includes forming associations, building partnerships, resource mobilization and fundraising, communication and advocacy, and building trust and accountability.[72]

In the sphere of conflict resolution and peacebuilding, capacity-building can also take the specific form of youth initiatives for peacebuilding dialogue; the creation of a community data bank of resources and skills among diaspora members; and training in creative reconciliation techniques.[73] Organizations that conduct capacity-building efforts in this area include the Netherlands-based African Diaspora Policy Centre, which provides training in peacebuilding and conflict transformation to African diaspora members in the Netherlands; the United States Institute for Peace, which has conducted training for Southern Sudanese diasporas; and the Public International Law and Policy Group, which has prepared Kosovar and Armenian diasporas to participate in peace processes.[74]

A rare example of capacity-building that specifically aims to promote the engagement of diaspora groups in policymaking is that of the Dutch NGO Oxfam Novib. This organization is typical of the Dutch approach to development co-operation insofar as it attaches "significant importance in its policy and financial resources to mainly (but not only) small-scale development initiatives of Dutch individuals or organisations."[75] Since 2006, Oxfam Novib has been running a capacity-building program for diaspora organizations that aims not just to improve their skills as small-scale development actors but also their ability to influence the policymaking process. It offers training courses on project cycle management, remittances, microfinance, managing international partnerships, proposal development, and fundraising. In order to promote alliance-building and to empower diaspora organizations to speak for themselves in policy forums, the program supports strategic partnerships among diaspora groups through an umbrella organization called Diaspora Forum for Development.

In 2008, Oxfam Novib commissioned an independent study to evaluate the results of its capacity-building programs for diaspora organizations. The resulting report finds that many of the programs' practical and technical goals in the areas of project development and alliance-building are measurably successful. However, it finds difficulty in assessing success with respect to the goal of diaspora groups'

Oxfam Novib (ON) is the Dutch affiliate of Oxfam, the international development NGO dedicated to alleviating poverty and injustice. Founded in 1956 as Novib, it was "the first politically independent and non-religious development organization in the Netherlands"; and in 1994 it became affiliated with Oxfam. It has some 350 staff at its head office in The Hague, and six field offices. Along with a group of five other Dutch international development NGOs, Oxfam Novib belongs to Linkis, a partnership that extends subsidies and advice to Dutch groups (including diaspora groups) undertaking small-scale development projects abroad.

[Source: http://www.oxfamnovib.nl/en-home.html]

The African Diaspora Policy Centre (ADPC) is an independent policy research centre founded in 2006 as a platform for enabling the African Diaspora in Europe to use its social capital for promoting peace, better governance and "brain gain" in Africa. In addition to producing policy-relevant research, it convenes meetings, facilitates networking and conducts capacity-building training to build conflict transformation skills. It also maintains an African Diaspora Skills Database aimed at including the skilled African Diaspora in development cooperation for the benefit of Africa.

[Source: http://www.oxfamnovib.nl/en-home.html]

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72 "A Capacity Building Workshop for Women Leaders of Diaspora Associations: 15-24 November 2010, Haifa, Israel" (2010), http://www.mhrr.gov.ba/iseljenistvo/?id = 1396

73 University for Peace, "Capacity for Peace and Development: Roles of Diaspora" (UPEACE Expert Forum, Toronto, Canada, October 19-20, 2006).

74 Public International Law & Policy Group (2009), Engaging Diaspora Communities In Peace Processes, http://www.diasporacentre.org/DOCS/PILPG_Engaging_Dia.pdf, 14ff.

75 Tom De Bruyn, "Evaluation of Oxfam Novib's Capacity Building Programme for Diaspora Organisations" (Study commissioned by Oxfam Novib, 2008), 7, http://www.diaspora-centre.org/DOCS/Oxfam_Novib_diaspo.pdf

empowerment to speak for themselves in the policy sphere. The report finds that some gains have been made in diaspora groups being brought by Oxfam Novib to international meetings as attendees, and diaspora groups have gained somewhat greater visibility in the Dutch media and national policymaking. Disappointingly, though, diaspora organizations are still not being invited in their own right to policymaking meetings, and receive only limited national and international attention as development actors. "[W]ithout the backing of more established organisations such as Oxfam Novib," the report concludes, "it is still very difficult for diaspora organisations to have a strong voice in the (policymaking) debates on development co-operation."[76] The tangible gains the Oxfam Novib program has made, the report notes, are strongly linked to its larger institutional context: namely, the longstanding (and unique) tradition among Dutch government and NGOs of recognizing the potential of, and giving support to, non-traditional development actors in development co-operation.[77]

Clearly, Canada is far from having this sort of institutional context of attitude and programming in place. Combined with the difficulty of discerning substantial progress in diaspora policymaking engagement, even from the Oxfam Novib program, these facts do caution against hoping for quickly-measurable results from similar initiatives within Canada. For this reason, as many commentators on the subject of diaspora engagement in development have observed, such engagement must be a durable commitment that is prepared to build community capacities over the long term as institutional contexts evolve in tandem.

F) Create And/Or Support Umbrella Diaspora Organizations

An aspect of diaspora capacity-building with proven potential for fostering policy engagement is the establishment of umbrella organizations capable of representing the interests of, and consulting government on behalf of, multiple diaspora groups. The potential of well-developed and professionalized diaspora groups to engage in policymaking is formidable. By far the most sophisticated examples of such potential are located in Europe, where the Netherlands and the UK in particular are home to umbrella groups with considerably sophisticated accomplishments on the policy front to their credit.

One such group is the Netherlands-based African Diaspora Policy Centre (ADPC). Among its projects is an effort to contribute the collective perspective of the African Diaspora in Europe to the Africa-European Union Strategic Partnership and Action Plan (which was adopted in 2007 to improve development cooperation between Africa and Europe). To advance this end, the ADPC has held events including a consultation meeting to share views among African intellectuals, experts and development workers from 11 EU countries, and a subsequent policy seminar to present those views to various European agencies, think tanks and governmental bodies.

Beyond this already substantial level of accomplishment, the ADPC is seeking more formalized ways of promoting diaspora engagement in the Africa-EU policy dialogue. It envisions the creation of "an EU-wide platform for formal diaspora engagement in migration and development initiatives," with the aim of linking various European organizations as well as generating advocacy, research and policy work. Another major goal is "formal access into the policy process in both the EU and AU levels," which entails a range of component steps. These include that the diaspora "cultivate a pool of experts who could represent diaspora interests"; that it be granted observer status in critical meetings involving the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership; and that it be "allocated (and actively seek) seats in appropriate EU and AU assemblies and committees dealing with migration and development."[78]

A second example of a highly sophisticated umbrella group engaged in policymaking is the Diaspora Forum for Development (DFD). In February 2010, it convened a European Diaspora Expert Meeting at which representatives from migrant organizations in ten EU countries discussed the creation of a European Diaspora Platform that would "provide a mechanism for increasing the visibility of migrant communities in the countries of residence as well as enhance the role they play as part of civil society."[79] A workshop at this meeting was devoted to advancing the role of migrants in policy dialogue, and it concluded that the emerging platform could serve to improve consultations, organize dialogue with policy makers, consolidate national diasporas and forge links across diverse diaspora groups.

Turning to the UK, significant umbrella groups there are also attempting to shape government policy on international development issues. One of these, Connections for Development, was formed in 2003 by the UK Department for International Development (DfID), in conjunction with Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) civil society groups, as a vehicle

76 Tom De Bruyn, "Evaluation of Oxfam Novib's Capacity Building Programme for Diaspora Organisations" (Study commissioned by Oxfam Novib, 2008), 47, http://www.diaspora-centre.org/DOCS/Oxfam_Novib_diaspo.pdf

77 Ibid.

78 African Diaspora Policy Centre, Position Paper: Diaspora Perspectives on the Joint Africa-EU Strategic Partnership (Amsterdam, Netherlands, 2009), 13-14, http://www.diaspora-centre.org/DOCS/Position_Paper_-_O.pdf

79 Diaspora Forum for Development, European Diaspora Expert Meeting: Towards Building a European Platform of Diaspora Organizations: Briefing Note on Final Decisions and Recommendations (The Hague, 2010), 3, http://www.nrbvoice.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/European%20Diaspora%20Expert%20Meeting.pdf

to promote the engagement of BME groups with DfID and with international development issues. Among its goals is fostering the involvement of BME groups in shaping development policy in two areas: realizing the internationally-endorsed Millennium Development Goals, and making global migration work to the benefit of international development. To these ends, Connections for Development mobilizes UK BME communities to participate in policy consultations with DfID and other relevant government departments; and it has contributed to policy debates on migration and development at the UK, European and United Nations levels.[80]

In contrast with the government-established and –funded nature of Connections for Development, the African Foundation for Development (AFFORD), another UK organization, is entirely independent of government. It was founded in 1994 by African diaspora members within the UK who were concerned that "Africans were effectively marginalized from mainstream development activity directed towards Africa."[81] Among its other activities, AFFORD is "a think tank that produces knowledge, expertise, and policies on migration and development issues, … particularly as these issues affect Africa and her global diaspora."[82] It has an extensive track record in influencing policy and media. One of its recent high-profile policy projects is RemitAid, a global campaign to provide remittance tax relief, through the vehicle of diaspora public-private partnerships, in support of international development.[83]

> Diaspora Forum for Development (DFD) is a Netherlands-based platform of more than forty diaspora groups representing more than thirty countries. It was founded in 2008 to coordinate diaspora groups involved in migration and development, and aims to foster diaspora members' involvement in migration and development issues, both in the Netherlands and in their countries of origin. Two of its main aims are "building strategic alliances of transnational networks both national and international" and "increasing the voice of diasporas in the policy making process at all levels."
> [Source: http://www.d-f-d.org/new-dfd/index.php/who-we-are.html]

While all four of these umbrella organizations have significant policy accomplishments to their credit, Canadian government and diaspora groups should move cautiously in emulating them. Some European observers of these organizations are critical of those founded and funded by government, seeing them as decidedly inferior to independently-arising and self-sustaining organizations.

A 2009 report that DfID commissioned to evaluate its programs of engagement with UK civil society groups found that the goals motivating DfID's founding of Connections for Development were admirable ones—but the vehicle used, "a new organisation … instigated by DFID and not well embedded in the broader UK BME institutional context" was poorly chosen.[84] The report's authors assert that DfID failed to understand the politics and organizational issues involved in seeking representation among a hugely diverse group of diaspora organizations that had themselves been unable to reach consensus on an existing representative national structure to engage with DFID, and that it was a mistake for DfID to seek to form a single institutional voice for diaspora interest in international development. Consequently, Connections for Development has run into conflicts resulting from its diverse membership. While the report assures that there is "scope for DFID engagement with BME civil society working with existing networks and established groups,"[85] its conclusion is one that Canada should heed carefully: "If an umbrella body does not exist there is probably a good reason why. DFID cannot create new UK civil society organisations but it can nurture existing ones[.]"[86]

Other commentators on the broader range of European examples reach similar conclusions about the merits of government-led versus grassroots efforts to engage diasporas through government development initiatives. An influential analysis of European diaspora engagement efforts states that: "Government or agency-led efforts to engineer consultative bodies or migrant platforms do not seem to be the way forward to create alliances between the established development sector and diaspora organisations … [T]op-down-designed, entirely subsidised migrant platforms tend to have limited or nonexistent legitimacy among their supposed constituencies, are not allowed a genuine influence in policy development, and can actually reinforce the separation between the 'two worlds' … [A] more fruitful strategy seems to be to support (through co-funding) and build on existing, spontaneously created diaspora organisations or networks that are based on a true commitment of its members who have already gained legitimacy through their active role in advocacy … or development."[87]

To be sure, there is a genuine need and desire among Canadian diaspora groups for umbrella partnerships to exist. Analysts of Canada's African diaspora groups, for instance, call for the formation of "South-South Diaspora Partnerships" that could

80 Connections for Development (n.d.), "Diaspora Civil Society: the great un-tapped resource," http://www.cfdnetwork.co.uk/sites/cfdnetwork.co.uk/files/Leaflet%20for%20Meetings.pdf

81 Hein de Haas, "Engaging Diasporas: How governments and development agencies can support diaspora involvement in the development of origin countries," Oxford: International Migration Institute (2006), 64, http://www.heindehaas.com/Publications/de%20Haas%202006%20-%20Engaging%20Diasporas.pdf

82 African Foundation for Development (2007a), "About Us," http://www.afford-uk.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=25&Itemid=43

83 African Foundation for Development (2007b), "RemitAid," http://www.afforduk.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=38&Itemid=57

84 Paul Thornton and Shaun Hext, "Review of DFID's Work to Build Support for Development through work with Businesses, Trades Unions, Faith Communities, Black and Minority Ethnic Communities, and Diaspora Groups" (2009), 26, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/consultations/bsdreview/bsd-bus-tu-fth-bmec-dia-rpt-0709.pdf

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid., 34.

87 Hein de Haas, "Engaging Diasporas: How governments and development agencies can support diaspora involvement in the development of origin countries," Oxford: International Migration Institute (2006), 100, http://www.heindehaas.com/Publications/de%20Haas%202006%20-%20Engaging%20Diasporas.pdf

support capacity-building by enabling more successful diaspora groups to share "lessons learned and best practices" for "engaging with public policy issues in Canada and in countries of origin."[88] While diaspora groups themselves might take the lead in establishing such institutional linkages, some forms of government support could help that to happen. And notwithstanding the reservations of European critics about government-established umbrella groups, it is also possible that the Canadian context is significantly different from the European in ways that make a robust government-led effort worth pursuing.

That proviso is worth bearing in mind with respect to all dimensions of the preceding analysis. If there is a single concluding observation to be made about how Canada should approach the challenge of engaging diasporas in foreign policymaking, it is that the experiences of European countries and perspectives of European commentators must be assessed against Canada's very different history of immigration and its distinctive notion of multicultural citizenship.

88 Eunice N. Sahle and Wisdom J. Tettey, "Transnationalism and the African Diaspora in Canada: An Examination of the Diaspora-Development Nexus," (unpublished paper 2009), 47.

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MECHANISMS FOR GOVERNMENTAL CONSULTATION WITH CANADIAN DIASPORA GROUPS IN FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Raphael Girard

I) THE CURRENT CONTEXT OF FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

In analyzing the prospects for Canadian diaspora groups to conduct a foreign policy dialogue with decision makers in the federal government, it is necessary first to understand the context in which foreign policy is currently being developed. Three major developments are relevant: the Transformation Agenda being undertaken by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT); the evolution of the division of power and influence on policy development within the federal government; and the ongoing negative investment that the government has been making in diplomacy since 2004. These factors have a direct impact on current mechanisms for Canada's foreign policy development—and by extension, they affect opportunities for groups external to government to participate. While such developments can present obstacles to diaspora groups seeking access to policy makers, they might also provide new opportunities to be pursued by diaspora groups that are willing to play a constructive role in the development of policies reflecting Canadian values.

In terms of changes to governmental structures, DFAIT's Transformation Agenda (which dates from 2007) is the most important factor. The Agenda consists of six elements: aligning with government priorities; strengthening the international platform; improving services to Canadians; focusing on core business; strengthening accountability; and renewing human resources. It represents more than just a reorganization of DFAIT to realign functions and adjust management structures to meet imposed cuts in the resource base or the changing needs of the government. In fact, the Transformation Agenda reflects a progressive alteration of the role that DFAIT sees itself playing in the formulation of policy and the delivery of programs.

In endorsing the Agenda's principle of focusing on core business, DFAIT reaffirms that its primary interests are peace and security, trade and investment, and international law and human rights. Implicit in this iteration of purpose is an acceptance of the premise that other government departments having programs that incorporate an international dimension are competent to develop those policies governing the international interface. Accordingly, DFAIT is left at most with a coordinating role and the responsibility to provide a platform for the delivery of other government departments' programs abroad. This position represents a significant departure from DFAIT's traditional role. From the height of Canadian diplomacy during the Pearson years until the early years of this millennium, DFAIT provided leadership for the government's entire foreign policy agenda. It was the custodian of a core of foreign policy issues; and, importantly, DFAIT often took the lead on non-core issues housed in other departments.

In researching and writing this chapter, the author consulted a wide range of active and retired experts in the foreign policy area, but avoided putting active members of government departments on record where the individuals were not comfortable. Those with whom discussions were held included the following: Director General Policy and Planning Bureau, DFAIT; Director, Human Rights Policy Division, DFAIT; Director, Program Policy, CIC; Director, Public Security Canada; Retired Senior Executive from the Corporate planning area, CIDA; Michael J Molloy, Senior Fellow, University of Ottawa Graduate School for Public Policy and former Canadian Ambassador to Jordan; A serving senior executive member of DFAIT currently on posting; Joseph Stern, former Special Assistant to the Hon. Lloyd Axworthy; the Hon. Sergio Marchi, Senior Fellow International Centre for Trade and Development and former Permanent Representative to the UN, Geneva and former Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. I used the DFAIT departmental website and Intranet posted material, that of Public Safety Canada and that of CIDA. I also drew organization material from Our World, the DFAIT employee magazine.

While this aspect of the Transformation Agenda will continue to multiply the number of loci of foreign policy development in government, concurrent changes in the way government conducts foreign policy have caused DFAIT to face erosion of its primacy in areas formerly regarded as its own. In an op-ed piece in the *Globe and Mail* following Canada's failure to win a seat on the UN Security Council in October 2010, former DFAIT Deputy Minister Allan Gotlieb and former diplomat Colin Robertson noted that the lead in foreign policy development in Ottawa has been shifting to the government's central agencies and the Prime Minister's Office, as well as to some of the line departments (particularly those dealing with defence and security).[1] They illustrated their concerns by noting that Afghanistan, climate change and anti-terrorism—three

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1   Allan Gotlieb and Colin Robertson, "Canada Must Rebuild Its Diplomatic Resources," The Globe and Mail, October 13, 2010.

important files that traditionally would have been managed by DFAIT—were then managed elsewhere. This leads to the conclusion that in today's Ottawa, DFAIT's control of core foreign policy issues has been weakened and its *de facto* lead on many non-core issues has gone elsewhere.

A third major influence on DFAIT's ongoing capacity for policy leadership is budgetary. In his book *Getting Back in the Game*, former Canadian diplomat Paul Heinbecker catalogues almost $200 million in cuts that DFAIT has sustained to its operating budget since 2004.[2] While the Transformation Agenda calls for the deployment of a larger proportion of the Department's resources abroad, cuts in operating budgets of this magnitude cannot but reduce Canada's on-the-ground representation abroad. This could leave notable gaps in coverage in areas such as Africa, where the current modest number of twenty-one missions is under threat due to the latest round of budgetary reductions. Without more investment in diplomacy by the government, it is unlikely that DFAIT will be able to draw on the same level of expertise that it previously cultivated in-house. It may have to develop alternative sources (perhaps some external to the Department) in order to carry out its mandate effectively.

II) IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT TRENDS FOR DIASPORA INPUT INTO POLICY DEVELOPMENT

While it has never been easy for any group (including those from the diaspora) to communicate their views to decision-makers, these developments at the federal level have made and will continue to make the initiation of a dialogue more difficult. With the proliferation of players and the shift in primacy for policy leadership away from DFAIT, there is no longer a central contact point; and in some cases, there may be few clues as to which policy issues are in play. In strengthening DFAIT's platform abroad, the Transformation Agenda calls for significant reductions in the size of headquarters. The geographic divisions of DFAIT, which were formerly the primary focus for the management of the bilateral relationship with some 170 countries abroad, have become less of a focus and more of a component in a web of operational and headquarters units that together make up a virtual team addressing priority issues.

While this may be a rational way to deploy scarce resources, it does make it more difficult for organizations external to government to find out where to plug in or whom to approach. The concept of desk officer and functional specialist for a country or group of countries appears to have been supplanted by the approach of task groups forming in response to specific challenges. The resulting patchwork at DFAIT—and the fact that some foreign policy issues may be managed either by one or other of the central agencies or by program departments that may have less visible structures—will require diaspora groups to work harder to develop a network of effective contacts and a dialogue with policy makers.

On the opportunity side, however, there would appear to be an opening for diaspora groups to help fill the gap that the Transformation Agenda and budget cuts risk creating in the gathering of information and the development of expertise on foreign policy issues. In the past, DFAIT could field specialists both in Ottawa and abroad with expertise on each country and region, who could supply up-to-date assessments on the implications of trends and events for Canada. Although senior management at DFAIT believes that modern media and communications will deliver enough information about the facts on the ground, it is counterintuitive to think that a smaller headquarters and fewer specialists will do anything but lead to a diminution of knowledge about the latest developments in countries of interest to Canada. If one accepts that the role of a foreign ministry is to advocate for Canadian interests abroad, and to interpret international events to government, it would follow that there could be a role for the diaspora in helping DFAIT to keep track of what is going on in various locations— thereby making up, to some extent, the capacity that the department no longer has in-house.

The Global Citizens Initiative is a research project involving policy staff of DFAIT who are trying to identify appropriate ways to use diaspora groups in Canada and Canadians resident abroad to advocate for Canadian interests in foreign countries and to supplement information-gathering relevant to the policy development process. Many of the ethnic and ethno-religious groups that trace their origins to countries having foreign policy interest for Canada maintain active links with these countries, facilitated by the Internet and social media. This advance in communications can enable them to offer timely comment and analysis that might not otherwise be available to policy makers. Exactly how the Global Citizens Initiative will develop and channel this potential toward constructive use is not entirely clear at present. However, the fact that the initiative is underway bodes very well for a more vigorous dialogue between officials and various communities both in Canada and abroad.

This is not to say that such inputs would be equally relevant across the entire foreign policy spectrum. The process of foreign policy development in Canada embodies a complex amalgam of interests both domestic and international. Our diverse population, regional interests and federated political structures provide the basis for policy formulation. For example, our reliance on foreign trade for 45% of our GDP requires the maintenance of effective relations with a diverse list of countries that would probably be more restricted were we not so dependent on a global trading system. Our reliance on international trade also dictates an active presence in multilateral forums that promote trade and a stable financial system.

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2   Paul Heinbecker, Getting Back in the Game (Bolton, ON: Key Porter Books, 2010).

While trade has a strong influence, Canada's foreign relations are not predominantly mercantile. Canada has a record of promoting peace, democratic development, respect for human rights and the rule of law. These goals have long been the cornerstone of our foreign policy, even when pursuing them restricts opportunities for the development of advantageous commercial relationships. We helped to construct the UN system and continue to pursue an active role in it. Our support for most UN agencies is prompted less for what it can return to Canada than for what multilateralism can do to improve peace and stability throughout the world. While trade will always command a priority in the conduct of Canada's foreign relations, it will not do so to the exclusion of a determination to make the world a better place not only for Canadians but for all peoples.

That fact is reflected in the latest organizational change flowing from the Transformation Agenda. The new Canada Bureau that has emerged in the reorganization of Headquarters and the Canadian field offices will take these field offices beyond their formerly exclusive focus on trade into involvement with political matters, including the development of closer links with ethnic and diaspora communities. As this evolves, non-governmental organizations in major Canadian centres where regional offices are located will be able to develop new local opportunities for dialogue.

III) EXISTING DIASPORA CONSULTATION ACROSS VARIOUS GOVERNMENTAL DEPARTMENTS

Although it might be assumed that aspects of foreign policy such as defence and security do not lend themselves to widespread consultation because of their need for secrecy, in fact these are areas in which interesting advances have been made. One of the most structured interactions with diaspora groups in Canada is found in the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security, managed by the Department of Public Safety. The operation of the Cross-Cultural Roundtable may be less designed to invite comment on security matters than to reassure moderates among Canadian ethnic and ethno-religious groups that the anti-terrorism agenda is aimed at combating extremism and does not constitute an attack on any religious or ethnic group. However, the Roundtable membership is composed of 13 distinguished professionals from the Jewish, Islamic, Sikh and other minorities (as well as Canadian Aboriginals), all of whom have credibility in their respective communities. They may have been selected more for their personal achievements than for their ability to represent communities; but their presence creates a two-way channel that provides community feedback on security initiatives. Future evaluations of the consultative mechanism will give more clarity about its usefulness as a vehicle for policy dialogue. Nonetheless, its very existence is unquestionably positive.

If such channels can be opened on these most security-sensitive foreign policy issues, there must be many other areas related to Canada's role in the world that can and should involve consultation more openly and at an early stage in development. Foreign policy choices should reflect relevant interests and shared values of Canadians; policy formulation should take into consideration a wide range of views and interests in order to ensure as much as possible that such policies are broadly supported by Canadians. Intuitively, if trade, aid, political policy and immigration issues bearing on a certain country or region are being examined, the shaping of the policy would surely benefit if residents of Canada from that country or region were able to provide considered inputs.

Nevertheless, if the ease and frequency of a real policy dialogue with the diaspora is the barometer of how such a dialogue is valued by government, one would be hard-pressed to conclude that there is unanimous support among policymakers for it. Policy analysts across government may accept that diaspora groups are significant stakeholders in foreign policy development. However, the paucity of effective mechanisms that could ensure relevant input in a timely manner indicates a disconnect between those who might offer valuable input and those who could use such input for the development of policy options.

At DFAIT, the late 1990s saw a more active dialogue with academia and the diaspora on policy issues than has existed in the recent past. Currently there is no champion of consultations in the DFAIT Minister's Office, and no central mechanism to elicit the views of ethnic or community groups. That said, however, consultation on specific issues does occur. In the 1990s and early 2000s, for instance, a fixture of the DFAIT calendar was the annual human rights consultation that included NGOs and ethno-religious groups. More recent years have seen that format changed to smaller group meetings concerning human rights and United Nations Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee that take place about thrice yearly.

An example of current issue-oriented consultation with diasporas is a conference organized by the Mosaic Institute in September 2010 at the request of DFAIT's Sudan Task Force, which brought Task Force officials together with academics and leaders of Sudanese-Canadian groups. The conference identified pressing humanitarian issues facing Sudan as well as challenges and opportunities facing Canada as a major donor of aid and other forms of assistance to the people of that country. Its success highlights the considerable value that input from informed members of the diaspora can produce for

the evaluation and fine-tuning of Canadian policy. In another example, following the devastating earthquake in Haiti in March 2010, DFAIT reached out to the Haitian-Canadian diaspora to seek their help in developing long-term objectives beyond immediate humanitarian relief.

The emerging pattern, then, is that DFAIT initiates contact with diaspora groups as issues develop. Perhaps the evolution of the Global Citizens Initiative and the promised outreach from the Canada Bureau will eventually produce a more systematic methodology and create a channel for ongoing dialogue that is not dependent on an immediate problem to be addressed.

Experiences have been varied in other departments that have a foreign policy interface. The Department of Citizenship and Immigration created advisory panels for policy input that included community leaders who were members of the diaspora groups. However, these mechanisms have fallen into disuse with successive reorganizations and changes in the machinery of government.

Although currently no standing committee or other consultative mechanism provides for such consultations, considerable dialogue is occurring. The stakeholder list maintained by the policy branch at CIC alone contains more than fifty organizations deemed to have a primary stake in immigration, refugee and citizenship policy. The program branches are in frequent contact with stakeholder groups that are partners in delivery; and CIC Ministers and senior officials regularly appear at conferences convened by ethnic and other groups to discuss policy and programming. While the vast majority of inputs to government are program- or issue-related, this process creates links enabling a policy dialogue that is more accessible and transparent than those in many other government departments.

CIDA has committed in principle to a consultative mechanism that includes not only partner country governments and stakeholders but also Canadian groups from countries that are recipients of Official Development Assistance (ODA) under bilateral programs. The principle that the Agency should seriously consider Canadian stakeholders' interests in the development of Country Development Program Frameworks (CDPFs) was accepted decades ago. As early as the late 1990s, steps were taken to provide a consultative process to enable Canadian stakeholders to comment upon draft CDPFs. In 2003, CIDA's Policy Branch issued guidelines for CDPFs that provide for intra- and extra-Agency consultations with a wide variety of interlocutors, including a call for a stronger all-of-government focus. Consultations with development partners and stakeholders (implicitly including diaspora groups) were recommended to take place after a concept paper was produced and approved by senior management, so that their input could be taken into consideration in the drafting of a final framework that would be approved by the CIDA President.

In practice, there were attempts to implement these guidelines in the spirit in which they were intended, but coverage was sporadic at best. By 2008, most CDPFs were outdated—some by four years or more. That same year, cabinet approved the CIDA "countries of focus" concept, which narrowed the recipient list to 20 countries. The profiles and strategy for each was renewed, but neither of these documents required any consultations except those with other donor agencies and the recipient countries themselves. Outdated CDPFs for countries not on the list of 20 did not have to be reviewed.

An Official Development Assistance Accountability Act (passed in 2008) identifies three groups—governments, international agencies and Canadian civil society organizations—that must be consulted at least every two years as a part of the decision making process relating to official development assistance as defined in the Act. In October 2009, CIDA approved updated CDPF guidelines and set up a new division of the Strategic Policy and Performance Branch, named the Consultations and Outreach Directorate. As of today, CIDA has a mandate to consult and the machinery to achieve it. The essentials for an active dialogue are in place.

IV) ASSESSMENT OF PRESENT REALITIES AND FUTURE POTENTIALS

In concluding this analysis of diaspora inputs into foreign policy, it is useful to consider whether it is at all practical to create and maintain a system for government-diaspora dialogue that can be relevant and timely. There would appear to be a growing need; and undoubtedly there is some capacity in the diaspora. However, for such dialogue to take place there must be accommodation on both sides.

A marked difference exists in the capacity of various diaspora groups in Canada to engage in dialogue on political issues, and it could be argued that such capacity is directly tied to the degree of the successful establishment of the community in Canada. Some communities, such as Afghans, Horn of Africa groups and Burmese, are relatively new and preoccupied with issues of settlement. Mature communities of Greek, Italian, Ismaili, Sikh and Jewish Canadians, on the other hand, have achieved a high level of political sophistication and have been successful in sending members to provincial and federal parliaments, where community inputs can be delivered without being filtered through consultation structures. Recent changes in Canada's Middle East policy toward stronger support of Israel, and the establishment of a consulate

in Chandigarh, India, constitute two examples of initiatives that the Jewish and Sikh communities did not advance through conventional consultation mechanisms. They are a function of the ability these communities possess not only to communicate to, but actually to form part of the highest levels of government and to influence Canada's political life.

As for those less well-connected communities that deal with government in a more circumscribed way, a number of highly-placed interlocutors perceive there to be an unfortunate amount of wasted effort. When groups do decide to make their views known to government, too often they do so on issues they oppose. A recurrent theme arising in discussions with former ministers and officials currently involved in policy development is that diaspora groups must convince interlocutors in the policy realm that they are interested in promoting a Canadian agenda in the countries of their origins, as opposed to the interests of those countries in Canada.

Realistically, if there is to be growth in contacts and opportunities for dialogue between government and the diaspora, there must be more leadership from the political level and more creativity in how to tap the resources that are there. Two effective models currently exist in Canada: one at CIC and the other at Public Safety. The former works because of an active programming interface that creates a channel for policy dialogue; the CIC Minister is accessible because the interlocutors are partners in delivery of service. The Public Safety model works because ministers recognize that social peace and harmony can be protected only by an open dialogue with minority communities most affected by the security and anti-terrorism agenda. The potential for expansion of dialogue at DFAIT and CIDA appears promising, given that legislation in the case of CIDA and organizational change at DFAIT proclaim an openness to consultation.

Recent projects such as those undertaken by the Sudan Task Force should help officials define more concretely what might be achieved with the Global Citizens Initiative. Since the Sudanese community is not well-established economically in Canada, DFAIT funded their participation in a national conference. While cost alone would rule this out as an ongoing model, it should spur the search for less costly options (perhaps drawing on electronic media to bring informed people together for an exchange of views).

Finally, both parties in the dialogue need to work diligently to overcome preconceived ideas. Some recent governmental decisions have led to questions in certain non-governmental quarters as to whether a true dialogue that raises dissenting policy views is viable. On the government side, politicians and officials comment that diaspora groups are too often negative. Although dissent and criticism are valued choices in any real democracy, groups seeking to bring about policy change would be well advised to emphasize the positive aspects of collaboration with government in shaping their input.

At the end of the day, Canada's diversity offers government an opportunity to broaden its horizons with respect to what is going on outside our borders and to target our contributions to peace and stability in the world more productively. What is needed is to find ways of tapping resources that exist within the Canadian community. Properly done, the cost of doing so will be far less than the cost of not doing so.

PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS

The principal purpose of this research paper has been to draw attention to the potential of Canadians from diaspora communities to enrich the content and direction of Canadian foreign policy. It does not pretend to serve as a comprehensive and definitive treatment of the issue, but only—as we have said in our Introduction—to "stimulate a healthy dialogue, essential to a healthy democracy, about how best to tap into the possibilities our increasingly diverse society holds for improving Canada's role in the world." Nonetheless, dialogue and discussion alone will not be sufficient in the long run. Rather, if the content of Canadian foreign policy is to be more inclusive of inputs from transnational Canadians possessing specialized knowledge and expertise about matters of strategic importance to Canada, then steps will have to be taken to alter the status quo. To that end, and to provoke further thinking and engagement with these issues, we offer the following broad recommendations, which are relevant not only to the Government of Canada, but also to civil society institutions, philanthropic organizations and individuals, and diaspora communities in Canada.

In reading these recommendations, it should be noted, as outlined in our Introduction under the sub-heading "What this report is <u>not</u>", that they are based primarily on principle and on other countries' experience in engaging diasporas in foreign policymaking. They do not purport to reflect a careful analysis of current fiscal and organizational realities facing the Government of Canada, nor should they be read as the findings of a comprehensive feasibility study, although we do believe that the topic of this paper is pressing enough to warrant such work being undertaken by public officials and others for whom the ideas presented may have direct implications.

That said, it should also be noted that while some of the recommendations do call for new or increased funding to support the capacity of diaspora-based organizations and/or the gathering and analysis of information received from Canadians from different backgrounds, the focus of other recommendations with obvious potential cost implications is on the advisability of reorganizing or reallocating existing public resources in order to increase government efficiency and effectiveness insofar as the making of foreign policy is concerned.

1. **Think 'outside the box' about potential insights to be gleaned from different kinds of dialogue with diaspora communities, and different ways in which members of diaspora communities in Canada might best become involved in contributing to the generation of Canada's official foreign policy outputs.**

Rationale: It is important for government to be open to the possibility of making substantial changes in the way the Government and its bureaucracy organizes itself to seek out, receive, assess and incorporate policy inputs from Canadians. Similarly, civil society organizations working in the foreign policy sphere must examine their own organizational memberships and practices to specifically consider the ways in which they are—or are not—reflecting the richness of Canada's diversity. Both public sector and private sector organizations working in this field must not limit themselves to the possibility of making changes only at the margins of existing structures and mechanisms; rather, more extensive, systemic changes must also be within their realm of contemplation.

In part, this is because the world in which we all operate is a quickly evolving one. The advent of globalization in its many guises—including ever-faster international telecommunications, the growth and spread of multinational enterprises, and the international mobility of people, among others—suggests that Canada must prepare itself in new ways to understand and respond to ideas and opportunities and challenges that originate outside of Canada.

Similarly, the Canadian population itself is quickly evolving, and demographic patterns are shifting. More and more people are immigrating to Canada from countries that a generation ago barely registered on the Canadian consciousness. They are bringing with them connections to and an understanding of issues and opportunities that were also unfamiliar to Canadians until the recent past. While they, like generations of people from scores of countries before them, will integrate successfully into Canadian life over time, and their children, or their children's children, will almost assuredly be full participants in Canadian civic life, it cannot be assumed that their own understanding of or access to the points of decision-making within Canada's prevailing system of government will enable them to provide strategic influence to the content or direction of Canadian foreign policy.

Given this backdrop, it would be unreasonable for either the Government of Canada or mainstream civil society organizations to presume that citizen experts on such matters as the Southern Sudanese referendum, or the rise of religious extremism in Pakistan, or opportunities for Canada to promote political reconciliation in Sri Lanka will necessarily be able or inclined to seek out and provide foreign policy inputs to the Government or civil society organizations working with government through existing channels and mechanisms. It would be even more unreasonable to declare, *ex ante*, that "foreign policy is best left to the professionals," as one former Canadian diplomat advised the Mosaic Institute prior to the inception of this research project. In today's world—which bears only a passing resemblance to that of yesterday— "business as usual" becomes a risky bromide.

Accordingly, these organizations should review and consider the introduction and use of more effective mechanisms for gathering and collecting information from Canadian diaspora communities with relevance to issues of strategic importance to Canada. Some of the mechanisms previously described in this paper that are already in use, such as the Department of Public Safety's Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security, bear further scrutiny, and their replication across other departments or their horizontal application to other areas of public policy should be considered.

In addition, both government and leading civil society organizations working in the area of Canadian foreign policy should proactively work to diversify their workforces so that they are more representative of Canada's changing demographic face. That way, even if Canadian foreign policy continues to be largely "left to the professionals," such professionals will include a proportionate number of citizen experts from those communities of greatest relevance to Canada's strategic international interests.

2.   **Develop a whole-of-government approach to diaspora engagement, laying out common principles, goals and policies.**

Rationale: One of the ways to enhance the engagement of diaspora Canadians in the formulation and review of public policy decisions is to simplify the government's interface with Canadians. It would not do the people of Canada any favours for a series of individual government departments and agencies to formulate their own elaborate ideas and mechanisms for increasing citizen engagement and involvement in their own policy development and analysis processes. To do so would only add to the challenge of dealing with government for those Canadians already intimidated by its organizational complexity.

Currently, a plethora of government departments and agencies share responsibility for different facets of Canada's relationship with the world. These include the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Department of National Defence, the Canadian International Development Agency, Public Safety and Security, Citizenship and Immigration, and the International Development Research Centre, among others. Already, for certain high-profile foreign policy files—such as those relating to Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan—many of these departments and agencies already collaborate in inter-departmental teams that facilitate the horizontal flow of information and work to offset the natural tendency for "informational silos" to be erected within large, multifaceted organizations (such as the Government of Canada).

The same effort should be made to co-ordinate efforts made by these and other federal departments and agencies to streamline the ways in which transnational Canadians are able to contribute to the foreign policy development and analysis process. They should lay out common principles, goals and policies in order to ensure a consistency both in the way they interact with Canadians who seek to participate in policy discussions and processes, and in their consideration of any inputs they receive.

3.   **Combine the research efforts of Statistics Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and other relevant governmental and non-governmental organizations to study the size, location, demographics, experience and foreign policy-related interests and capacities of Canadian diaspora groups.**

Rationale: At a time when population diversity seems poised to play such a crucial role in helping Canada to position itself and respond to opportunities and challenges in an increasingly globalized world, it is axiomatic that Canadian policymakers must have as much information about that diverse population as possible.

For instance, in 2009 the Sudan Task Force of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade retained the Mosaic Institute to undertake a small ethnographic study of the Sudanese diaspora living in Canada. Special runs of Statistics Canada data cross-tabulated with Citizenship and Immigration data were helpful, but a series of community meetings and the extensive use of "snowball sampling" techniques soon led the researchers to believe that the Sudanese diaspora in Canada was much larger than official numbers suggested. Furthermore, they unearthed some very interesting findings about the political views of community members from different regions of Sudan, and identified a remarkable commonality of opinion regarding Canada's foreign policy interests in that country.

More of this kind of research needs to be done and it should not be seen as the responsibility of only one department or agency of government to do it. Discussions about "diasporas" raise innumerable inter-related questions about migration, multiculturalism, Canada's role in the world and so forth, and given that expertise in these often-overlapping substantive areas is spread across several different departments and agencies of government, it is only sensible that an "all of government" approach be adopted in pursuing essential research questions related to these matters. Moreover, governmental and non-governmental organizations should also pool resources whenever possible to ensure that their data-gathering and analysis is as comprehensive and strategic as possible.

4. **Fund capacity-building for diaspora communities or groups to develop the organizational skills necessary for effective participation in policymaking.**

Rationale: Not all diaspora communities in Canada are created equal, as even a cursory review of the case studies that are appended to this report will confirm. Depending on a number of different factors—possibly including sheer numbers, longevity in Canada, degree of economic success and recognized strategic importance of their regions of origin among them—some communities and community-based organizations are better organized than others, and some are far more effective at interfacing with the Government of Canada on foreign policy issues.

Rather than running the risk that more poorly-resourced ethnocultural communities or community organizations will never be as effective in reaching the ear of Government as those that are more-established or better-resourced, the Government of Canada, perhaps in partnership with philanthropic organizations, should provide program-based funding to help those diaspora communities or groups who do lack resources and sophistication about public policy decision-making in Canada to close the capacity gap.

Moreover, given the myriad different communities and issues of strategic importance to Canada at present, helping to strengthen the capacity of individual communities or groups within those communities to interface with the rest of the foreign policy community would help to ensure that the overall content of Canadian foreign policy remains high and representative of a full panorama of views from directly-affected communities.

5. **Fund, in partnership with the not-for-profit and philanthropic sectors, the establishment of a national umbrella group to promote shared learning and partnerships across different diaspora groups.**

Rationale: There is a genuine need and desire among Canadian diaspora groups with foreign policy-related interests and agendas to increase the flow of information and the sharing of knowledge that exists between and among them. Less well-established and less Ottawa-savvy diaspora groups in Canada are well aware of the successes of larger and more established groups in gaining effective access to policymakers, and they have expressed the desire for a means by which they could learn from the experience of others.

For instance, as noted previously in this paper, analysts of Canada's African diaspora groups have called for the formation of South-South Diaspora Partnerships that could support capacity- building by enabling more established and "successful" diaspora groups to share their wisdom and experience with less-well-established organizations. While diaspora groups themselves might take the lead in establishing such institutional linkages, some forms of government support could help that to happen.

As also mentioned previously, there are several examples from Europe of umbrella diaspora groups—some funded at least in part by government—that have achieved substantive success in ensuring they and their members are included in foreign policy discussions at both the national and EU levels.

There is some criticism of government created or funded organizations, and some sense that they are both less credible and less effective at channelling substantive foreign policy contributions from diaspora communities than are their counterparts who have developed exclusively from the grassroots. Some of these critics urge that governments not attempt to found new umbrella organizations but to support existing grassroots ones. However, in the Canadian context—which, it bears mentioning, has a very different history of immigration than Europe and a distinctive notion of multicultural citizenship not known to that continent—a robust government led effort to support the capacity of diaspora organizations with foreign policy concerns to participate in Canadian foreign policy discussions across a number of different files is worthy of consideration.

An umbrella organization to encourage Canada's better-established diaspora organizations to share their wisdom and experience with smaller or newer ones could not only raise the overall quality of interactions between government actors and diaspora Canadians: it could also, if structured properly, serve as a central point where diaspora communities, other civil society actors and government officials could meet and exchange ideas.

CASE STUDIES: AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The following five case studies are appended to this paper in order to provide a comparative overview of how selected diaspora communities in Canada are faring *vis à vis* their engagement with the federal government's foreign policymakers.

As explained in the Introduction, these five diaspora groups (all from Asia or Africa) were chosen on the basis of diverse criteria, with the prominence of their country of origin for Canada's current foreign policy being a main (though not an exclusive) consideration. The authors of these case studies were asked to address the following issues: the demographic profile of the diaspora community in Canada; the organizational structure and capacity of community groups; the key foreign policy issues of concern to each community; Canada's current involvement with the country of origin; the interface between the community and governmental policymakers; and any barriers or capacity gaps preventing the community from engaging more effectively with policymakers.

What comes out of these case studies are findings that corroborate much of what is already known about the circumstances of recently-arrived diaspora groups in Canada (and in other Western countries as well). For example, many community groups are divided along ethnic lines reflecting ethnic and political divisions in their countries of origin. Where there are organizations whose mission and membership cross those divides (as in the Sudanese-Canadian community), they generally have explicitly non-political mandates. And where different ethnic organizations do advocate foreign policy positions (as in the Chinese-Canadian community), very different foreign policy priorities are expressed.

On the whole, there are very few diaspora organizations whose main focus is on Canada's relations with their country of origin. To the extent that community organizations do interact with those who make foreign policy, these interactions are mainly focused on immigration concerns, with political and development issues having a much lower profile. The vast majority of the diaspora organizations that do have some foreign policy focus have very limited financial resources to dedicate to policy advocacy, and are volunteer-run. Accordingly, they report capacity limitations including frequent personnel turnover, lack of sufficient English, and inadequate knowledge of the political system.

As to the central issue of how diaspora groups have engaged the government on foreign policy issues and what reception their efforts have met with, the findings among the five communities are quite diverse. While the government has conducted outreach activities to communicate with some communities, others report few if any government efforts to engage them substantively in foreign policy formulation. A number of human rights-focused groups express frustration that their advocacy efforts are met only with minimal *pro forma* responses, and express puzzlement that the government's commitment to human rights abroad is not acted upon more robustly. Several groups note that barriers to engagement are created by the government's perception of their communities as too politicized (in the case of Eritrean-Canadians) or potentially sympathetic to a terrorist cause (in the case of Tamil Canadians). And both the Eritrean and Sudanese-Canadian respondents noted that fears among their own community members about engagement with government officials pose a substantial barrier to effective interactions. Several communities explicitly call for government support or mechanisms that would better enable low-capacity and grassroots community groups to interact with the government on foreign policy issues.

IMPORTANT NOTE: As addressed in the Introduction to this paper, one key point to bear in mind is that these case studies were largely completed in the last quarter of 2010. Consequently, certain significant political events or geopolitical changes that one might otherwise expect to be included in a report released late in 2011—such as the election of a majority federal government in Canada in May 2011, or the referendum in Southern Sudan in January 2011 that saw overwhelming support for the creation of the separate state of South Sudan, or the winding-up of Canada's combat mission in Afghanistan in mid-2011—are absent. Nevertheless, these case studies do contain essential background information on the size, organization, leadership and long-term priorities of key diaspora communities in Canada.

CASE STUDY #1
THE AFGHANI DIASPORA IN CANADA

Ajmal Pashtoonyar

I) INTRODUCTION

Compared to other migrant communities, the Afghan diaspora in Canada is a relatively new group, bonded by more recent shared experiences. The first official record of Afghans in Canada was in 1973. That year, 18 Afghans immigrated to Canada.[1] Since then, Afghani migration to Canada has gradually increased due to conflicts and refugee movement from Afghanistan. While it is difficult to ascertain the exact figure, according to Statistics Canada over 36,000 Canadians identified Afghanistan as their country of birth in the 2006 Census.[2] Unofficial estimates of Afghan-Canadians, including those born in Canada, currently range from 80,000 to 120,000.[3]

In the Canadian labour market, Afghan-Canadians primarily engage in the retail, manufacturing, health care and food services industries; fewer work in professional, scientific and technical services.[4] Moreover, the 2006 Census data shows that relative to other diaspora groups, the education level among Afghans is low, with many falling in the lower income levels.[5]

Afghan-Canadians are a diverse community representing Afghanistan's various ethnic backgrounds. The majority of the Afghan diaspora is settled in Toronto, Vancouver and Calgary, while other sizeable communities are found in Edmonton, Montreal and Ottawa. Prominent diaspora groups in Canada are the Ontario-based Afghan Association of Ontario (AAO) and the Afghan Women's Organization (AWO).

Established in 1982, the AAO is the oldest Afghan diaspora organization, providing resettlement services to Afghan immigrants and community social programs. Likewise, the AWO also provides resettlement, skills training and education programs for Afghan women and youth.[6] Through private donations, primarily from Afghan-Canadians, the AWO also manages an orphanage for girls in Kabul and has previously undertaken education and skills training projects for Afghan refugee women and children in Pakistan.[7] However, in light of drastic funding cuts by the federal government to Ontario-based resettlement agencies, both AAO and AWO programs and services to Afghan immigrants will be impacted.[8]

There are also smaller Afghan community groups based in Vancouver, Edmonton and Calgary. The majority of these primarily focus on community issues and organizing cultural and religious events. Many rely on community volunteers and have limited expertise, mandate and resources to formally engage in foreign policy issues. A number of Afghan-Canadian students are active in college and university campuses through Afghan student groups.

In comparison to other Afghan diaspora groups, the AWO has emerged as the leading diaspora organization that has actively sought engagement with the government on Canada's role in Afghanistan, in particular on Afghan women's issues. In large part, this is due to the leadership provided by the AWO Executives, and the network that the organization has been able to build with decision-makers in the government and community.[9] Its governance, institutional capacity and resources have also benefitted AWO in its proactive advocacy on Canada's role in Afghanistan. Other smaller organizations would welcome engagement with the government if such opportunity were available.

Diverse opinions exist among the Afghan-Canadian community concerning Canada's role in Afghanistan; for instance, opinions may differ among Afghans who have settled in Canada in the 1980s and 1990s as opposed to recent émigrés. Each group has a different history and experience of Afghan realities. For some, there is confusion about Canada's military engagement in combat as opposed to a non-combatant role in the Afghan conflict. Many are victims of the conflict, having lost families and property, and may not welcome any engagement concerning Afghanistan as they build a new life and

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1   Information Canada (1975), Man Power and Immigration, Immigration Statistics 1973, (Ottawa), 6.
2   Statistics Canada (2006), 2006 Census Report, Immigrant population by place of birth and period of Immigration, http://www40.statcan.gc.ca/l01/cst01/demo24a-eng.htm
3   Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, "Canada's Mission in Afghanistan" in Evidence, no. 006 (December 4 , 2007).
4   For detailed overview of labour and education demographic, see 2006 Census Report, Ethnic origin and visible minorities, Statistics Canada http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/rt-td/eth-eng.cfm.
5   Ibid.
6   See Afghan Association of Ontario, http://www.aaocanada.ca/aao/; also see the Afghan Women's Organization, http://www.afghanwomen.org/intro.php
7   Ibid.
8   With federal funding cuts, the AAO will lose 85% of its annual budget as of March 2011 (Information provided by AAO).
9   As a tireless campaigner, AWO Executive Director Ms. Adeena Niazi is recognized for her work on Afghan human rights issues. As early as 2002, Ms. Niazi was named as one of the top ten Canadians by Maclean's magazine. In January 2008, Ms. Niazi became the first Afghan-Canadian recipient of the Order of Ontario.

identity in Canada. Others in the community may have no interest at all except to participate in community festivities.[10] However, on an individual level, many Afghan-Canadian professionals and entrepreneurs have returned in recent years to contribute to Afghanistan's reconstruction. Notable among these Afghan-Canadians are the current Government of Afghanistan Finance Minister, the Minister for Agriculture, and the Governor of Kandahar Province. Other Afghan-Canadians are active in the health sector and in the media in Afghanistan.[11]

In terms of diaspora media, a number of Afghan-Canadian media outlets (print, radio and TV) have emerged in recent years. Notable among these are the Afghan *Hindara* (*Mirror*), a weekly Afghan-Canadian cable TV program and the *Afghan Post* monthly paper. Others include the Vancouver-based *Ariana* TV program. While these outlets primarily focus on the Afghan-Canadian community and local businesses, some reporting also covers current affairs in Afghanistan. In recent years, Canadian government officials have engaged with these outlets to communicate Canada's role in Afghanistan. However, limited information is available on how proactively these media outlets inform officials on Canada's policy in Afghanistan.

II) CANADA IN AFGHANISTAN: FORGING AN "ACCIDENTAL RELATIONSHIP"

Just as Afghans are a recent addition to Canada's ethnocultural mosaic, the history of state relations between Canada and Afghanistan is also recent. Formal diplomatic relations between the two countries was established in 1968, lasting for only a decade.[12] Canada severed its ties with the communist regime in power at that time soon after the December 1979 military intervention by the Soviet Union. Relations remained severed following the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and in the ensuing civil conflicts of the 1990s. On the international stage, Canada supported the United Nations in seeking the secession of hostilities and condemned the harsh treatment of Afghan women under the Taliban regime. In addition to its diplomatic stance, between 1980 and 2001 Canada provided $150 million in humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan and Afghan refugees in the region.[13]

Relations between Canada and Afghanistan increased considerably following the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. In November 2001, Canada deployed its military forces to Afghanistan, and allocated $100 million in bilateral aid in December 2001 to help the Afghan people with "aid and comfort, food and clothing."[14] Moreover, after twenty-two years of hiatus, in January 2002 Canada re-established formal diplomatic relations with Afghanistan to further humanitarian and development cooperation.[15]

Over the following years, a growing debate emerged in Canada over the direction and duration of Canada's military engagement in Afghanistan. In response to increasing political and public attention, in October 2007 Prime Minister Stephen Harper established a five-member Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, called the Manley Panel.[16] The recommendations of the Manley Panel resulted in new priorities for Canada's engagement in Afghanistan for 2008 to 2011, with a whole-of-government approach to diplomatic, development and security efforts that are primarily concentrated in Kandahar province of Afghanistan.[17] A parliamentary motion in March 2008, extended Canada's military mission in Afghanistan to July 2011.

Under the United Nations-mandated and NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, over 2500 Canadian soldiers currently serve in Afghanistan. To date, Canada has lost over 154 soldiers, a diplomat, two humanitarian aid workers and a journalist; hundreds of others have been injured in the ongoing Afghan conflict.[18] Overall, Canada's aid commitment is $1.9 billion from 2001-2011, making Afghanistan Canada's largest bilateral aid recipient country.[19] In November 2010, the Harper government announced its post-2011 policy, which will see a reduced contingent of Canadian troops continuing in training rather than combat roles in Afghanistan until 2014. A scaled-down development program for Afghanistan will now focus on four priorities: education, humanitarian assistance, promoting regional diplomacy, and advancing security, rule of law and human rights.[20]

10   This analysis is informed by the author's conversations with members of Afghan-Canadian community.
11   For example, Windsor-based Afghan-Canadian cardiologist, Dr. Asmat Naebkhill, helped establish Afghanistan's first facility for cardiac diagnosis and treatment in Kabul; other notable Afghan-Canadians media personalities are Niloufar Pazira and Mozhdah Jamalzadah.
12   Mr. Charles Eustace McGaughey of North Bay, Ontario, served as Canada's first non-resident Ambassador to Afghanistan, while concurrently serving as Canada's High Commissioner to Pakistan (DFAIT press release on file with the author).
13   Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Review of the Afghanistan Program, http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/acdi-cida.nsf/eng/NIC-65152224-QQK
14   Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Audit of Afghanistan Country Program, online: http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/NAT-914949-HC6.
15   "Ottawa re-establishes diplomatic ties with Kabul," CTV News January, 25, 2002, http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/CTVNewsAt11/20020125/ctvnews840729/;
     For detailed analysis of diplomatic engagement see Library of Parliament, Afghanistan: Canadian Diplomatic Engagement by Karin Phillips in Info Series, PRB 07-38E (2008).
16   Canada, "Prime Minister Harper announces Independent Advisory Panel on Afghan Mission" (News Release, October 12, 2007).
17   Canada, Report of the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, 2008).
18   "In the line of duty: Canada's casualties" CBC News, December 20, 2010, http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/afghanistan/casualties/list.html
19   For an overview of Canada's bilateral aid programs to Afghanistan: http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca.
20   Canada, "[Federal] Ministers Announce Canada's New Role in Afghanistan" (News Release, November 16, 2010).

For many Afghan-Canadians, the post-9/11 international intervention in Afghanistan was long overdue. The majority came to Canada as refugees from ensuing conflicts, and support Canada's contribution to bringing peace and stability in Afghanistan. For many, the security and basic needs of families and fellow Afghans remain a primary concern. For others, a peaceful Afghanistan represents opportunities for business and entrepreneurship—particularly given the recent announcement of an estimated $1 trillion in untapped mineral resources across the country.[21]

III) FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND AFGHAN-CANADIANS

The record of successive Canadian governments engaging Afghan-Canadians as key stakeholders and potential contributors to its foreign policy is rather sparse. Prior to September 2001, the government had limited, if any, engagement with the Afghan-Canadian diaspora community in the context of foreign policy. For the majority of Canadians, Afghanistan was a distant conflict with limited historic, cultural or economic ties. While interaction has increased in the past ten years, this accidental engagement at varying levels remains inadequate for a country that the government sees as a foreign policy priority for Canada.

As early as November 2001, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) hosted a conference entitled "Afghanistan of Tomorrow: Realistic Prospects for a Lasting Peace." This conference was the first and, to date, the only high-level gathering where Afghan-Canadian community leaders engaged with representatives of the Canadian government; participants affirmed the important role of consulting the Afghan diaspora and tapping into their expertise to rebuild Afghanistan.[22] In 2002, DFAIT supported a series of roundtable consultations with over 150 Afghan-Canadian women across Canada, including representatives of the Afghan Women's Organization.[23] Organized by the Senate Committee on Women, Peace and Security, the final report of these consultations, with specific recommendations for the Canadian government, was hand-delivered by the Afghan-Canadian women to the (then) Foreign Minister, Bill Graham.[24] In his statement on this report, Minister Graham noted that "[t]hese consultations with Afghan-Canadian women will help to ensure that government initiatives are both well-informed and properly targeted."[25]

On the other hand, the government has actively engaged the Afghan-Canadian community in its outreach initiatives on Canada's role in Afghanistan. Many government officials (including military personnel) have participated in outreach events with the diaspora groups to share their field experiences in Afghanistan. The Prime Minister, cabinet ministers and other federal and provincial elected officials have also participated in such outreach events. Afghan-Canadian community leaders were invited to the Canadian Parliament in Ottawa during the September 2006 official state visit of Afghanistan's President. In February 2007, Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced additional aid for Afghanistan in a speech to the Afghan-Canadian community in Ottawa.[26] In 2007 and 2008, Federal Minister Bev Oda was a keynote speaker at the Annual Afghanistan Independence Day celebrations in Toronto, which was organized by the Afghan Association of Ontario. Federal Ministers also consulted with Afghan-Canadian business leaders and Afghan government officials on "how to facilitate stronger economic linkages between Afghanistan and Canada."[27]

In terms of tapping into diaspora community expertise, the federal government increasingly relies on Afghan-Canadians as cultural advisors, language interpreters, translators and trainers. Through CANADEM, a civilian roster for humanitarian and development experts, hundreds of Afghan-Canadian cultural interpreters have been recruited for the Department of National Defence and deployed alongside Canadian Forces as key field force magnifiers in Afghanistan.[28] Here at home, many Afghan-Canadians also provide critical pre-deployment training to the military by familiarizing them with the theatre operating environment, particularly the socio-cultural context, and on interactions with local Afghans in the field.[29]

In contrast to the Canadian military's recognition of the contributions that Afghan-Canadians have to make, the government has a poor record in attracting qualified Afghan-Canadian professionals for its Afghan foreign policy and development programs. For instance, in November 2009, it was reported that of the 252 total staff dedicated to the Afghanistan file at the three federal departments (DFAIT, CIDA and Privy Council Office) in Ottawa, only six were fluent in local Afghan languages of Dari and Pashtu.[30] In the past nine years, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAIT) has

21   James Risen, "U.S. Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan," The New York Times, June 14, 2010.

22   South Asia Partnership, Afghanistan of Tomorrow Conference Report, http://action.web.ca/home/sap/issues.shtml?sh_itm = e02dbf63c74139e65049b968b43cb9ef.

23   Canadian Committee on Women, Peace and Security, A Stone in the Water: Report of the Roundtables with Afghan-Canadian Women (July 2002), http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord. php?RecordId = 10153.

24   DFAIT, "Minister Graham to Receive Report from Afghan-Canadian Women" (News Release, October 2002).

25   Ibid.

26   See speech of the Prime Minister Stephen Harper to the Afghan-Canadian Community in Ottawa (February 26, 2007), http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category = 2&featureId = 6&pageId = 46& id = 1555 .

27   This consultation was held in February 2009 and attended by Federal Minister Beverly Oda and Minister Stockwell Day, http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/news-nouvelles/2009/2009_02_11b.aspx

28   See for example testimony of Paul LaRose-Edwards, Executive Director, CANADEM before the House of Commons Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (October 2006).

29   Afghan-Canadians also provide linguistic and cultural training to civilian personnel. See testimony of Lt. Gen. Andrew Leslie to the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence (March 2009); also see testimony of Col. Bernd Horn, Chief of Staff, Land Force Doctrine and Training System, at the Senate Standing Committee on Human Rights, (October 2009).

30   Jeff Davis, "Canadian diplomats largely speechless in Afghanistan," Embassy Magazine, November 11, 2009, http://embassymag.ca/page/view/diplomats_afghanistan-11-11-2009

employed only one Afghan-Canadian public servant on its Afghanistan file.

Another missed opportunity was the Manley Panel. Not one of the appointed five-member-panel was an Afghan-Canadian (or for that matter, an eminent Aboriginal or other diaspora community leader). Moreover, between November and December 2007, the Manley Panel met with representatives of only two Afghan-Canadian groups, the Canada-Afghanistan Business Council and the Afghanistan Canada Council.[31] Including a prominent Afghan-Canadian on the Manley Panel would have permitted active diaspora engagement at the highest level of policy development.

With respect to elected officials, Afghan-Canadians also have had limited engagement with Canadian Parliamentarians. For instance, in undertaking its 2007 study of Canada's role in Afghanistan, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development invited only two Afghan-Canadian witnesses. In its report, the Parliamentary Standing Committee specifically states:

> In noting that the talent and knowledge of the Afghan diaspora in Canada have not been as systematically and effectively accessed to the benefit of Canada's reconstruction and development activities in Afghanistan, the Government of Canada should actively pursue mechanisms by which the Afghan community in Canada could be consulted and engaged in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan.[32]

At a January 2007 national conference organized by the Afghan Women's Organization in Toronto, more than 300 Afghan-Canadian women signed a resolution calling on Canadian troops to stay in Afghanistan, with a "hope to see a change in their mission—from combat to development."[33] This resolution was sent to each member of the House of Commons and the Senate. The organization was invited to appear at the Standing Committee on National Defence in its review of Canada's military mission in 2007.[34]

More recently, in a June 2010 report, the Parliament's Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan stressed the need to use the skills of the Afghan-Canadian diaspora in building capacity for Afghan state institutions "to plan and deliver development programs for Afghans."[35] In the more than two years since its formation, however, this Special Committee has yet to invite an Afghan-Canadian organization or community leader as a witness concerning Canada's ongoing engagement in Afghanistan.

In spite of a limited engagement between the government and diaspora organizations, a number of Afghan-Canadians are active on an individual level in advocacy efforts in the media, as well as in joint efforts with other non-diaspora organizations concerning Canada's ongoing engagement in Afghanistan. Such groups include the Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan, the Canada-Afghanistan Solidarity Committee, the Centre for Afghanistan Progress and Future Generations Afghanistan.

IV) CONCLUSION

With the exception of the Afghan Women's Organization, in the past decade the Afghan-Canadian diaspora has had limited engagement with policy makers about Canada's role in Afghanistan. The instances of the federal government, including elected officials, in engaging with the Afghan diaspora have been few, and have failed to establish an active rapport beyond outreach activities. While it remains to be seen if the government will engage Afghan-Canadians in its post-2011 policy *vis-à-vis* Afghanistan, to date no such effort has been made. Today, relations between Canada and Afghanistan are bonded by a shared experience of sacrifice. The Afghan-Canadian diaspora has a role to play in articulating its concerns and in further strengthening bilateral political and economic relations between the two countries beyond the scheduled withdrawal of Canadian troops from Afghanistan in 2014.

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31   See complete list of consultations held by the Manley Panel in Annex 2 of the Manley Report.

32   Canada, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, "Canada in Afghanistan" in Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, (July 2008).

33   Resolution in AWO letter addressed to Canadian Parliamentarians, Afghan Women's Organization, http://www.afghanwomen.org/documents/AWO%20Resolution.doc.

34   Canada, Standing Committee on National Defence, "Canadian Forces in Afghanistan," in Official Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence, (June 2007), 84.

35   Canada, Special Committee on The Canadian Mission in Afghanistan, "Report on a Trip to Afghanistan, 28 May—3 June 2010" in First Report of the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan, (June 2010), 64.

CASE STUDY #2
THE CHINESE DIASPORA IN CANADA

Elena Caprioni

I) PROFILE OF THE CHINESE IN CANADA[1]

In current English literature, the concept of Chinese diaspora has a general sense of dispersion/scattering of people who have left their homeland to live and build communities in their adopted country. Referring to Chinese migrants in general, Ronald Skeldon observed that a Chinese diaspora exists, but it is "made up of many separate and distinct parts," based on the background and place of origin of different migrants.[2] This chapter, rather than analyzing one homogenous Chinese diaspora, provides a clear picture of the many different mini-diasporas included under the big umbrella of what is in geopolitical terms, the People's Republic of China (PRC). It analyzes their divisions along ethnic and religious lines, their different traditions, cultural practices and interactions with other Canadians. These communities also relate differently with other immigrant groups from China by sometimes creating parallel and/or intertwined diasporas. It is through these mini-diasporas that one can discuss the phenomenon of the Chinese diaspora in Canada.

The Chinese have been living in Canada for more than 150 years, divisible into three periods of Canadian immigration policies towards the Chinese people: free entry (1858-1884), restricted entry and exclusion (1885-1947),[3] and selective entry (1948-present).[4]

A) Historical Waves

During the first period, Chinese immigrants had the opportunity to come into Canada without restrictions. They migrated mainly to the two British colonies of Vancouver Island and British Columbia (BC) to capitalize on the Fraser River gold rush. The early migrants (men) came alone without family members and without an intention to remain. They came from the west coast of the United States and from the south of Guangdong and Fujian as labour and chain migrants. Their numbers fluctuated from 2,500 in 1860 to 4,383 in 1881.[5]

The second period of Chinese immigration was associated with the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway in BC.[6] Due to the post-gold rush recession, racism and prejudice against the Chinese community was on the rise. Each man had to pay a head tax to the Canadian government to migrate to the country (the price increased from $50 in 1885 to $100 in 1900 and to $500[7] in 1903). Nonetheless, numerous Chinatowns mushroomed across the country. In 1923, the government enacted the Chinese Immigration Act (the Exclusion Act) to prohibit any Chinese immigrants from entering Canada. As a result, in this period the Chinese population decreased significantly, almost disappearing in some areas of the country. Their percentage in BC shrank from 9% in 1881 to 4% in 1921. In 1947 the Immigration Act was repealed and Chinese Immigrants became eligible for admission to Canada under certain restrictions.

B) Contemporary Waves

The third period began after 1947, when the Chinese finally began to enjoy the civil rights that other Canadians had long since benefited from. Following the changes to immigration policies in 1967 (the introduction of the points system), Chinese were allowed to migrate to Canada under the same conditions as other ethnic groups. Since the end of World War II, most Chinese moving to Canada came from Hong Kong and Taiwan. People from mainland China were obstructed due to the lack of diplomatic relations between China and Canada during the Cold War. However, during the 1970s, when the two countries re-established dialogue (via an agreement signed between China and Canada in October 1970) and the PRC

1   This section refers to all of the ethnic groups from China who have immigrated to Canada.
2   Ronald Skeldon, "The Chinese Diaspora or the Migration of Chinese Peoples?", in The Chinese Diaspora: Space, Place, Mobility, and Identity, eds. Laurence J.C. Ma and Carolyn Cartier (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 63.
3   David Chuenyan Lai, "From Downtown Slums to Suburban Malls: Chinese Migration and Settlement in Canada", in the The Chinese Diaspora: Space, Place, Mobility, and Identity, eds. Laurence J.C. Ma and Carolyn Cartier (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 312-313.
4   Ibid., 320
5   Ibid., 320
6   Ibid., 313
7   Using Nominal GDP per capita calculations (measuring worth conversions), the relative value of $500 in 1903 would have been roughly $72,000 in 2009, http://www.measuringworth.com/index.html

was recognized by the United Nations as the sole legitimate government of China (25 October 1971), migrant flows started again.[8]

However, since the mid-1980s the volume of Hong Kongese immigrants to Canada (in particular the west coast) skyrocketed, reaching 30,000 a year in 1990 and 44,000 a year in 1994.[9] This was due to the agreement (1984) between China and the UK who sanctioned the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty. Moreover, in 1985, Canada expanded the business immigration program by including investors, entrepreneurs and the self-employed, thus attracting many people from Hong Kong and Taiwan as well. After that peak, the population drastically fell in the last two decades as exemplified by the following figures: 50.1% of immigrants came to Canada in the period before 1991, 30.9% in 1991-1995, 15.5% in 1996-2000, and 3.5% in 2001-2006.[10]

Taiwanese immigrants underwent a similar fluctuation. From the late 1980s, an influx of Taiwanese people without families or with relatives in the U.S. immigrated to Canada, in particular to BC: 19.4% of immigrants came before 1991, 26.5% in 1991-1995, 37.7% in 1996-2000 and only 16.4% in 2001-2006.[11] Immigrants from Macau are also on the decline: 52.1% of Macauese immigrants came to Canada before 1991, 27.2% in 1991-1995, 16% in 1996-2000 and only 4.7% in 2001-2006.

In contrast, the volume of PRC immigrants rose after 1989, when Canada endorsed a humanitarian program (OM-IS-339) on compassionate grounds, which permitted thousands of Chinese temporary residents to obtain landed immigrant status. Moreover, the accession of China into the WTO and the opening of economic doors facilitated a further expansion. Permanent residents from China began to rise annually, from 4,415 in 1989 to 29,336 in 2008 (with many fluctuations in between). Between 1995 and 2006, the percentage of immigrants shifted from 8.4% to 13.9%, of which 49.2% ranged in age from 25 to 44 years old. Unlike pre-1961 when just 2% of Canada's immigrants hailed from the PRC, that number had increased to 28.7% by 1991, and wavered to 14.9% between 1991-1995, to 23.2% for 1996-2000 and 33.2% in the period 2001-2006. After the UK, the immigrant population from the PRC is the second highest by place of birth, representing 466,940 people. This number includes all of the ethnic groups in the PRC (Han and non-Han) but excludes people from Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), Macau SAR and Taiwan province.[12]

Until the mid-90s, the Hong Kongese group was dominant in Canada (middle-class professionals or business people) having become the linguistic, political and economic hegemon in the Chinese-Canadian community. The enormous immigration flow in the 1990s has played a vital role in the community by creating a more varied Chinese diaspora. Most Chinese immigrants were admitted as skilled workers or investors. Human capital and post-graduate experience became the most important criterion of selecting skilled workers after the enacting of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of 2001.[13]

Canada is home to numerous Chinese migrants from diverse areas and ethnic origins. Whereas in the late 19th and early 20th century, most came to Canada from the southeast province of Guangdong and Fujian (with Hong Kong as a transit link), currently people migrate to Canada from nearly every corner of the PRC. Today, Toronto and Vancouver in particular, have a diversified Chinese social and cultural scene with separate mini-diasporas along ethnic, religious and sometimes regional lines. A new Chinese-Canadian community has emerged across the country, characterized by different cultures, education levels, heritages, languages, etc.

The subsequent sections provide in-depth examinations of the distinct mini-diasporas. Only those who fall under the umbrella of China and who are significantly involved in international issues and Canadian foreign policy will be analyzed. The relevant communities are: Chinese plus Falun Dafa and people from Hong Kong (Han); Taiwanese; Tibetans; and Uyghurs.

II) CANADA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA

In the 1970s, the establishment of diplomatic relations between Canada and China led to the renewed exchange of official visits between the PRC and Canada. In 1978, the Canadian Department of External Affairs established the Canada-China Trade Council—later renamed the China Canada Business Council (CCBC)—which aimed to further trade relations between

8   For further information on the history/evolution of Chinese immigration, see Peter S. Li, The Chinese in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998);
     Xiao-Feng Liu and Glen Norcliffe, "Closed windows, open doors: geopolitics and post-1994 mainland Chinese immigration to Canada," The Canadian Geographer 4 (1996): 306-319.
9   Statistics Canada (2006). 2006 Census Report. Population Groups (28), Age Groups (8), Sex (3) and Selected Demographic, Cultural, Labour Force, Educational and Income Characteristics (309), for
     the Total Population of Canada, Provinces, Territories, Census Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations, http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2006/dp-pd/tbt/Rp-eng.cfm?LANG
     =E&APATH=3&DETAIL=1&DIM=0&FL=A&FREE=1&GC=0&GID=0&GK=0&GRP=1&PID=97615&PRID=0&PTYPE=88971,97154&S=0&SHOWALL=0&SUB=803&Temporal=2006&THEME=-
     80&VID=0&VNAMEE=&VNAMEF=
10   Ibid.
11   Ibid.
12   Statistics Canada (2006). 2006 Census Report. Population Groups (28), Age Groups (8), Sex (3) and Selected Demographic, Cultural, Labour Force, Educational and Income Characteristics (309), for
     the Total Population of Canada, Provinces, Territories, Census Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations, http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2006/dp-pd/tbt/Rp-eng.cfm?LANG
     =E&APATH=3&DETAIL=1&DIM=0&FL=A&FREE=1&GC=0&GID=0&GK=0&GRP=1&PID=97615&PRID=0&PTYPE=88971,97154&S=0&SHOWALL=0&SUB=803&Temporal=2006&THEME=-
     80&VID=0&VNAMEE=&VNAMEF=
13   An Act Respecting Immigration to Canada and the granting of Refugee Protection to Persons Who are Displaced, Persecuted or in Danger, Statutes of Canada 2001, c. 27.

the two countries. Canada and China signed a Development Cooperation Agreement in 1983. In the first 20 years, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) supplied foreign aid to help build China's "international linkages and learn from foreign expertise by supporting people-to-people contacts and education programs in Canada and China."[14] Today, CIDA supports reform projects in China that promote good governance, human rights, democratic development and environmental sustainability.[15]

Notwithstanding the tension between the two countries following the Tiananmen Square protests, in 1994 Canada established its four-pillar policy towards China: economic partnership; peace and security; sustainable development; human rights; good governance and the rule of law. In the meantime, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien signed a nuclear co-operation agreement and a letter of intent on six development projects with Premier Li Peng. In 2001, Prime Minister Chrétien led one of the largest trade missions ever to Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong. He was accompanied by close to 600 business participants, eight provincial premiers, three territorial leaders, Pierre Pettigrew (Minister for International Trade) and Rey Pagtakhan (Secretary of State, Asia-Pacific). In 2005, President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Paul Martin announced a strategic partnership with the intention to double trade within five years.[16]

Given China's massive size and rapid economic growth, Canada does not provide direct financial assistance or aid to the government. Instead, it provides support to facilitate the undertaking of the above-mentioned reforms. In 2009-2010, CIDA provided $35.86 million in funding to supports Canadian organizations delivering expertise to Chinese agencies that are implementing human rights and environmental reforms.[17]

Under the Conservative government, Canada's relations with China have suffered for a number of reasons. For example, the Dalai Lama was awarded honorary Canadian citizenship, the government has regularly criticized China's human rights record and accused China of commercial espionage, certain ministers have made pointed comments about Taiwan,[18] and Prime Minister Harper did not attend the opening ceremonies of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. At the APEC Summit in November 2006, China appeared to initially back out of bilateral meetings to snub the Harper government, and ministers from both sides threatened to skip out on others on numerous occasions.[19]

However in 2009, both governments agreed to re-establish high-level exchanges. Harper visited China in December 2009 for the first time; bilateral agreements on climate change, mineral resources, culture and agricultural education were signed, pointing to greater cooperation in these areas. Moreover, both countries decided to improve the role of the Strategic Working Group, a bilateral mechanism founded in 2005 aimed to stimulate dialogue between officials. Current China priorities for the Harper government are: trade, governance, human rights, rule of law, climate change, and public health and pandemics.[20] This thorny relationship still needs to be nurtured in the upcoming years if Canada wants to capitalize on China's growing political and economic influence.

III) HAN CHINESE COMMUNITIES

In the 2006 Canadian Census, 1,346,510 persons or 4.3% of the Canadian population claimed "Chinese" as their ethnic origin. Approximately 84% noted a single ethnic origin, while the remaining 16% reported multiple ethnic origins. The gap between men and women of Chinese origin is in favour of the female sex: 52% vs. 48%. It is one of the youngest communities as 83.4% of Chinese-Canadians over 15 years old were born outside Canada in 2006, and only 2.3% are third-generation.[21]

Whereas the population of Canada increased by 7.7% between 1996 and 2006, the number of respondents with Chinese ethnic origins rose by 31.6% in the same time period. It is the largest ethnic group amongst those of East and Southeast Asian origin and the fifth largest ethnic group in Canada excluding Canadian, English and French. Chinese is the third-most-spoken language in Canada, after English and French.[22]

14   Canadian International Development Agency, CIDA's Program in China, (2005), 1, http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/CD4-30-2005E.pdf
15   Ibid.
16   Xuecheng Liu, "China and Canada on the Global Arena", China Institute of International Studies, (2011), http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2011-08/11/content_4400998.htm
17   Canadian International Development Agency, Government of Canada. "China", (2011), http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/china
18   "Milestones in Chinese-Canadian relations," CBCNews, November 16, 2006, http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/china/china-canada-relations.html
19   "Won't 'sell out' on rights despite China snub: PM," CBCNews, November 15, 2006, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2006/11/15/harper-snub.html
20   On Canada-China political relations, see Government of Canada, China-Canada, http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/china-chine/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/china_canada_chine.
      aspx?lang=eng&menu_id=14&menu=Land
21   Statistics Canada (2006). 2006 Census Report. Ethnic Origin, Single and Multiple Ethnic Origin Responses and Sex for the Population of Canada, Provinces, Territories, Census Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations, http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/rt-td/eth-eng.cfm.
22   Statistics Canada (2006). 2006 Census Report. Population Groups (28), Age Groups (8), Sex (3) and Selected Demographic, Cultural, Labour Force, Educational and Income Characteristics (309), for the Total Population of Canada, Provinces, Territories, Census Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations, http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2006/dp-pd/tbt/Rp-eng.cfm?LANG=E&APATH=3&DETAIL=1&DIM=0&FL=A&FREE=1&GC=0&GID=0&GK=0&GRP=1&PID=97615&PRID=0&PTYPE=88971,97154&S=0&SHOWALL=0&SUB=803&Temporal=2006&THEME=80&VID=0&VNAMEE=&VNAMEF=

Almost one third of the people of Chinese origin in Canada live in Toronto (537,060), which represents 10.6% of the city's population. This number increased by 1.6% from 2001 to 2006. The other large slice of Chinese have chosen Vancouver (402,000), representing more than 19% of the population, and rising by 1.5% from 2001. Other sizeable Chinese communities reside in Calgary (7%), Edmonton (5.2%), Victoria (4%) and Ottawa (3.2%), even if their numbers do not come close to those in Toronto or Vancouver.[23]

Amongst these Chinese origin respondents, only communities representing mainly Hans will be analyzed in this section.

Since the Chinese migration to Canada, a plethora of organizations from mainland China and Hong Kong SAR have established themselves. The Chinese Canadian National Council (CCNC), considered a leader in the Chinese Canadian community, is focused on the promotion of the full participation of Chinese people in Canadian society. It is also seeking to advance a balanced and holistic Canada-China relationship.[24] The group, made up of paid staff, has dialogue with DFAIT on international development and some human rights concerns/cases, but it does not feel that its activities are adequately responded to by policymakers. According to the group, Government ministers and DFAIT improperly develop policies and draw expertise from textbooks and the business lobby, rather than directly engaging with diaspora communities. They would like to have more regular roundtables led by the diaspora, and to provide the Government with solid suggestions on Canada-China relations without the interference of business and academic lobby groups.

The Chinese diaspora is also characterized by a coalition of associations with deep concerns about human rights abuses including the denial of linguistic, religious and cultural rights in the PRC. The China Rights Network (CRN), founded in 2006 and located in Toronto, is a joint venture of Amnesty International, the Canada Tibet Committee, the Falun Dafa Association of Canada, the Federation for a Democratic China, Students for a Free Tibet, the Taiwanese Human Rights Association of Canada, the Tibetan Women's Association, the Tibetan Youth Congress and the Uyghur Canadian Association. The coalition claims to have a sophisticated understanding of the government's efforts in balancing trade concerns with the promotion of human rights. CRN frequently writes to Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs and other officials including the Prime Minister. Most of the CRN groups participate in annual discussions with DFAIT's China desk personnel. Notwithstanding its activism, the coalition resents the lack of specificity and substantive responses to their requests by policymakers. Answers are limited to *pro forma* responses such as "The Minister takes your concerns seriously and is looking into it." CRN is also aware that its outreach is limited due to the lack of time and expertise of its volunteer members, but it also blames the Canadian government for bowing to the PRC government's demands. The group thinks that it would be helpful if DFAIT (including Ministerial offices) tried to create a dialogue between Chinese diplomatic officials, cultural and pro-democracy associations and Canadian government representatives by organizing a full-day review of Canada-China policies.

The Falun Dafa Association of Canada (FDAC) was founded in Canada in 1996 and has many branches across the country. Most of its volunteer members are ethnic Chinese, even though the group is open and willing to accept everyone. Initially it was mainly focused on the "high-level cultivation practice guided by the characteristics of the universe—Truthfulness, Benevolence, and Forbearance."[25] The practice of this belief includes meditation, group exercises, readings, seminars and workshops. But with the banning and persecution of Falun Dafa in China in July 1999, other aims have been added: to impede the persecution in China, to publicize human rights abuses directed at Falun Gong practitioners, and to end the Chinese propaganda that gives a false image of the community. The group is asking the Canadian government to step up anti-persecution campaigns in China and in Canada. It requests that elected officials uphold human rights values, and Canadian moral values and democracy by disseminating knowledge of Falun Dafa persecution in Canada and China to the general public, the media, DFAIT, and NGOs through letters, meetings and other means. The FDCA views the attacks on Falun Dafa adherents as direct assaults on Canadian moral values and democracy.[26]

The volunteer-run Federation for a Democratic China (FDC), located in Toronto, was founded in 1989 after the Tiananmen incident. Its guiding political principles are to promote human rights, protect social justice, abolish the one-party dictatorship, and establish a democratic China by insisting on values, rights, transparency and openness. The group, though involved with several international issues, is focused on human rights concerns in areas such as Tibet and Xinjiang.[27] The vice-president of the group, Sheng Xue, expressed that looking back on her 20 years of activism, current Canadian foreign policy seems focused on both business issues and human rights, even if true equality between the two still has not been reached. The association seems quite satisfied with their connection with the Canadian government based on letters and meetings once or twice a year. However, it is not satisfied with the current role of policymakers, and blames the government for not having a real strategy to reach the community. On the other hand, the Ms. Xue also

23   Statistics Canada (2006), 2006 Census Report. Ethnic origins, 2006 counts, for Canada, provinces and territories, at http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/rt-td/eth-eng.cfm.
24   Chinese Canadian National Council, "About Us," http://www.ccnc.ca/about.php
25   Falun Dafa, "What is Falun Dafa?" http://www.falundafa.org
26   Ibid.
27   Federation for a Democratic China, "About Us," http://fdc64.de/index.php?option = com_content&task = blogsection&id = 6&Itemid = 31

recognizes that obstacles are created by the same members of her group who do not have a good command of English and do not have sufficient knowledge of Canadian politics because "[they] come from a non-democratic country…[and] do not know how to deal with the government."[28] The FDC maintains that regular meetings and information exchanges between diasporas and the government, in addition to the creation of a foundation which could help all of the diasporas with their activities, could give more opportunities to these communities to contribute to Canada's foreign policy development.[29]

The Hong Kongese population made up half of the Chinese population in Canada before the 1990s. That percentage has decreased and there are currently 215,430 first-generation Hong Kongese Canadians over 15 years old, of whom 40.2% range in age from 25 to 44 years old.[30] The community is well organized, with a number of associations involved in Canadian foreign policy issues. Two organizations are highlighted herein: the Movement for Democracy in China (MDC) and the Vancouver Society in Support of Democratic Movement (VSSDM). Both were founded in 1989 and are volunteer-run. The MDC represents the Chinese in Canada, while the VSSDM represents Chinese residents in BC and Vancouver. Most of the VSSDM's members are from Hong Kong, but they were adamant that it remain completely open to all Chinese in Canada. The MDC and the VSSDM advocate human rights and democracy in China and they are quite active in this regard. The VSSDM, for example, organizes annual candlelight vigils to commemorate the June 4 Tiananmen massacre victims, publishes a bi-monthly newsletter in Chinese to update the community on Chinese and Hong Kongese issues, and it is regularly quoted or invited to participate in discussions on issues in China and Hong Kong on radio and TV. The main international goal of both organizations is to achieve human rights improvements in China, and the implementation of a truly democratic government. The MDC and the VSSDM have a good knowledge of Canada's foreign policy and are eager to lobby the Canadian government to put human rights in front of business and economic agreements when dealing with China, in order to "influence China to improve human rights and environmental conditions," as noted Pun York Tong, a spokesperson for the MDC.[31] However, due to the small size of the community and the lack of human and financial resources and time, the MDC does not have any dialogue with the government. Consequently, it does not have proper discourse with policymakers, but tries to co-sign appeals to the government with other larger organizations striving for similar goals.

Meanwhile, the VSSDM was regularly invited by the previous Liberal Government to participate in China roundtable discussions. Today, it is a member of the CRN, so the group feels somewhat represented in Ottawa by this coalition which regularly pressures the Canadian Government to take a stronger stance on Chinese human rights abuses, and constantly dialogues with elected officials and DFAIT. In short, according to Henry Chau, President of the VSSDM, "our involvement is limited by choice to the internal discussion in the coalition and endorsing any policy initiatives." Their requests are not treated adequately by policymakers, as noted by the Mr. Chau because "it depends on the standing of the incumbent government." The MDC and the VSSDM stated that their biggest obstacles are created by limited human and financial resources as well as the distance from the center of power which, observed Mr. Chau, "forbid [them] to develop the expertise in policy formation and lobbying." The MDC states that it is working on uniting with other groups to achieve more visibility. However, the VSSDM is extremely satisfied with its group which is thought to be very vocal in expressing its opinions on issues at stake through the media, public education campaigns or direct contact with government officials. Now, "it's up to them whether they want to hear from us or not," concluded Mr. Chau.[32]

IV) TAIWANESE COMMUNITIES

In the 2006 Census, 17,705 people declared Taiwanese as their ethnic origin: 67.5% reported a single ethnic origin, while 32.5% listed multiple ethnic origins, of which 48.2% are men and 51.8% women. Taiwanese are listed separately from Chinese, although the PRC government considers them PRC subjects.[33]

Much like the early years of immigration to Canada, the majority of Taiwanese people currently live in Vancouver (9,810). The other large concentrations of Taiwanese are in Toronto (4,065) and Montreal (1,065). In other metropolitan areas such as Edmonton, Ottawa, and Calgary, their numbers decrease drastically to 370, 365 and 255, respectively. The vast majority of Taiwanese Canadians over 15 years old (92%) are first-generation immigrants who were raised and educated in Taiwan, and are fluent in Taiwanese and Mandarin.[34]

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28   Sheng Xue (Vice President of the Federation for a Democratic China), key informant, interview by Elena Caprioni, August 2010.

29   Ibid.

30   Statistics Canada (2006). 2006 Census Report. Population Groups (28), Age Groups (8), Sex (3) and Selected Demographic, Cultural, Labour Force, Educational and Income Characteristics (309), for the Total Population of Canada, Provinces, Territories, Census Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations, http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2006/dp-pd/tbt/Rp-eng.cfm?LANG=E&APATH=3&DETAIL=1&DIM=0&FL=A&FREE=1&GC=0&GID=0&GK=0&GRP=1&PID=97615&PRID=0&PTYPE=88971,97154&S=0&SHOWALL=0&SUB=803&Temporal=2006&THEME=80&VID=0&VNAMEE=&VNAMEF=

31   P Y Tong (spokesperson for the Movement for Democracy in China), key informant, interview by Elena Caprioni, August 2010.

32   Harry Chen (president of the Formosan Association for Public Affairs), key informant, interview by Elena Caprioni, August 2010.

33   Statistics Canada (2006), 2006 Census Report. Ethnic origins, 2006 counts, for Canada, provinces and territories, http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/rt-td/eth-eng.cfm.

34   Statistics Canada (2006). 2006 Census Report. Ethnic Origin, Single and Multiple Ethnic Origin Responses and Sex for the Population of Canada, Provinces, Territories, Census Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations, http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/rt-td/eth-eng.cfm.

Once the first waves of Taiwanese immigrants had arrived in Canada, they began to organize themselves in several communities across the country: World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI) was founded in the 1960s[35], the Taiwanese Human Rights Association of Canada (THRA) in 1964 (revived in 1984), the Taiwanese Canadian Cultural Society (TCCS)[36] in 1991, the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA)[37] in 1993, and others.

The TCCS represents the voice of the entire national Taiwanese Canadian diaspora. It is focused on helping Taiwanese immigrants integrate into Canadian society by promoting Taiwanese culture and introducing it to Canadians while contributing to multicultural development.[38] Meanwhile, WUFI (representing only those who seek the independence of Taiwan) and the FAPA (encompassing all Taiwanese Canadians) are both volunteer organizations and are more involved in promoting Taiwan's status in the international community and in safeguarding freedoms, human rights and the democracy of Taiwanese people. The THRA, whose volunteer members are from Ontario, is mainly concerned with promoting human rights in Taiwan, China and Canada and it is a member of CRN. All four are involved in international issues along two main strands. The TCCS, WUFI and the FAPA believe that Taiwan should be regarded as an independent country and should be a member of the WHO and APEC without being controlled or influenced by China. Meanwhile the THRA is more involved in the struggle for the respect of human rights in government policies. The TCCS, WUFI and the FAPA would like to see Canada stand firm on its foreign policy commitments based on the principles of democracy and human rights. In short, they are seeking greater Canadian support for Taiwan, and relative protection from pressure or threats due to China's military aggression. They also seek the creation of a free and independent Taiwan, reclaiming a seat at the UN. WUFI and the FAPA attended consultations organized by DFAIT during which Harry Chen, president of the FAPA, mentioned Bill C-357 (the Taiwan Affairs Act) and requested the establishment of more equitable bilateral relations between Canada and Taiwan. The FAPA also asked for support to conduct free elections in Taiwan without Chinese interference and to have observer status at the WHO General Assembly. The TCCS occasionally pressures the government to support Taiwan's entry into WHO and its full membership at APEC. Meanwhile, the THRA would like to see Canada more concerned with the promotion of human rights, but the group is not involved in significant foreign policy dialogue with the government.

Some group expressed that most of their motions are not well-received or responded to by policymakers in terms of concrete answers, although the responses are always polite.[39] According to some respondents, current bureaucrats in DFAIT do not want to antagonize China, but prefer to remain on the sideline. The main obstacles mentioned by the volunteer communities were lack of time and financial resources to complete more detailed research and develop lobbying techniques. The TCCS, which is the only organization with paid staff, claimed that the major obstacle is the overwhelming Canadian interest in trade with China instead of human rights, democracy and freedom. Some of the respondents encourage the Canadian government to create a better dialogue with diaspora groups "who have been appreciative of Canadian universal values ... and contribute to making the whole world a better and more peaceful and just place."[40] On the other hand, others suggest bringing human rights issues in Taiwan to the attention of policy makers and MPs.

V) TIBETAN COMMUNITIES

One of the most outspoken groups among the fifty-six ethnic groups identified by the CCP are the Tibetans, whose ethnic homeland is the Tibet Autonomous Region inside the PRC. Following the exile of the Dalai Lama and his flight to India in 1959, then Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau agreed to accept over 200 Tibetan immigrants in the early 1970s, under the Tibetan Refugee Program, to ease the burden on crowded refugee camps in India.[41]

Tibetans, seeking job opportunities and following in the footsteps of friends and relatives, started immigrating to Canada. Today the Tibetans, classified as a separate ethnic group in the Census, number 4,275 people: 87.7% declared a single ethnic origin and 12.3% multiple ones,[42] while 51.6% are men and 48.4% women.[43] During the period 2001-2006, the Tibetan population increased by 200%.[44] Most Tibetans in Canada over 15 years old are first-generation (94.3%), while only 0.3% are third[45]. Almost all live in Toronto: 3,475 make up 0.06% of the total population there. Elsewhere in Canada, the number of Tibetans is minimal: 300 in Calgary, 110 in Montreal, 100 in Vancouver and 40 in Ottawa.[46]

35 World United Formosans for Independence. "Introduction". http://www.wufi.org.tw/eng/introeng.htm
36 Taiwanese Canadian Cultural Society. "About Us". http://www.tccs.ca/english/about.html
37 Formosan Association for Public Affairs. "About FAPA". http://fapa.org/new/index.php?option = com_content&view = article&id = 19&Itemid = 27
38 Taiwanese Canadian Cultural Society. "About Us". http://www.tccs.ca/english/about.html
39 Interviews with leadership of WUFI, FAPA, TCCS, THRA held in fall 2010.
40 Harry Chen (president of the Formosan Association for Public Affairs), key informant, interview by Elena Caprioni, August 2010.
41 Canadian Tibetan Association of Ontario, "CTAO Background," at http://www.ctao.org
42 Statistics Canada (2006), 2006 Census Report. Ethnic origins, 2006 counts, for Canada, provinces and territories, http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/rt-td/eth-eng.cfm.
43 Statistics Canada (2006). 2006 Census Report. Ethnic Origin, Single and Multiple Ethnic Origin Responses and Sex for the Population of Canada, Provinces, Territories, Census Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations, http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/rt-td/eth-eng.cfm
44 Ibid.
45 Statistics Canada (2006), 2006 Census Report, Ethnic Origin (247), Generation Status (4), Single and Multiple Ethnic Origin Responses (3), Age Groups (9) and Sex (3) for the Population 15 Years and Over of Canada, Provinces, Territories, Census Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations, 2006 Census, http://www12.statcan.ca/English/census01/products/standard/themes/ListProducts.cfm?Temporal = 2001&APATH = 3&Theme = 44&VID = 0&VNAMEE = &VNAMEF = &FL = A&RL = 0&DS = 99&GK = 0&GC = 0&ORDER = 1&ShowAll = Yes&DETAIL = 0&FREE = 0&S = 1
46 Statistics Canada (2006). 2006 Census Report. Ethnic Origin, Single and Multiple Ethnic Origin Responses and Sex for the Population of Canada, Provinces, Territories, Census Metropolitan Areas and

According to Tenzin D. Khangsar, a Tibetan-Canadian working within the government, the Tibetan community is extremely integrated in Canadian society because of its efforts in speaking the official languages and its peaceful Buddhist culture. Most Tibetan-Canadians ask for the genuine autonomy of Tibet, preservation of their culture and human rights. Since they were raised in Canada—a democratic country—they feel it is their right to be part of the policymaking process regardless of any partisan differences. "We are considered rational and reasonable, and different from the radicals who do not have any dialogue with policymakers," Mr. Khangsar noted.[47] In this sense, it seems Tibetan associations have a good working relationship with the government. Tibetans are well represented in Canada in the form of several associations across the country, such as the Canada Tibet Committee, the Tibetan Women's Association, Students for a Free Tibet, the Tibetan Youth Congress, and others.

For reasons of space, this section will analyze only the Tibetan organization that seems to be most involved in Canada's foreign policy issues: the Canadian Tibet Committee (CTC). Founded in 1987, it is concerned with the lack of human rights and democratic freedoms in Tibet. This group is focused on disseminating information about Tibet and promoting the cause of the Tibetan people through outreach campaigns to governments, NGOs, the public and the media by means of organizing seminars, cultural events, and publishing reports. The CTC claims to speak on behalf of Tibetans and activists for a number of issues, as noted on its detailed website.[48] Among its many aims, the CTC seeks to be involved in foreign policy issues mainly by participating in government consultations on human rights abuses through their relations with DFAIT, CIDA, Heritage Canada and the Department of Immigration. Since 1989, there has also been an association with the Canadian Parliamentary Friends of Tibet group, through the organization of hearings and visits with the Dalai Lama. Moreover, the CTC works with Canadian and international NGOs such as the Canadian Network for International Human Rights (NIHR) and the International Tibet Support Network (ITSN) on collective letter campaigns, statements and urgent action for human rights. Finally, it publishes the *Canada Tibet Newsletter*, distributed semi-annually to Canadian MPs and organizations. It is also a member of the CRN.

Unlike other associations analyzed thus far, this section cannot provide more details about the CTC's attempt to influence and contribute to Canadian foreign policy, or about their dialogue with, and suggestions to, policymakers. This is due to the fact that certain members were suspicious of the present project. Even after receiving a detailed background, they did not trust the aim of this research report, and claimed that they could not see the benefit of this study for their organization and thus refused to participate.

Meanwhile, the Tibetan Women's Association of Ontario (TWAO) was eager to participate. The group is made up mostly of refugee women (volunteers). It promotes the social, political and economic empowerment of Tibetan women, especially in Ontario. Their international goal is to gain meaningful freedom for Tibet and its citizens by reminding their members of the importance of the Buddhist concept of the middle way (the path of moderation). By promoting this gentle path and reaching out to Chinese communities, they seek to disseminate this mutually beneficial stance. In terms of foreign policy position, the President of the TWAO, Tsering Choedon, stated that the group would like to search for good ethical relations with China for the best interest of Canada. In addition to promoting trade opportunities, Canadian officials should be mindful of secret and influential Chinese interests. The barrier between the community and the government, including policymakers, is created by the lack of financial resources and visibility. Tsering noted that perhaps by pushing environmental issues to the forefront of Canadian foreign policy, Canada could take a global leadership role on other pressing issues.[49]

VI) UYGHUR CANADIAN SOCIETY

One of the smallest and youngest groups among the mini-diasporas analyzed in this report is the Uyghur community. Uyghur migration to Canada first began in the 1990s. The Uyghurs are a Turkic ethnic group living in the most north-western region of the PRC, called the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) by Hans, and Eastern Turkistan by Uyghur nationalists. Uyghurs speak a Turkic language written with a version of the Arabic alphabet known as "Chagatai" and adhere to the Hanafi school of Islam. Identified as one of the 56 ethnic groups of the PRC, the present population of Uyghurs is approximately 9.8 million, representing 46% of the population in Xinjiang.[50] However, some estimate the number at more than 20 million by counting Uyghurs living in Xinjiang and abroad. In Canada, the Uyghur ethnic group is not listed in the 2006 Census under the section "Ethnic Origin and Visible Minorities."[51] According to the community itself, there are almost 1,000 living in Canada divided between Toronto (300), Vancouver (180), Calgary (more than 50), Montreal (approximately 70) Hamilton (around 30) and the remaining dispersed across the country. Meanwhile, based on other

Census Agglomerations, http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/rt-td/eth-eng.cfm

47   Tenzin D. Khangsar (former Deputy Chief of Staff and Director of Multicultural Affairs to the Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism), key informant, interview by Elena Caprioni, 2010.

48   Canadian Tibet Committee, http://www.tibet.ca

49   Tsering Choedon (President of the Tibetan Women's Association of Ontario), key informant, interview by Elena Caprioni, August 2010.

50   Xinjiang Weiwuer Zizhiqu Tongjiju, 2009 Nian Xinjiang Tongji Nianjian [2009 Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook] (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, 2009), 78.

51   Statistics Canada (2006), supra at footnote 13.

sources, the number of Uyghurs is significantly less, around 400 people divided between Toronto (180-200), Vancouver (160), Calgary (40) and Montreal (40). Most of them are first generation immigrants.[52]

Notwithstanding the small population numbers in Canada, they are fairly well represented by an organization called the Uyghur Canadian Society (UCS) founded by a small group in Toronto in 2000. Today, the organization has roughly 90 registered volunteer members (both male and female) who work for lobbying purposes and to promote the cause of Uyghurs in Canada. Their aim is to support the preservation of their culture, to ensure the rights of all Uyghur-Canadians by encouraging their greater education and integration into Canadian society, and to use an active lobbying strategy to make their voices heard. Inside the group, some members are also involved in the Uyghur Canadian Women's Project centered on promoting Uyghur-Canadian women's financial security and independence, health and safety, and rights and learning privileges via educational conferences and job search workshops. The UCS is also a member of the CRN and collaborates with international NGOs to promote democracy and human rights in China. The community is involved in international issues and in domestic policy areas. Its preeminent focus is to promote the cause of Uyghurs in the international arena, to dispel perceptions that they are terrorists or barbarians (as they are sometimes labeled by Chinese authorities) and promote Uyghur human rights.[53]

According to Mehmet Tohti, Former President of the UCS and a Uyghur human rights activist since his early childhood in China, the organization appears fairly well-informed on Canadian foreign policy issues. The community is eager to concentrate on lobbying the Canadian government to keep human rights issues on the top of the agenda without sacrificing these for trade privileges. It is also keen on achieving democratization in China accompanied by full political reform.[54]

The UCS is received throughout the year during NGO consultancies, and especially by DFAIT and the Parliamentary Human Rights committee. However, UCS president Rukiye Turdush noted that his group is not entirely satisfied with its dialogue with the government and policymakers.[55] There was one major issue at stake recently, regarding the case of Huseyin Celil, the Canadian citizen of Uyghur origin who was arrested and convicted by China on questionable charges. Although there was dialogue between the Canadian government and the UCS (which provided documentation to the government), the issue was not resolved in the Uyghur-Canadian prisoner's favour, and many Canadian human rights activists have criticized the government over its handling of the case. However, some barriers hinder the Uyghurs' opportunity to be completely heard by the Canadian government or integrated into society, including a lack of financial resources, overwhelming Chinese propaganda and intensive Chinese pressure towards family members in Eastern Turkistan/Xinjiang. Ultimately, the UCS came to the conclusion that only through further education and greater participation in social and political life in Canada would they be able to significantly contribute to Canada's foreign policy development.[56]

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52   Interview with Mehmet Tohti, former President of the Uyghur Canadian Society (UCS), Fall 2010.
53   Ibid.
54   Memet Tohti (former president of the Uyghur Canadian Society), key informant interview by Elena Caprioni, August 2010.
55   Rukiye Turdush (President of the Uyghur Canadian Society (UCS)), key informant interview by Elena Caprioni, August 2010
56   Ibid.

CASE STUDY #3
THE ERITREAN DIASPORA IN CANADA

Helen Tewolde

I) ERITREAN DIASPORA: CONTEXT AND DEMOGRAPHICS

Eritrea is one of the youngest nations in the world today, having gained its independence from Ethiopia in 1991 following a 30-year revolutionary struggle. Eritrea's independence was sealed in April 1993 after a UN-monitored referendum, in which 99.8% of the population (including the diaspora) favoured independence. With an estimated population of 5.1 million,[1] Eritrea is situated in the Horn of Africa, bordered on the north by Sudan, Ethiopia on the south, and Djibouti to the southeast.

The Eritrean revolutionary struggle had widespread participation within the country and among its diaspora, a group that almost universally fled as political refugees during the revolution but remained committed to assisting the cause of independence through remittances, lobbying and advocacy via network-based, loosely-organized underground activities. Eritreans started to immigrate to Canada in the late 1970s.[2] Most left Eritrea due to the 30-year Struggle for Independence (1961-1991), traveling to a temporary country of residence before coming to Canada.

The effect of this migration on the population of Eritrea was massive. Close to one million Eritreans were displaced from their territory during the 30-year Struggle. The majority of them became refugees in neighboring Sudan, from where many have not returned.[3] Fairly recent migration estimates have documented 848,851 Eritrean emigrants globally.[4] Adding the number of Eritreans born abroad will raise this figure significantly; however, this will depend on both how the term "diaspora" is defined and how people self-identify.

II) THE HORN OF AFRICA—REGIONAL "SECURITY COMPLEX"

The Horn of Africa region has been the site of endemic inter- and intra-state conflict for decades. The many conflicts are interlinked in a regional "security complex", a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.[5]

Since the era of de-colonization after the Cold War (1945-1960) Africa has harboured much of the world's intra-state conflicts. Three of the inter-state conflicts in Africa—the Ethiopian-Somali War (1977), the Ugandan-Tanzanian War (1978) and the Eritrean-Ethiopian Border War (1998)—were fought in the Eastern and Horn of Africa region, which has become increasingly volatile.

The overall lack of funding for development going to these regions is due, ironically, to the lack of political and economic stability that pervades it, on the one hand, and the interests of national governments on the other (for example, the Government of Eritrea's policy on economic self-reliance for development.[6]) Due to its large share of the Red Sea coastline, two important ports (Massawa and Assab) and its access to the Middle East, Eritrea has both historically[7] and in modern times been a strategically important region for Western foreign policy interests. In the post-9/11 climate, Eritrea has been targeted as a crucial geopolitical actor in the region by the U.S., and by the international community via the United Nations Security Council.

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1   Eritrea's first census, originally scheduled for 1998, was postponed as a result of the border conflict (1998-2000). The size of the population remains uncertain, but is currently estimated at 5.1 million (See UNFPA: http://www.unfpa.org/webdav/site/global/shared/CO_Overviews/eritrea_b1_9.18.doc).
2   John Sorenson, "Opposition, Exile and Identity: The Eritrean Case," Journal of Refugee Studies 3, no. 4 (1990): 302, http://haerel.org/ifaapr/298.pdf.
3   K. Gaim, "Left in limbo: prospects for repatriation of Eritrean refugees from Sudan and responses of the international donor community", in Tim Allen, ed., In Search of Cool Ground: War, Flight and Homecoming in Northeast Africa, (London: James Currey 1996), 53–65;
    J. Bascom, Losing Place: Refugee Populations and Rural Transformations in East Africa (Oxford: Berghahn Books 1998).
4   Dilip Ratha and Zhimei Xu, Migration and Remittances Factbook 2008 (World Bank: 2008).
5   Terrence Lyons, "The International Context of Internal War: Ethiopia/Eritrea," in Africa and the New International Order: Studies of State Sovereignty and Regional Security, eds. Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 85.
6   See Appendix #1 for a list of development actors that are currently funding projects in the region. Source: African Development Bank Group: Interim Country Strategy Paper for Eritrea, 2009-2011: http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/Eretrea_Interim%20Country%20Strategy%20Paper%202009%202011%20-%20Eritrea_2.pdf
7   For example in 1952 the U.S. point of view was expressed by Chief Foreign Policy Advisor John Foster Dulles and was never forgotten by Eritreans: "From the point of view of justice, the opinions of the Eritrean people must receive consideration. Nevertheless, the strategic interests of the United States in the Red Sea Basin and considerations of security and world peace make it necessary that the country [Eritrea] be linked with our ally, Ethiopia." Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, and Richard L. Sklar, eds., African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press Ltd., 1985), 169.

III) REMITTANCES AND TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS

The Eritrean diaspora is actively involved in the social, political and economic situation in Eritrea. Mr. Tekie Beyene, Governor of the Bank of Eritrea, described the contributions from the diaspora as "beyond anybody's imagination."[8] The effect of remittances—or, as one writer described it, "privatized foreign aid"—on the Eritrean political economy is under study by economists and development theorists globally. [9]

Researchers have noted the difficulty of obtaining statistically verifiable data surrounding all aspects of the Eritrean economy, as there has been little internationally verifiable reporting of data since 2003.[10] One Canadian source, however, has documented Eritrea as having the highest percentage of GDP owed to remittances in the world at 37.9%, valued at $411 million USD.[11] It is widely known that all Eritreans in the diaspora are required by Eritrean law to contribute 2% of their earnings to the country, based on their yearly income-tax assessments.[12] Yearly payments ensure that Eritreans abroad are able to renew their Eritrean Identification Cards and are issued entry visas. Conducting administrative affairs (i.e. land acquisition) in Eritrea is impossible without an updated ID card and confirmation of remittances tendered. These individual and collective remittances by diaspora organizations are referred to as the "moral economy", a system of nationalist commitments and obligations (both formal and informal) that communicate a moral expectation to remit as well as regulate and socialize personal behaviours.[13]

One detailed European study has characterized four phases of Eritrean transnational relations: (1) mobilization during the struggle for independence (1961-91); (2) de-mobilization of the diaspora in the post-independence phase; (3) re-mobilization and institutionalization of the diaspora during the Ethio-Eritrean war (1998-2000) and (4) diversification and increasing alienation of diaspora communities from the Eritrean state since the beginning of the new millennium. [14] Using the above categories, the organizations reported in this study would be manifestations of the latter, third and fourth phases of transnational relations.

IV) ERITREAN DIASPORA IN CANADA

There are at least 150,000 Eritreans living in OECD and Middle Eastern countries.[15] Most Eritrean immigration to Canada has been to large cities: Toronto, Vancouver, Winnipeg and Montreal. There has been a significant influx of primarily recent (0-5 years) immigrant Eritreans to Calgary, Edmonton and Saskatchewan. The current number of Eritreans living in Toronto is not known; estimates vary anywhere from 10,000 to 20,000. There are an estimated 3,000 Eritreans residing in Winnipeg.[16]

There is no accurate data on the size of the Eritrean populations in host countries in North America and Europe. This is principally due to the fact that they were registered upon arrival in the pre- and post-independence period as "Ethiopians" rather than "Eritreans."[17] One important source for obtaining these numbers is the voting figures for the 1993 Referendum for Independence:

> …according to these data, a total of 84,370 votes were cast by Eritreans outside Eritrea (Referendum Commission of Eritrea 1993). They indicate that the most significant host countries for Eritrean refugees outside Africa are Saudi Arabia (37,785), the U.S. and Canada (14,941) and Germany (6,994). However, these data certainly underestimate the true size of the Eritrean Diaspora, largely because they record only those Eritreans eligible to vote—that is over eighteen years of age [...][18]

8   Carol Pineau reporting from Asmara, Eritrea, Voice of America (June 24, 1998), as quoted in Victoria Bernal, "Eritrea Goes Global: Reflections on Nationalism in a Transnational Era," Cultural Anthropology 19, no. 1 (February, 2004).

9   Ilene Grabel, "Remittances, Political Economy and Economic Development," Erasmus University Rotterdam: International Institute of Social Studies, December 2, 2009, http://www.iss.nl/DevISSues/ Articles/Remittances-Political-Economy-and-Economic-Development.

10   See: "Eritrea's Economic Survival: Summary record of a conference held on 20 April 2007" Sally Healy Associate Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House and Convenor of the Horn of Africa Group, http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/108632, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2007. Healy is summarizing David Styan's (Birkbeck College, University of London) presentation on page 6.

11   David Carment, Brandon Lum and Milana Nikolko's, Diasporas and Canadian Foreign Policy (Norman Paterson School of International Affairs –Country Indicators for Foreign Policy, May 10, 2010), slide 17, http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1296.pdf.

12   Remittances are important contributions to individuals, families, communities and national GDP in poor countries; however, their overall effects on development have not been deeply explored. Professor Ashok Swain notes that remittances promote uneven and inconsistent development patterns; in effect, increasing, rather than equalizing, the gap between inequalities. Conference Presentation and Report on Working Group 1: Mapping Actors, Roles and Strategies (Section V.: Conflict Prevention) by Professor Ashok Swain, Uppsala University, Sweden UPEACE High Level Expert Forum Panel (Toronto, ON, October 2006), 35, http://www.gordonfn.org/resfiles/UPEACE_conference_report.pdf.

13   Matsuoka, Atsuko and John Sorenson, Ghosts and Shadows: Construction of Identity and Community in an African Diaspora (Toronto: University of Toronto Press),100, quoted in Clara Schmitz Pranghe, "Modes and Potential of Diaspora Engagement in Eritrea" (working paper 3, DIASPEACE, July 2010), 16, http://www.diaspeace.org/D12_WP3_Fischer_Final.pdf.

14   Ibid., 12.

15   Sally Healy, Associate Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House and Convenor of the Horn of Africa Group, "Eritrea's Economic Survival: Summary record of a conference held on 20 April 2007", (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2007), 6, http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/108632.

16   Matt Preprost, "Protest links seminar to Eritrean terrorists," Winnipeg Free Press, August 23, 2010, http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/local/protest-links-seminar-to-eritrean-terrorists-101283344.html.

17   Nadje Al-ali, Richard Black, and Khalid Koser, "The Limits to 'Transnationalism': Bosnian and Eritrean Refugees in Europe as Emerging Transnational Communities", Ethnic and Racial Studies 24, no. 4 (2001): 6.

18   Nadje Al-ali, Richard Black, and Khalid Koser, "The Limits to 'Transnationalism': Bosnian and Eritrean Refugees in Europe as Emerging Transnational Communities", Ethnic and Racial Studies 24, no. 4 (2001): 6.

V) ERITREAN-CANADIAN DIASPORA AND CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Eritrean-Canadian activism, particularly since 9/11, has had a strong preoccupation with U.S. foreign policy towards the Horn of Africa, a focus that has precluded a specific analysis of the Canadian government's position. While there may be many important reasons for this, one overarching observation can be made: the U.S. role and foreign policy position concerning Eritrea has always been prominent and clear, whereas Canadian policy is not as clear or distinctive. Much of Eritrean diaspora advocacy in general focuses on the U.S,. position toward Eritrea, which is believed to strongly influence the Canadian government's stance.

There has been a distinctive Canadian advocacy focus, however, with respect to the immigration and refugee system. Eritrean-Canadian advocates have probed Canadian UNHCR officials about their commitment and support to Eritrean refugee claimants abroad and protected persons in Canada. A recent collaboration between Eritrean-Canadian diaspora organizations and the Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR) has produced research and recommendations to Citizenship & Immigration Canada and Public Safety Ministers about the inadmissibility of former EPLF liberation soldiers on security grounds.[1] This is one current example of advocacy, although there is a long history (albeit largely undocumented) of advocacy in the Eritrean-Canadian diaspora.

VI) ERITREAN DIASPORA ORGANIZATIONS

While this research is focused on Eritrean organizations in the political realm, the Eritrean community has a vibrant and diverse array of non-political groups that are culturally, socially and, for the most part, religiously organized. For example, in 2008 two new churches—*Medhanie Alem Tewahdo Church* and *St. Michael's Church*[2]—were purchased in Toronto as a result of the organizing and fundraising efforts of their respective membership bases over the past 10-15 years. There are also other strong faith-based collectives represented by the Catholic, Pentecostal and Muslim communities. One settlement and integration organization, *the Eritrean Canadian Community Centre of Metropolitan Toronto* (ECCC)[3], is a non-profit charitable organization established in 1985.

For those focused on the political realm of diaspora activities, the primary mode for organizing and mobilizing in the Eritrean diaspora community is through a small number of grassroots organizations/movements. These entities have a strong emphasis on raising awareness and advocacy. Comparatively, the visions, missions and purposes of existing organizations are quite polarized. Although most of these organizations are focused on what is happening in Eritrea, their organizational missions either: (1) mostly align with the policies of the Government of the State of Eritrea (GOSE) in both its domestic and foreign policy or (2) mostly denounce the actions of the GOSE on these domestic and foreign policy issues.

There are a growing number of people "in the middle" who feel they cannot make an informed decision due to the lack of clear information. They can be observed anecdotally, but do not have an organized political voice, since there is a sharp public division of views. Through key informant interviews it was clear that community organizers representing opposing views on Eritrean politics are equally frustrated with the level of polarity on these issues in the diaspora community, as it prevents dialogue and co-operation.

It is clear, however, that the environment for organizing, and even—perhaps especially—for mobilizing humanitarian aid is high-stakes and full of tension due to the current political situation in Eritrea. The following sections mostly focus on organizations established in Toronto, due to the scope of this study as well as the fact that Toronto-based organizations have most effectively mobilized Eritreans nationally. Some recent Eritrean-Canadian organizations are developing in Western Canada and gaining national attention among the diaspora, such as, *Hidmona*—the Eritrean-Canadian Human Rights Group of Manitoba (Est. September 2009)[4] who recently hosted veteran journalist, lecturer and long-time friend of Eritrea, Mr. Dan Connell, on September 18, 2011 at the University of Winnipeg. [5]

VII) PAST DIASPORA ORGANIZATIONS (1979-2005):

While it is a small diaspora, historically the Eritrean-Canadian community has been very active in advancing its concerns to the highest level of government in Canada. Although mostly no longer operational, the following organizations and collaborations have a resonant history in the Eritrean diaspora community in Canada. They were established by the

1   Canadian Council for Refugees, Eritrean Canadian Community, Centre of Metropolitan Toronto (ECCC), Hidmona-Eritrean, Human Rights Group In Manitoba, Holy Trinity Eritrean Orthodox, Church in Toronto, Meftih Eritrea Community Newspaper, Qalna Eritrean Human Rights Group-Toronto, From Liberation to Limbo: A Report on the Impact of Immigration Security Inadmissibility Provisions on the Eritrean Communities in Canada, and Recommendations for Reform, submitted to the Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration and Public Safety, (2010) http://ccrweb.ca/files/from_liberation_to_limbo.pdf.

2   Medhanie Alem Eritrean Orthodox Tewahdo Church (Toronto, ON, Canada), http://www.medhaniealem.com; St. Michael's Eritrean Orthodox Church (Toronto, ON, Canada), http://makidusmichael.com.

3   Eritrean Canadian Community Centre, http://www.eccctoronto.ca/.

4   Hidmona, www.hidmona.net (Hidmona translates as "Our Refuge" in English).

5   For a list of Dan Connell's books and articles on Eritrea see his website: http://www.danconnell.net/books.

Eritrean intelligentsia who had the capacity to navigate Canadian bureaucracies such as the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). What is notable is that most (if not all) of this work was conducted on a volunteer basis by individuals working full-time elsewhere; there was no dedicated staff to do this work.

1. Eritrean Relief Association (ERA)

Established during a time of high optimism regarding Eritrea's progression toward becoming an independent and self-reliant state, ERA-Canada (est. 1979) was a Canadian NGO formed with the following objectives: (1) provide humanitarian aid to victims of war, drought and famine; (2) assist development programs in the horn of Africa; (3) conduct development education in Canada; and (4) provide information and help facilitate communication between Eritrean and Canadian NGOs.[6] ERA is remembered as a dynamic transnational organization that was established during the revolution as a way to ensure that an adequate food supply reached the liberated areas captured by the revolutionary movement—the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). The ERA networks were revitalized under new names after liberation: "Eritrean Development Fund" in the United States, "Eritrea Hilfswerk" in Germany and "EriTree" in Canada.

2. EriTree (formerly ERA-Canada)

EriTree began focusing on long-term, integrated agricultural rehabilitation programs, reforestation and soil and water conservation programs to rebuild Eritrea's ecosystem. In 2005, the Zagir Water Supply and Environmental Sanitation project in Zoba Maekel, Eritrea was effectively implemented, whereby 5,000 villagers gained access to a clean, reliable water supply. This was especially significant for females in the village who no longer had to walk five hours and miss school to get water for their families.[7] In an online article by EriTree entitled "EriTree Receives $105,000 in Canadian Government Funding,"[8] EriTree announced CIDA funding toward this project. The total budget for this project was $170,000. EriTree needed to raise the balance of $65,000 from its supporters—the Eritrean-Canadian diaspora community. For every dollar EriTree raised CIDA committed to matching two dollars. EriTree mobilized a large segment of the Eritrean population in fundraising for this project. Strong lessons from EriTree's partnership with CIDA have emerged and were revealed to me in an interview with its members who are considering a new focused role for EriTree, namely to support the outreach and engagement of underserved Eritrean-Canadians with existing social services.

3. Canadians for Peace and Development in Eritrea (CPDE)

At the outbreak of the Border War in 1998, the Eritrean diaspora began to panic in the absence of information about what was happening during the conflict. Almost immediately after the war began, approximately 60 Eritrean professionals living in North America developed the Information Task Force (ITF), whose purpose was to tell the Eritrean story during the war. The ITF created an e-list and developed press releases to work toward its mandate; however, political divisions quickly emerged, and it disbanded. Subsequent to the ITF, Canadians for Peace and Development in Eritrea organized as a grassroots group to advocate for peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia. It was not designed to be an ideological group and did not ask the Canadian government to pick sides; it focused on enabling the capacity of Eritreans to exercise their rights as individual taxpayers to lobby the government for peacebuilding in the region.[9]

4. Canada Peace Rally (1998-2001)

This was an attempt to co-ordinate a loose network of Eritreans. Canada Peace Rally (CPR) was a mailing list and primary instrument for national and international communications, information-sharing and organizing. This network engaged several high-profile bureaucrats and politicians,[10] and the members of CPR began lobbying in Ottawa for increased development assistance and emergency relief funds for Eritrea (particularly since one million people had been displaced due to the war). CPR members were successful, as Canada was the first foreign power to ask Ethiopia to withdraw troops from the region; the first peacekeepers on the ground were 420 Canadians in the United Nations Mission on Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE). The CPDE team met with the Minister of International Cooperation (head of CIDA), who approved $1 million in aid to Eritrea. CPDE requested more funds, given that there were so many internally displaced people (IDPs) in Eritrea, and $2.5 million was eventually dispatched.

6   Mulugheta Ogbamichael, DEHAI Mailing List Archive, "EriTree: Aim, Vision and Goal [sic] from All Perspectives," April 9, 2001, http://www.ephrem.org/dehai_archive/2001/apr01/0071.html.

7   Eritrea Daily, "Eritrea: EriTree completes Water project successfully," May 28, 2005, http://www.eritreadaily.net/News2005/article200505281.htm.

8   EriTree Canada, "Eritrea Receives $105, 000 in Canadian Government Funding," May 6, 2002, http://www.shaebia.org/wwwboard/contributedarticles/messages/54.html.

9   Key informant interview with lead organizer of ITF, CPDE and CPR, September 2010.

10   E.g. Hon. Maria Minna, Minister for International Cooperation (1999-2002), Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy (who later became the UN Envoy for Eritrean-Ethiopian War) with Eric Hoskins as Senior Policy Advisor (Currently serving as Ontario Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) and Art Eggleton was Minister of National Defence (1997-2002).

VIII) EXISTING ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS (2004 - PRESENT)

The following are relatively new organizations and movements that have emerged in the past five to seven years.

1. Young Peoples' Front for Democracy & Justice (YPFDJ)

The Young Peoples' Front for Democracy & Justice (YPFDJ)[11] is an international Eritrean diaspora movement of youth[12] that was organized to build a patriotic youth movement. Its focus is to build a wide network of Eritrean youth who identify strongly with an Eritrean identity, espousing six fundamental principles.[13] The movement is in North America, Europe and Australia and conducts regional and international meetings. As it is a decentralized, grassroots movement, YPFDJ is funded by their members, and the logistics are controlled by each local chapter, with each chapter organizing its own programs and events. As one of the lead organizers at the Toronto chapter, Mr. Fnan Desta, explains: "One of the main goals [of YPFDJ] is to be able to have people mobilized and be effective spokespersons for their country so that they can approach members of government ... [in Canada] we are not at the level we'd like to be as an organization in order to do that, but in the long term we are interested in developing our foreign policy advocacy."[14]

YPFDJ is actively involved in advocacy for the repealing of sanctions against the Government of the State of Eritrea; the demarcation of the Eritrean-Ethiopian border and educating youth and the wider public about the goals, missions and values of the Eritrean government. While it is agreed by the organizers that the general perception of YPFDJ is that they wholeheartedly support the Government of the State of Eritrea, lead organizers of YPFDJ were clear in stating that YPFDJ was "… not created to support the existing government. Everyone as part of the movement can have different questions and opinions about the Government of the State of Eritrea, so you can't see the YPFDJ as a homogenous movement. YPFDJ's decentralized and different views are expressed within it. This perception limits our role and we don't want to be put in a box. YPFDJ was created to support the sense of identity of youth in the diaspora, so that they invest financially, emotionally and feel connected enough to help build a strong nation."[15]

This movement in Canada does not currently have the capacity to engage the Canadian government in a sustained way. It is specifically focused on U.S. Foreign Policy in the Horn of Africa, since "…Canada had nothing to do with the sanction— it had no voting power at Security Council—we might approach Canada about the asset-freezes, etc., but even if we got the Canadians to accept that this is an illegal and unjust sanction, they can't really do anything about it."[16] In 2010 the YPFDJ facilitated youth registration for the *Zura N'Hagerna*[17] trip to Sawa Military Training Camp in Eritrea where close to 130 youth from Toronto and surrounding area went on a cross-country trip to experience their country first-hand.

2. Eri-Forum

Eri-Forum is a small, informal, local grassroots organization focused on bringing initial attention to the activities of the Government of the State of Eritrea in order to raise awareness and bring justice to the following issues: 1) implementation of the rule of law in Eritrea; 2) the release of G-15 political prisoners; 3) the implementation of Eritrea's Constitution; 4) free and fair elections in Eritrea; 5) freedom of arrested journalists; and 6) support for the sponsorship and transition of Eritrean refugees in Sudan. Although the specific details of Eri-Forum activities are not widely publicized or known, some Eritreans in the diaspora are aware of its existence anecdotally and its efforts to lobby the Canadian government to ensure that the Government of the State of Eritrea is not supported by the international community. It is alleged (though there is little evidence to confirm) that Eri-Forum successfully lobbied the Canadian government to ensure that the Finance Minister of Eritrea, Osman Saleh Mohammed, did not obtain an entry visa in August 2008.[18]

3. Qalna

Qalna is a human rights organization established by Eritreans in Toronto, with a mandate of ensuring that Eritrea is a country in which every person enjoys all of the human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It also maintains a strong belief in the importance of applying vigilance and timely protest in order to curtail current abuses and stop further tragedies

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11   Young Peoples' Front for Democracy & Justice (YPFDJ), http://www.youngpfdj.org.

12   Youth in the Eritrean context means anyone 40 years old and under.

13   1. National Harmony. For the people of Eritrea to live in harmony, peace and stability, without distinction along regional, ethnic, linguistic, religious, gender or class lines. 2. Political Democracy. For the people of Eritrea, to be active participants and become decision-makers in the administration and conduct of their lives and of their country, with their rights guaranteed by law and in practice. 3. Economic and Social Development. For Eritrea to progress socially and economically in the areas of education, technology and the standard of living. 4. Social Justice (Economic and Social Democracy). Equitable distribution of wealth, services and opportunities, and special attention to be paid to the most disadvantaged sections of society. 5. Cultural Revival. Drawing on our rich cultural heritage and on the progressive values we developed during the liberation struggle, to develop an Eritrean culture characterized by love of country, respect for humanity, solidarity between men and women, love of truth and justice, respect for law, hard work, self-confidence, self-reliance, open mindedness and inventiveness. 6. Regional and International Cooperation. For Eritrea to become a respected member of the international community, by coexisting in harmony and cooperation with its neighbors; and by contributing, to the extent of its capability, to regional and global peace, security and development.

14   Mr. Fnan Desta (Young Peoples' Front for Democracy & Justice (YPFDJ)), key informant, interview by Helen Tewolde, September 2010.

15   Ibid.

16   Ibid.

17   Translated, Zura N'Hagerna means: "Tour of/for our Country"—it is a tour of villages and main cities in the country including the military training base at Sawa, Eritrea.

18   Lesley Ciarula Taylor, "Eritrean minister denied Canadian visa," Toronto Star, September 13, 2008, http://www.thestar.com/article/498645.

from recurring in Eritrea.[19] Qalna conducts its campaigns through educational seminars, letters of protest, debates and networking with various national and international organizations, associations, groups and individuals engaged in promoting human rights protection. Most of Qalna's activities focus on advocacy work with the Canadian Council on Refugees (CCR), the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), and Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). Due to a lack of capacity, Qalna does not have intensive engagement with Canadian Foreign Policy officials, but it has engaged MPs in order to stop deportations of Eritrean refugees in Libya and Egypt. Qalna has supported the Canadian Council for Refugees in developing a report by profiling Eritrean refugee claimants in Canada who are in limbo[20] due to their participation in armed struggle during Eritrea's liberation movement (1961-1991).[21]

IX) THE CURRENT STATE OF ERITREAN-CANADIAN ADVOCACY

While the earlier years of Eritrean-Canadian advocacy appeared to have made some gains in terms of partnership and recognition by CIDA and DFAIT, the cohesiveness of Eritrean-Canadian advocacy has changed. It now appears to align with what was mentioned as the fourth phase of Eritrean transnational activity: diversification and increasing alienation of diaspora communities from the Eritrean state. As one leader notes: "Eritrean-Canadian activism may appear to be diminished since the early 2000s but it is still there. However, its net effect [in advocacy to government] is dissipated or neutralized because the political forces on each side are so strong and focused on their own goals."[22] The diversification of the diaspora and the rise of political opposition to the State of Eritrea in diaspora countries has created stronger local opposition to local diaspora organizations and initiatives that were once widely believed to be neutral or simply community-based but which are now being linked—due to their leadership, philosophy and fundraising goals—directly to the State and its political or economic interests. This is a precarious position to be in given the country's current international reputation and the fact that the State of Eritrea is currently under sanction.

X) ROSTER OF PRINCIPAL ISSUES

My research in the Eritrean diaspora community revealed a number of critical issues that the diaspora seeks to address, most of which are evident from the mandates of the organizations reviewed above. Recurring themes have been distilled to the following five overarching foreign policy concerns, which is by no means an exhaustive list. The prioritization of principal issues differs according to the segment of community or organization interviewed and the issues presented below are not in any particular order.

1. "Eritrean Sanctions Must Be Annulled and Repealed Today!" (E-SMART) Campaign

Many Eritreans in the diaspora are involved and concerned with the E-SMART (Eritrean Sanctions Must Be Annulled and Repealed Today!)[23] campaign, which mobilizes against the sanctions imposed on the state pursuant to the adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1907 (December 23, 2009) that was approved by 13 of 15 voting members at the UN Security Council on April 22, 2010.[24] The E-SMART campaign is an international diaspora-led effort to give voice to what is considered the unfair and unjust actions of the United Nations Security Council decision in April 2010 to sanction the Eritrean government based on what are considered to be false allegations of Eritrea's role in destabilizing the region. This issue's effect on the Eritrean diaspora today is highly complex. It is exacerbated by the lack of substantial evidence or access to classified information regarding critical claims by community leaders, and international actors including the UN and the Government of the State of Eritrea itself.

One of the most alarming claims, made by the U.S. Government and resulting in the imposition of sanctions on the Government of the State of Eritrea, is that the Eritrean government has been arming al-Shabab militants in Somalia, in an attempt to destabilize the U.S. and Ethiopia-backed Transitional Federal Government. The Eritrean government has fervently and consistently denied these claims. There have been recent statements by prominent security analysts (International Crisis Group) that conclude "Eritrea is not supporting al-Shabab"[25] and that the U.S. State Department has wrongly classified Eritrea as a state sponsor of terrorism.

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19   Qalna website, "About Us," www.qalna.com.

20   "Limbo" means they are accepted as Convention Refugees (UNHCR 1951) but cannot become permanent residents. These individuals cannot travel nor reunite with family members abroad and therefore experience significant ongoing difficulties.

21   Canadian Council for Refugees, Eritrean Canadian Community, Centre of Metropolitan Toronto (ECCC), Hidmona-Eritrean, Human Rights Group In Manitoba, Holy Trinity Eritrean Orthodox, Church in Toronto, Meftih Eritrea Community Newspaper, Qalna Eritrean Human Rights Group-Toronto, From Liberation to Limbo: A Report on the Impact of Immigration Security Inadmissibility Provisions on the Eritrean Communities in Canada, and Recommendations for Reform, submitted to the Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration and Public Safety, (2010) http://ccrweb.ca/files/from_liberation_to_limbo.pdf.

22   Mr. Amanuel Melles, (Director of the Capacity Building Unit, United Way Toronto), interview by Helen Tewolde, November 6, 2010.

23   E-SMART Campaign, http://www.eritrean-smart.org/.

24   With China abstaining and Libya voting Against. The measures imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1907 (2009) include: 1. a prohibition on the sale, supply or transfer of arms and related material to Eritrea and to persons designated by the UN sanctions committee established to oversee the sanctions against Somalia and Eritrea (the 751 Committee); 2. a prohibition on the provision to Eritrea and to persons designated by the 751 Committee of technical, training, financial or other assistance related to military activities or to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance or use of arms and related material of all types; 3. an assets freeze against persons designated by the 751 Committee; and 4. a travel ban against persons designated by the 751 Committee. Source: United Nations Act (P.C. 2010-479 April 22, 2010); "Regulations Implementing the United Nations Resolution on Eritrea ", Canada Gazette 144, no. 10, http://canadagazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2010/2010-05-12/html/sor-dors84-eng.html.

25   Michael Onyiego, "Analysts say Eritrea is not supporting Al-Shabab," Voice of America, July 21, 2010, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/-Analysts-say-Eritrea-is-Not-Supporting-al-Shabab--98924444.html.

2.   Border demarcation following Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission ruling in 2002

Prior to the E-SMART campaign, the main focus for a large segment of the diaspora since the beginning of the Border War (1998-2000) has been a dispute over the small border village of Badme. The diaspora has sought to bring international pressure on the UN and the Ethiopian government in order to ensure that the "final and binding" agreement produced by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC)—which situated Badme in Eritrea—is properly demarcated.[26]

This border war was fought at high humanitarian and economic costs. In Eritrea there was forced mobilization of more than 300,000 to 350,000 men and women at its early stage; an increase in military spending; lowered investment in the private sector and loss of agricultural output and port revenues. All of this severely strained the Eritrean economy.[27] Eritrea experienced a decline in real GDP growth from an impressive 7% in 1994 through to 1997, dropping to 0.3% in 1999, before finally plummeting to -13.2% in 2000.[28] The Government's Damage Assessment Team estimated the cost of destruction to households, public infrastructure and private establishments at $564 million USD, greater than Eritrea's GDP in 2000, which was $509 million USD. The war affected nearly 2.2 million people, with an estimated 1.1 million being directly displaced.[29] The bulk of these were elderly, women or children, and many were forced to live in camps for much of 2000 and into 2001.[30]

Ten years after the Algiers agreement, Eritrea and Ethiopia are in a "frozen conflict" where there is no war and no peace. Thus, the principal issue here is the delay in implementing the ruling after the Boundary Commission's final and binding decision for border demarcation. The lack of international support for the Eritrean government by the UN Security Council, despite attempts to reach out to the international community by the Government in the early years after the Border war, was viewed as a result of United States' aligned interests with the Ethiopian government as a response to the War on Terror, and is a cause of deep frustration among much of the Eritrean diaspora community. This situation was viewed by both the Eritrean diaspora community and many analysts as an intentional marginalization of Eritrean interests.

3.   Food security

Food security in Eritrea is a controversial issue. The Eritrean Government's policy on self-reliance is clear-cut: "foreign food aid demonizes the local people and makes them lazy."[31] While development experts diverge in their analysis on the effectiveness of foreign aid, the Eritrean policy on self-reliance was recently lauded in Dambisa Moyo's popular manifesto *Dead Aid.* [32] However, many in the diaspora allege that they are hearing the news of food shortages and experiencing the direct effect of inflation raising the price of food as they send remittances to relatives in the country. One person interviewed wondered: "what happens to those who don't have people outside to help them…are they starving to death? We don't know." The Eritrean government has stopped food aid and has no NGOs or bilateral organizations in the country. In a recent interview with Al-Jazeera, President Isaias Afwerki denied that there are food shortages in the country and asked: "Why do people want to spoon-feed us when we have enough food?" [33]

4.   Human rights and the new refugee crisis

The refugee crisis for Eritreans has always been severe and it is continually worsening. The Government announced its commitment to facilitate refugees' voluntary repatriation and to assist in their reintegration, which enabled even more Eritrean refugees to return to their homeland. A Tripartite Agreement for the voluntary repatriation of refugees between UNHCR and the Governments of the State of Eritrea and the Republic of Sudan was signed in April 2000. The 2008 UNCHR report claims that "in Africa, one-third of all positive decisions were rendered to Eritrean asylum-seekers."[34] The same report notes that, by nationality, the highest numbers of new asylum claims were filed by individuals originating from Zimbabwe (158,200), Myanmar (48,600) and Eritrea (43,300).[35]

According to UNHCR, 63,000 applied for asylum in 2009, and 1,800 cross over to Sudan every month.[36] This crisis reveals a further strain on Eritreans in the diaspora who are obligated to financially support not only their families in Eritrea but also to those who are leaving the country. They also carry the burden of financial costs related to sponsoring and integrating

26   In 2002, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) used colonial maps to legally place Badme inside Eritrean territory. See BBC News "Eritrean Badme Ruling Upheld," Monday, 31 March, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2903229.stm.

27   Amanuel Mehreteab, "'Border Conflict (1998- 2000)' and its Psychological Impact on Youth in Eritrea's Economic Survival," 28-77, in Sally Healy, "Eritrea's Economic Survival: Summary record of a conference held on 20 April 2007" (Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, April 2007), 30, http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/108632.

28   Library of Congress—Federal Research Division, Country Profile: Eritrea, (September 2005), 8, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/
profiles/Eritrea.pdf

29   World Bank, "Initial Project Information Document (PID): ERITREA-Eritrea: Emergency Reconstruction Supplemental Project," (May 29, 2003), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/06/02/
000104615_20030602140748/Rendered/PDF/PID0P082813.pdf

30   World Bank, International Development Association Proposed Supplemental Financing (In Grant) of SDR 10.9 Million (U.S.$15 Million Equivalent) to the State of Eritrea for the Emergency Reconstruction Project (Credit 3434-Er) (Report No. P 7590-ER, June 19,2003), 1, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/06/02/000012009_20030602094224/
Rendered/PDF/P75901ER1Supp01con1IDA1R20031012211.pdf.

31   Ambassador Girma Asmerom's (to the European Union) remarks to BBC, "Eritrea's Controversial Push to Feed Itself," December 24, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8428492.stm.

32   Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2009); see also Dambisa Moyo website: http://www.dambisamoyo.com/
deadaid.html

33   Eritrean president Isaias Afewerki, interview by Jane Dutton on Al Jazeera, February 22, 2010, http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/
talktojazeera/2010/02/201021921059338201.html.

34   UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency, 2008 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons (June 16, 2009), 18, http://www.unhcr.org/4a375c426.html.

35   Ibid.

36   Eritrean president Isaias Afewerki, interview by Jane Dutton on Al Jazeera, February 22, 2010, http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/
talktojazeera/2010/02/201021921059338201.html.

relatives to new host countries. The diminishing human rights situation in Eritrea since 2001 is widely noted as the cause of this crisis by international advocacy groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.[37] A Human Rights Watch 95-page report, *Service for Life: State Repression and Indefinite Conscription in Eritrea*, documents serious human rights violations by the Eritrean government, including arbitrary arrest, torture, appalling detention conditions, forced labour, and severe restrictions on freedom of movement, expression, and worship. It also analyzes the difficult situation faced by Eritreans who succeed in escaping to other countries such as Libya, Sudan, Egypt, and Italy.[38]

In a letter to Qalna dated March 2, 2010, former Foreign Affairs Minister, Lawrence Cannon, wrote the following: "The Government of Canada is concerned by the situation of Eritrean refugees in Libya and continues to monitor reports from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on the conditions of their detention […] Canada supports the efforts of the UNHCR to find durable solutions for Eritrean refugees. The Government of Canada recognizes that Eritreans forcibly returned to the country may face arrest without charge, detention, ill-treatment, torture, and even death at the hands of the authorities. Canada is preoccupied by Eritrea's human rights situation, particularly with regard to democracy and the rule of law, the imprisonment or ill-treatment of political opposition members and journalists, and the protection of civil liberties."[39]

5.   Socially responsible mining

Some key informants in this study identified that the recent opportunities for mineral extraction in Eritrea, with Bisha Mining Share Company (BMSC) (which is 60% owned by Vancouver-based Nevsun Resources and 40% by ENAMCO, the Eritrean National Mining Company), leaves the country susceptible to the same labour, human rights and environmental abuses that other countries have experienced as an inevitable resource curse, particularly in the Third World context. BMSC began gold production in 2010,[40] and already, there have been concerns in the United States and Canada about lax standards and regulations in Eritrea.[41] Advocacy for socially responsible mining in Eritrea is emerging in diaspora organizations that are principally concerned with exposing human rights violations in Eritrea.

XI) CANADA'S ROLE IN THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

As noted on the Government of Canada's website, relations between Canada and Eritrea are "good but limited." Canada has been engaged in mediating the Eritrea-Ethiopia border dispute and supports the 2000 Algiers Peace Agreement as the "sole framework for peace." In 2001, Canada sent 450 peacekeepers to the border region as part of a UN force with a mandate to prepare for the United Nations Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE). Canada is monitoring and concerned about Eritrea's human rights situation, particularly with regard to the respect for democracy and the rule of law, the imprisonment or ill-treatment of political opposition and journalists, and the protection of civil liberties. Canada does not currently provide bilateral assistance to Eritrea. Canada does, however, provide regional funding to multilateral partners, which may provide some benefit to Eritrea.

Bilateral trade with Eritrea is very limited. In 2009, Canadian exports totalled $2,392,424 while imports amounted to approximately $112,024. Canadian company Nevsun Resources has investments in Eritrea for ore and other mineral extractions due for production in late 2010. Canada, as a UN member-state, must domestically implement the legally binding sanctions against Eritrea and persons designated by a committee of the Security Council. However, implementation of the travel ban imposed by Resolution 1907 as described above is ensured in Canada under existing provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.[42]

XII) INTERFACE BETWEEN THE DIASPORA COMMUNITY AND THE FOREIGN POLICY COMMUNITY

The main avenues for exchange and consultation between the diaspora community and the foreign policy establishment seem to be one-way: the diaspora formally lobbies the Canadian government on critical issues affecting Eritrea and Eritreans via local representatives (MP or MPPs). Ten years ago, the organization known as Canada Peace Rally had a relatively strong capacity to monitor the Canadian government's position and engage with high-level bureaucrats

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37   Human Rights Watch, "Eritrea: Repression Creating Human Rights Crisis: Host Countries Should Cease Forced Returns of Eritrean Refugees," April 16, 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/04/16/
      eritrea-repression-creating-human-rights-crisis.
38   Human Rights Watch, Service for Life: State Repression and Indefinite Conscription in Eritrea (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/node/82284.
39   A letter written by The Honourable Lawrence Cannon, P.C., M.P., Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Haile Kiflai, Vice Chair, Qalna Eritrean Human Rights, March 2, 2010, http://www.qalna.com/
      Letter%20from%20Lawrence%20cannon.pdf.
40   Mineweb website, "Eritrea signs Bisha gold/base metals mining agreement with Nevsun," December 13, 2007, http://www.mineweb.com/
      mineweb/view/mineweb/en/page66?oid=41955&sn=Detail;
      Nevsun website, "Bisha Mine Reaches 70% Completion & Q4 Commissioning On Track," August 12, 2010, http://www.nevsun.com/news/2010/august12/.
41   Avinash Gavai, "Will new US focus on extraction operations abroad lead to changes here?" Embassy Magazine, June 2, 2010, http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=23792.
42   See Current Sanctions Regimes for Eritrea in the Canadian Economic Sanctions section of the Department of Foreign Affairs & International Trade (DFAIT) website, http://www.international.gc.ca/
      sanctions/eritrea-erythree.aspx?lang=eng&menu_id=45&menu=R.

to advocate for peace and make the case for an increase in development assistance; so did EriTree in their efforts at partnership with CIDA. Key informant interviews reveal that the diaspora does not now have informal access to the foreign policy community and that there is a lack of interest and representation in the community as it concerns Eritrea.

One key informant recalled an MP's advice to not waste their time trying to access the foreign policy community in Canada because Eritrea is "a poor African country and nobody will care." This caused the key informant to pose this question about the prioritization of foreign policy issues in Canada: "How are decisions related to diaspora issues made: Are they based on human rights law and norms or domestic economic interests?"

XIII) LESSONS FROM PARTNERSHIP WITH CIDA

A number of Eritreans were able to recall the attempted partnership with CIDA. The perspective has been the same: what does CIDA mean by "partnership" with diaspora communities and organizations? The role of small partners must be clarified. The experience of CIDA's partnership with EriTree, for example, reveals that a consultant paid for by CIDA assigned to support the organization was helpful and appreciated. Mr. Tekeste Foto recalls precisely: "We even hired someone who speaks and looks like CIDA, you know, without the accent, someone that was white. We knew this would be more effective and it was." Also, the perception is that CIDA prefers to work with large organizations to lead development efforts and the diaspora organizations could not compete in terms of financial, human resources and organizational capacity. The past president of EriTree, Mr. Ephrem Habteselassie explains: "I always resented that even though we worked so hard we were still not seen as credible. We developed a Board of Directors, we were able to get matching funds for our fundraising efforts, and did a lot of work to ensure the environment in Eritrea was responsive. We even set up an office in Eritrea which was not easy to do. But, still, we were not credible. What is credibility then?"[43]

Some organizers recall that in order to work with CIDA there had to be a clear return on their investment—Canadian products had to be purchased and there had to be some positive effect on the Canadian economy. The perception is that CIDA focuses on high-level foreign policy but does not consider grassroots needs, expertise or advice. This high-level priority setting makes it fundamentally unfair for smaller diaspora organizations directly invested in development efforts: "We understand the focus of coordinating and harmonizing foreign aid—but the collateral damage is that poor countries like Eritrea get forgotten."[44]

XIV) GAP ANALYSIS

As the role of Canada in Eritrea is limited, such are the diaspora's policy inputs. Interviews conducted for this research revealed a number of challenges and gaps that Eritreans in the Canadian diaspora experience when attempting to navigate the Canadian foreign policy community.

XV) CHALLENGES—CANADIAN GOVERNMENT

1. **No clear policy on engagement**
   What does successful advocacy look like? How can individuals or organizations access the Minister? What are the criteria?

2. **Lack of funding**
   Successful lobbying/advocacy requires resources for fact-finding missions, project development, getting to and from Ottawa, etc. Most Eritrean diaspora organizations do this work on a volunteer basis with very few donations, which affects the quality and consistency of efforts. While it may not make sense for the Canadian government to fund advocacy/lobbying groups, the government can definitely play a facilitation/convening/co-ordinating role among low-capacity groups and potential funders/resources as a way to increase substantive civic and political engagement on issues the diaspora community truly cares about.

3. **Lack of diversity in the Department of Foreign Affairs**
   The lack of adequate representation in the Department poses a challenge for grassroots diaspora groups that may have community-based or non-conventional ways of engagement with the government. Responsiveness to the diversity of approaches is important.

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43   Mr. Ephrem Habteselassie (past President, EriTree Canada), interview by Helen Tewolde, September 2010.
44   Ibid.

4. **Lack of clarity on Canadian foreign policy interests**
    Interests seem ad hoc and inconsistent at times. What is the rationale on prioritizing issues? How does the government come to its decisions? What is their position on Eritrea? As one person noted, "If we knew the policy, we could work accordingly…"

5. **Perception of an overly-politicized diaspora**
    There is a sense that diaspora organizations are too political. This phenomenon results in a lack of acknowledgement and engagement of the critical intelligence and networks of diaspora groups. Most of the diaspora actors in this study perceived that their input was not valued when it came to development efforts in their homeland (both in the diaspora countries and in Eritrea). This reveals a gap in terms of engagement as it is not clear where advocates should focus their time and efforts for maximum effect.

XVI) CHALLENGES—ERITREAN DIASPORA COMMUNITY:

1. **Lack of understanding of and engagement** with procedures in Canadian politics/policymaking;

2. **Lack of funding and resources** for grassroots advocacy organizations to develop their work further;

3. **Community insularity, so that** while some groups try to engage non-Eritreans in their attempt to broaden their advocacy strategy, it is difficult because many Eritreans want to work in Tigrinya (the dominant Eritrean language); and

4. **Real and perceived fear** by individuals, organizations and faith-based institutions attempting to lead or expose their real concerns/issues: "…you're doing things at the risk of yourself and your family members that you've left behind…"

LIST OF DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS IN ERITREA

Source: African Development Bank Group (2009-2011) Country Strategy Paper

DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS' ACTIVITIES

Organization/Institution	Current Program and areas of Focus
WORLD BANK	**Operational Framework: FY** 2009-2010 Interim Strategy Note **Focus:** infrastructure (energy, port and telecommunication) and human capital development (health and education) **Funding:** USD $70.73 million (IDA 15 2009/11)
EU	**Operational Framework:** 2009-2013: Country Strategy Paper (under preparation) - Program under 10th EDF **Focus:** food security/rural development— livestock production, marketing and pricing (€70 million), road infrastructure and regional connections (€30 million) and capacity building (€22 million) **Funding:** €122 million for six years
IFAD	**Operational Framework: Four year Plan** **Focus:** recovery and rural development— food security (crop and livestock production and irrigation components) **Funding:** Estimated allocation per year of USD $15-16 million
UN SYSTEM	**Operational Framework:** 2009-2010 Strategy (under preparation) **Focus:** Development program (capacity building, health and education) and political dialogue **Funding:** USD $10 million per annum
NORWAY	**Operational Framework:** 2009-2010 Strategy (under preparation) **Focus:** Development program (capacity building, health and education) and political dialogue **Funding:** USD $10 million per annum
IMF	**Operational Framework:** No Fund program in place. **Dialogue:** 2009 Article IV Consultation Report.
CHINA	**Focus:** telecommunication, industry, education and agriculture (food security) **i)** Telecommunication project USD $20 million (2006) **ii)** Cement factory USD $40 million (2007)

CASE STUDY #4
THE SRI LANKAN DIASPORA IN CANADA

Suthamie Poologasingham

PROFILE:

I) HISTORY AND DEMOGRAPHIC

The Sri Lankan diaspora demonstrates transnational citizenry and multiculturalism through its political, cultural, social, and economic contributions in Canada and Sri Lanka. The rich experiences of this multi-ethnic and multi-religious community should be an asset to shaping and informing Canadian foreign policy. However, to date the diasporic community has played only a minimal role, directing its efforts through a limited number of organizations and institutions.

Canada is home to one of the largest Sri Lankan diasporas in the world. While data from the Canadian government indicates there are 105,670 Sri Lankan-born immigrants in Canada,[1] this data is not representative of the total Sri Lankan-Canadian population; it excludes those of Sri Lankan origin born in Canada as well as other birth places such as Germany, France, etc. More common estimates of the total Sri Lankan diaspora in Canada range from 350,000 to over 450,000.[2] The Sri Lankan diaspora in Canada is made up of several ethnic groups, with the vast majority identifying themselves as Tamils, although Sinhalese, Muslims, Burghers and Malay Sri Lankans are also represented in the above figures.

Prior to World War II, Sri Lankan migration to Canada was limited, as immigration was restricted to fifty Sri Lankan (non-sponsored) immigrants, per annum. In 1967, immigration laws were revised to incorporate a points system, opening up Canada's borders to additional Asian immigrants. The earliest Sri Lankan migrants left Sri Lanka because of government restrictions that hindered employment and education opportunities.[3] Thereafter, ethnic riots and tensions in the early 1980s as well as an increase in Sinhalese nationalism spurred an exodus of mainly Sri Lankan Tamil refugee migrants into Canada. The 1990s also saw Canada open its doors to approximately 80 % of Sri Lankan Tamil applicants as a result of Sri Lanka's 30-year-long civil conflict.[4] As a result, an important characteristic of the composition of the diasporic community in Canada is the reversal of the minority-majority role: Tamils account for a minority of the population in Sri Lanka, but they comprise the majority of the Sri Lankan diaspora in Canada.[5]

II) RELIGIOUS, LINGUISTIC AND FAMILIAL CHARACTERISTICS

The religious composition of the Sri Lankan diaspora in Canada includes Hindus, Buddhists, Muslims, Christians and Catholics. The majority of the Tamils and Sinhalese practice Hinduism and Buddhism, respectively.

According to the 2006 Census, 10,845 and 122,020 Canadians marked Sinhala and Tamil respectively as their mother tongue.[6]

Collectivism − an emphasis on a collective group instead of the individual − is a defining characteristic of the Sri Lankan diaspora. It is visible through: the weight attributed to the ties of kinship, despite world-wide migration; an increase in Canada of Family Class immigration;[7] and the substantial amounts of money sent by diaspora members in Canada in the form of remittances to support the daily and supplementary needs of family still living in Sri Lanka. Total worldwide remittances sent to Sri Lanka in 2004 through formal methods alone was recorded at USD $1.3 billion.[8] While exact figures for funding and donations sent through the Sri Lankan Canadian diaspora are unknown, the figure is assumed to be substantial given the large number of Sri Lankan Canadians.

1   Statistics Canada, 2006 Census (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 2006).
2   Interview with two Consul Generals of Sri Lanka to Canada and the Canadian Tamil Congress by Suthamie Poologasingham, 2010.
3   Paul R. Magocsi, ed., Encyclopedia of Canada's Peoples (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).
4   International Crisis Group, "The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora After the LTTE," February 23, 2010.
5   Government of the United States, "Background Note: Sri Lanka" (Washington, D.C., 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm.
6   Refers to the first language learned at home in childhood and still understood by the individual at the time of the census. This includes Indian Tamils; Sri Lankan Tamils are assumed to make up the majority of the Canadian Tamil speaking population.
7   The balance of entry of immigration applicants is thought to have shifted from mainly refugee class to family class applicants. Anne Milan, Migration International: 2009 (Ottawa: Ministry of Industry, July 2011).
8   Priya Deshingkar and M. M. M. Aheeyar, Remittances in Crisis: Sri Lanka After the Tsunami (London: The Humanitarian Policy Group at Overseas August 2006); Esperanza Lasagabaster, Samuel Maimbo Munzele, and Sriyani Hulugalle, "Sri Lanka's Migrant Labor Remittances" (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, December 2005).

III) IMMIGRATION

Since 2001, Canada has received approximately 4,000 to over 5,000 new Sri Lankan-born immigrants annually. While Sri Lanka was among the top 10 source countries for Canadian landed immigrants in 1991, 2001 and 2008, the numbers overall have been on the decline. As of 2009 Sri Lanka is no longer a top 10 source country of new immigrants to Canada.[9]

IV) CANADA'S ROLE IN SRI LANKA

Aid and Assistance: Canada has a longstanding and robust relationship with its Commonwealth partner that spans over half a century. It is exemplified by the Sri Lanka Canada Friendship Road leading from the Katunayaka Airport in Colombo, which was constructed pursuant to Canada's "Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific." Over the years, Canada has provided development, humanitarian and election monitoring assistance to Sri Lanka in the form of both funding and personnel. In 2009-2010, Canada's assistance to Sri Lanka totalled approximately $31.3 million.[10] However, Sri Lanka is no longer designated a recipient of bilateral assistance by CIDA, which now provides 80% of its bilateral resources to only twenty countries in order to ensure greater effectiveness and accountability. Countries are selected based on need, capacity to benefit from aid and alignment with Canadian foreign policy priorities. Sri Lanka has not been placed on that list.

Tourism: Canada was among the top 10 source countries for visitors to Sri Lanka in 2008. In 2005, more than 21,000 Canadian tourists visited Sri Lanka, representing 2.3% of all tourists.[11] While tourism has recently declined due to political instability and conflict,[12] the number of Canadian tourists is expected to increase in the future.

Politics: Sri Lanka's polarizing conflict has been perpetuated by successive governments and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

The country's civil conflict has roots in legitimate grievances held by the minority Tamil population, dating from Sri Lanka's independence from British rule. While steps were taken to address some of these grievances by various Sri Lankan governments, a subsequent rise in Sinhala nationalism and ethnic violence against the minority community in 1983 led to at least 1,000 killings and the destruction of 18,000 properties.[13] The impunity of the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) during that time added to other grievances and encouraged the rise of the LTTE as a force of opposition to the government.

The LTTE formed in the early 1970s as a separatist movement to address the Tamil minority's grievances with the GoSL. The complex history of the group includes its eventual development into a militant organization engaging in tactics such as political assassinations, suicide bombings and the stifling of political pluralism within the Tamil community. The LTTE was first banned by the Indian government in 1992 following its alleged involvement in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the former Prime Minister of India.[14] In 2006, it was designated as a terrorist organization by Canada pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism Act.[15] This designation also helped stem diaspora funding of the LTTE's activities. The LTTE has played a distinct role in the Sri Lankan civil conflict, at one point controlling major regions of Sri Lanka in the north and east and participating in peace talks with the GoSL. In a final conflict in 2009, the LTTE was militarily defeated by the GoSL.

Following this conclusion, Canada's foreign policies have stressed the need for the GoSL to "present a viable political solution … to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of all Sri Lankan citizens."[16] Sri Lanka's current goals, however, emphasize economic development over political reconciliation. Within the current political environment, there is also little room for political dissent[17] or freedom of the press.[18]

9   Anne Milan, Migration International: 2009 (Ottawa: Ministry of Industry, July 2011).

10   Canadian International Development Agency, Government of Canada, "Sri Lanka" (2011), http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/srilanka-e#a1.

11   Sri Lankan Tourism Development Authority, Annual Statistical Report 2009.

12   Ibid.

13   Chandrika Kumaratunga, President Kumaratunga's speech at the 21st Anniversary of 'Black July', Presidential Secretariat (Colombo, July 23, 2004).

14   Supreme Court of India, Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction, rulings by Justice K.T. Thomas, Justice D.P. Wadhwa, Justice Quadri, Central Bureau of Investigation, 1998, http://cbi.nic.in.

15   Public Safety Canada Government of Canada, "Currently Listed Entities," June 2008. Note: pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism Act

16   Government of Canada, "Canada-Sri Lanka Relations," March 2011, http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/sri_lanka/
     bilateral_relations_bilaterales/canada-srilanka.aspx?lang = eng&view = d.

17   Mosaic Institute, "'What's Next for Sri Lanka?'—Session of the Young Canadians' Peace Dialogue on Sri Lanka" (Toronto, September 2010).

18   Committee to Protect Journalists, "19 Journalists Killed in Sri Lanka since 1992/Motive Confirmed," New York, 2011, http://www.cpj.org/killed/asia/sri-lanka.

V) EXISTING ORGANIZATIONS AND NETWORKS

A) Overview

There are hundreds of organizations that Sri Lankan-Canadians access for their varying needs. These include cultural, religious and gender-specific associations; political, humanitarian, and resettlement organizations; business and trade associations; university-affiliated associations; 300 high school alumni networks (or "Old Boys/Old Girls" associations) and Sri Lankan home village associations;[19] and sports clubs. Many of the organizations hold multiple mandates that range from local initiatives (such as assisting new immigrants in settlement and integration) to transnational initiatives (such as providing development and other remittances to Sri Lanka). The majority of organizations—including cultural, religious and university/youth associations—are comprised of specific ethnic groups, while sports and business associations tend to integrate all ethnicities, even if sports associations tend to be either segregated by gender or the exclusive domain of men (e.g. cricket).

Organizations from within the diaspora that have partially or exclusively political mandates tend to engage robustly with the media and the Canadian government. Such organizations are often a go-to point of contact for the media as well. For example, it was not rare to see the same organizations quoted in multiple media outlets on issues pertaining to Sri Lanka, especially during the final phase of the civil conflict.

An example of such an organization within the Tamil community is the Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC). It is one of the best-known and most active groups representing the Tamil diaspora in Canada, with 11 chapters across the country. The organization acts as a community voice for a variety of issues, including concerns arising from the civil conflict in Sri Lanka, with a particular focus on any mistreatment of Tamils in Sri Lanka. The CTC is also involved in civic engagement and community building; for example, the organization raised $35,000 for the Canadian Cancer Society in 2010.

Another organization from within the Sinhalese community is the Sri Lanka United National Association (SLUNA). That group's stated mission is to "uphold, unequivocally, the sovereignty, territorial integrity and the national unity of both Canada and Sri Lanka."[20]

There are a number of smaller and newer organizations that also merit mention, in part because they connect their Canadian members to larger, more global political movements concerning the future of Sri Lanka. These include the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (established in 2010) which has elected 135 representatives worldwide and 25 in Canada,[21] and the National Council of Canadian Tamils (also established in 2010), which has 43 elected representatives from Canada. Both of these organizations advocate for the self-determination of Tamils in Sri Lanka.

B) Barriers

Doubts have been cast upon the integrity of virtually all Tamil Canadian organizations due to direct affiliations that exist between select diaspora organizations and the LTTE. For instance, in 2008, the World Tamil Movement (WTM), then active in Canada, was identified as a terrorist group pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism Act.[22] The community organization was listed as a leading front organization for the LTTE and accused by Human Rights Watch of extorting the Tamil diaspora for contributions through intimidation and harassment.[23] The confusion over which individuals or organizations might have either sympathies for or ties to terrorist organizations has arguably complicated the relationship between the Government of Canada and the broader Sri Lankan diaspora, as well as Canada's bilateral relationship with the GoSL.

Prior to the designation of the LTTE as a terrorist organization, a majority of donors in the Tamil diaspora willingly contributed to them.[24] Many contributors, affected by the civil war, viewed the LTTE as the only viable force with enough clout to negotiate with the GoSL.[25] At the same time, most Tamil-Canadians also supported the need for a peaceful resolution to the longstanding minority grievances in Sri Lanka.[26] Canadian authorities, the media, and Sri Lankan-Canadian leaders collectively were responsible for the poor understanding of the distinction between the LTTE and law-abiding members of the Tamil community; as a result of public misperceptions, anti-Tamil sentiment and suspicion

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19   Rudramoorthy Cheran, "Transnationalism, Development and Social Capital: Tamil Community Networks in Canada" in
     Luin Goldring and Sailaja Krishnamurti, eds., Organizing the Transnational, Labour, Politics and Social Change (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008).
20   Limited information is provided on the Sri Lankan United National Association website regarding current community initiatives, http://webhome.idirect.com/~sluna/index1.htm (2010).
21   Noor Javed, "Toronto Tamils vote on transnational government to gain voice," Toronto Star, April 28, 2010.
22   Public Safety Canada Government of Canada (2011), "Currently Listed Entities," June 2008. Note: pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism Act.
23   Human Rights Watch, "Funding the 'Final War'—LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora," Human Rights Watch Report 18, no. 1, March, 2006.
24   Ibid.
25   Interviews with community associations, July 2010; interviews with Diaspora members. Note: Contributions were made for a variety of reasons other than arming the LTTE; these also included a desire to satisfy the development needs of the war-affected areas and humanitarian needs of civilians living in the LTTE controlled regions.
26   Interviews with community associations, July 2010; Interviews with Diaspora members.

increased in Canada.[27] Examples ran the gamut from Tamil-Canadians experiencing discrimination from employers and co-workers in their workplaces[28] to the rhetoric surrounding the arrival of the MV Sun Sea boat on Canada's west coast, filled with Tamil refugees, all of whom were portrayed by the Department of Public Safety as potential terrorists.[29] Even more recently, during the Spring 2011 election campaign, a Progressive Conservative Tamil candidate was accused of having links to the LTTE even though he had been thoroughly vetted by party officials.[30]

Suspicions among the incumbent GoSL in regards to Canadian political organizations, representatives of Tamil-Canadian constituents and the Tamil diaspora have also complicated official bilateral relations between Sri Lanka and Canada. In one extreme example, Bob Rae, a federal MP and Opposition Critic for Foreign Affairs, was denied entry into Sri Lanka when he arrived in Colombo, despite having already been issued an entry visa by Sri Lankan officials in Ottawa.[31]

Taken all together, these various factors illustrate the complexity of the environment within which the Government of Canada, and in particular the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, engages with the Sri Lankan diaspora in Canada.

VI) ROSTER OF PRINCIPAL ISSUES

When they consider Canada's official engagement with Sri Lanka, members of the Sri Lankan diaspora in Canada identify a number of issues of critical concern. These include: persistent humanitarian and development needs in Sri Lanka; the status and effectiveness of inter-community reconciliation efforts; governance challenges; and family reunification. Since the interviews for this case study were first conducted in late 2010, the international accountability of the GoSL has also taken centre stage as an issue of concern to the diaspora.

Humanitarian and development work by the Sri Lankan diaspora focuses on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of areas affected by the civil war, the 2004 tsunami and poverty. Diaspora activities include extensive fundraising to rebuild schools, hospitals and community centers. After the 2004 tsunami in Sri Lanka, three community radio stations and one TV station raised $2.5 million.[32] In addition to monetary contributions, knowledge transfer through professional and academic exchanges has also been important.

Conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Sri Lanka is another area of interest. While some organizations carefully refrain from taking a substantive position on how to address conflict and promote reconciliation in Sri Lanka, other organizations do align themselves either in favour of or opposed to such possible political solutions to persistent inter-community conflict as the establishment of a separate homeland for Tamils, or the decentralization of specific powers from Colombo to the various regions of Sri Lanka.

At the height of the Sri Lankan civil war in 2009, the Sri Lankan diaspora renewed its interest and efforts in peacebuilding. For example, Hearts for Harmony was an event led by a group of Sinhalese youth who sought to donate outside of their community by fundraising for internally displaced Tamils in Sri Lanka.[33] Another example is the Roots for Reconciliation event, led by Sri Lankans without Borders, a group of Tamil and Sinhalese professionals who provide opportunities for all Sri Lankan Canadians to engage in dialogue and work together towards common goals.[34] A "Young Canadians Peace Dialogue on Sri Lanka" hosted by the Mosaic Institute and the Trudeau Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies led to the establishment of BuildChange, an initiative by young adults in Tamil and Sinhalese communities to construct wells and provide for the most basic needs of families in the war-affected Wanni region.[35] That same peace dialogue also resulted in a Final Statement about the need to pursue poverty reduction, pluralism and peacebuilding efforts in Sri Lanka. More than 50 young leaders from all Sri Lankan communities in Canada signed the statement before it was submitted to the Government of Canada, the Sri Lankan High Commission in Ottawa, and to media outlets active in the Canadian Sri Lankan community.

Transparency is an issue of significant concern to the Sri Lankan diaspora in Canada. Members of the community have sought assurances that Canadian funding for Sri Lankan-based projects, including humanitarian assistance provided by the Canadian government, reaches the intended recipients on the ground (e.g. tsunami victims and internally displaced

27   Institute for Research and Public Policy Symposium (Ottawa, September 2007).
28   Interviews with members of the Diaspora, 2010-2011; Institute for Research and Public Policy Symposium (Ottawa, September 2007).
29   Of the 492 Tamil migrants aboard the MV Sun Sea only four have been deported for their links to the LTTE; Douglas Quan, "MV Sun Sea crew member cleared of people smuggling," PostMedia News, June 2011.
30   Anthony Reinhart, "Tories' bid to win over South Asians opens party to Tamil Tiger remnant," The Globe and Mail, March 2011, regarding PC candidate Shan Thayaparan; The Canadian Press, "Hudak denies Conservative candidate has ties to banned Tamil group," March 2011.
31   Mike Blanchfield, "Ottawa rips Sri Lanka for deporting 'security threat' Bob Rae," National Post, June 10, 2009.
32   Priya Deshingkar and M. M. M. Aheeyar, Remittances in Crisis: Sri Lanka After the Tsunami (London: The Humanitarian Policy Group at Overseas August 2006); Esperanza Lasagabaster, Samuel Maimbo Munzele, and Sriyani Hulugalle, "Sri Lanka's Migrant Labor Remittances" (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, December 2005).
33   Proceeds from the Canadian event amounting to over $5,000 were donated to Act Lanka (www.actlanka.org),which in 2009 used the funds to purchase medicine for internally-displaced persons (IDPs) in Sri Lanka; Interviews with Community associations, July 2010;
34   Sri Lankans Without Borders website, www.srilankanswithoutborders.ca.
35   BuildChange website, www.buildchange.ca.

peoples). International NGOs, the GoSL and the LTTE have all been thought to lack transparency at various times, and members of the GoSL and the LTTE have been accused of corruption, bribery and the inappropriate use of funds. The inefficient and inappropriate use of funds as well as insufficient use of local employees for in-country positions by certain international NGOs has also been alleged.[36]

Family reunification and the desire to speed the processing of refugee claims by Tamil Sri Lankans is a point of heightened concern. Community organizations, prominent and well-connected individuals and some provincial and federal Ministers were inundated with requests to assist in this matter at the height of the Sri Lankan civil war in 2009. Concerns about the conditions faced by would-be refugees in Sri Lanka were intensified by the arrival of 76 Sri Lankan Tamil refugee claimants off the coast of British Columbia in May 2009, followed by 490 more claimants in August 2010.

Accountability and verification of the last stages of the civil conflict is an area of distress and anger for the Tamil diaspora and human rights organizations.[37] This was heightened in 2011 by the release of a report by a committee reporting to the UN Secretary-General, and by a documentary produced by Britain's Channel 4 News.

A report was issued by the UN Secretary-General's "Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka" in March 2011. The report highlights credible allegations that both the GoSL and the LTTE committed war crimes and crimes against humanity in the last stages of the war in 2009. Allegations against members of the GoSL and the Sri Lankan Army include the shelling of hospitals, the denial of humanitarian assistance, violating the human rights of conflict survivors, and intimidating and silencing members of the media and other critical observers of the war. Allegations against LTTE members include: the use of civilians as human buffers; the killing of civilians fleeing LTTE control; the use of military equipment in proximity to civilians; and the forced recruitment of children.[38]

The expert panel stated that, "multiple sources of information indicate that a range of up to 40,000 civilian deaths cannot be ruled out at this stage."[39] Furthermore, the UN panel determined that there was little confidence that justice would be served in the existing political environment in Sri Lanka despite the establishment of a Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission by the GoSL. The latter was deemed "deeply flawed" by the panel.[40]

Around the same time as this report was issued, Britain's Channel 4 News released a documentary entitled "Sri Lanka's Killing Fields." The film describes the final weeks of war in 2009 "around the time when thousands of Tamil Canadians demonstrated in Ottawa and Toronto to pressure the Canadian government to ask its Sri Lankan counterpart for a ceasefire."[41] The documentary contains graphic video footage of war crimes allegedly perpetrated by members of the Sri Lankan army. (Since this case study was issued, the GoSL released a video titled *Lies Agreed Upon*, a point by point rebuttal to the human rights allegations in the Channel 4 documentary.)

Gordon Weiss, the UN's spokesperson in Colombo in 2009 and a veteran journalist, also released a book supporting claims of complicity by the GoSL and the LTTE in the high civilian death toll;[42] his book further sounds an alarm regarding the lack of a credible war crimes investigation by the GoSL which not only has domestic consequences but could also set a dangerous precedent for other countries mired in conflict.

Most organizations have taken a strong position on the subject of accountability. Many of the associations interviewed in preparation for writing this case study were extremely supportive of the establishment of an independent, international inquiry into war crimes in Sri Lanka; only a few were opposed to the idea. Those supportive of the international inquiry pointed out that the GoSL would be incapable of conducting its own effective inquiry, as twenty years of ineffectual GoSL commissions of inquiry have demonstrated. They also pointed to a "formal justice system in tatters."[43] Those opposed to the international community convening an inquiry in Sri Lanka believed that the panel was interfering "in the internal affairs of a sovereign state."[44]

The categories of concern listed above are not the only ones held by the members of the Sri Lankan diaspora living in Canada. Other concerns include freedom of the press and freedom of assembly in Sri Lanka, the resettlement of displaced

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36   Interview with Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickramanayaka, regarding the inappropriate use of NGO funding for their personal welfare instead of for that of displaced peoples. Indika Sri Aravinda, "NGO Act to be Amended," Daily Mirror, February 28, 2010, http://www.dailymirror.lk/index.php/news/1911-ngo-act-to-be-amended.html.

37   Amnesty International, "When will they get justice? Failures of Sri Lanka's Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission," 2011; International Crisis Group, "Reconciliation in Sri Lanka: Harder than Ever" Asia Report no. 209, July 18 2011, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/209-reconciliation-in-sri-lanka-harder-than-ever.asp.

38   United Nations. Report on the Secretary-General's Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, March 31, 2011

39   Ibid., 41.

40   Ibid., 96.

41   Samy Yiagadeesen, "How the world should react to 'Sri Lanka's Killing Fields'," Toronto Star, June 23, 2011. Samy Yiagadeesen is Associate Professor of International Affairs at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa.

42   Gordon Weiss, The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers (London: The Bodley Head, 2011).

43   Amnesty International, "Twenty Years of Make Believe, Sri Lanka's Commission of Inquiry," 2009; Canadian Tamil Congress, "Canadian Tamil Congress urges meaningful action on UN Report," April 26, 2011; Other press releases of organizations reviewed include Coalition to Stop the War in Sri Lanka and the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam.

44   Sri Lanka United National Association, "UN Secretary General's Panel on Sri Lanka is a Blunder of Serious Proportions," July 11, 2010, http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2010/07/11/un-secretary-general%E2%80%99s-panel-on-sri-lanka-is-a-blunder-of-serious-proportions-2/.

people, and the country's increasing militarization. In July 2011, Sri Lanka's Parliament extended the country's Emergency Regulations for another month. The fear of unfounded violence as a result of these stringent measures is demonstrated by an attack on five parliamentarians from the Tamil National Alliance,[45] allegedly by armed soldiers,[46] and the impunity towards similar attacks on civil society organizations and media outlets.[47] The issue of the well-being of all Sri Lankans, especially vulnerable groups, will be of continued concern to the diaspora.

VII) INTERFACE BETWEEN THE DIASPORA AND FOREIGN POLICY COMMUNITY

Interactions between most of the Sri Lankan diaspora organizations in Canada interviewed for this case study and the foreign policy community appear to be minimal. Regular and consistent interaction is limited to a few organizations.

Those groups that interact with Canadian federal government officials typically do so through informal and indirect correspondence, including letters, petitions, phone calls and protests. In addition, cabinet ministers and Members of Parliament are invited to community events, providing brief opportunities for personal interaction with the diaspora.

Access to federal networks is based on historical, personal and political connections. Some of the access larger organizations have to federal networks is based on their standing and credibility within their respective Tamil or Sinhala communities. Other interest groups that have personal connections may include "academics, or former diplomats ... who would express their views on Sri Lanka."[48] Finally, some organizations rely on networks they develop through their relations with Canadian political parties or Sri Lankan government representatives. At the same time, a few organizations try to inform the federal government indirectly through the use of media coverage. While certain organizations have received extensive coverage and publish regular press releases, none of the organizations rely solely on the press to correspond with the federal government. As one interviewee noted, their message of humanitarian relief "got derailed ... due to the media frenzy"[49] during the 2009 Tamil protests.

Only two organizations interviewed mentioned direct and regular correspondence with federal officials on a monthly or weekly basis. Direct methods of communication include presenting policy recommendations and holding meetings.

VIII) OUTREACH

Outreach initiated by the Canadian government is often ad hoc and depends on current concerns of the governing federal party. Outreach often takes the form of a public forum to discuss a particular issue. For example, community organizations were invited by Citizenship and Immigration to discuss the Balanced Refugee Reform Act (Bill C11); they were also invited to meet with former Prime Minister Paul Martin after the 2004 tsunami, prior to his trip to Sri Lanka. These public forums help to garner further insights and sentiments from the affected communities.

More consistent outreach is initiated by a few community organizations and individuals. During the height of the Sri Lankan civil war in February 2009, an emergency parliamentary debate was held in the House of Commons to which diaspora organizations were invited to provide input.[50] The fact that the debate was held at all likely reflects the high degree of outrage around the war communicated by constituents to their Members of Parliament.[51]

IX) CAPACITY

Within the majority of Sri Lankan organizations, no earmarked funding exists for the purpose of initiating or maintaining relationships with the federal government. Where there is capacity, volunteers and board members reach out and educate the government based on their knowledge of the topic (such as conflict, immigration, or trade) using the personal, business and political networks they possess.

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45   The Tamil National Alliance is a minority political alliance which was formed as an amalgamation of moderate Tamil parties as well as a number of former rebel groups
46   Harim Peiris, "International Squeeze Tightens as Domestic Policy Tightens," June 23, 2011, http://harimpeiris.com/2011/06/23/international-squeeze-tightens-as-domestic-policy-hardens. Harim was a Sri Lankan Presidential spokesperson from 2001-2005.
47   Reporters Without Borders, "Tamil journalist gets 'shameful' 20-year sentence on terrorism charges," August 31, 2009,
http://en.rsf.org/sri-lanka-tamil-journalist-gets-shameful-20-31-08-2009,34343;
Reporters Without Borders, "No news of political cartoonist one year after his disappearance," January 24, 2011,
 http://en.rsf.org/sri-lanka-no-news-of-political-cartoonist-24-01-2011,39384.html.
48   Interview with federal government employee, July 2010.
49   Interview with community association, July 2010.
50   Government of Canada, 40th Parliament Second Session—(Emergency Debate), February 4, 2009.
51   New Democratic Party, "New Democrats called for emergency debate on Sri Lanka," February 5, 2009, www.ndp.ca.

X) EFFECTIVENESS

Sri Lankan organizations in Canada hold mixed views about whether the government adequately responds to their input.

One organization felt that the federal government could have played a larger role in the Sri Lankan conflict. For example, the Canadian government failed to appoint a special envoy, who would have facilitated communications with the Sri Lankan government and advanced Canada's humanitarian and democratic interests. Another organization spoke about the lack of a Canadian trade office in Sri Lanka to strengthen bilateral relations.

Alternatively, one association felt the federal government does "pay attention but also has [its] own way of dealing with the issues."[52] For example, in June 2009, actions were taken to expedite immigration applications from Sri Lanka for persons who were "directly and significantly affected by the humanitarian situation."[53] This directive is believed to be partially in response to formal concerns presented by several Sri Lankan diaspora and international humanitarian organizations.

Despite these mixed sentiments, there was consensus among all organizations interviewed that there is a need for mechanisms to allow transnational Canadian communities to inform foreign policy. While one Tamil organization felt that the local Tamil community is well organized, they believed that not all communities have the organizational capacity to reach out to the federal government regarding policy work, and felt this barrier should be eliminated.

XI) ASSESSMENT OF POLICY INPUTS AND GAP ANALYSIS

Most of the contributions provided by the Sri Lankan diaspora are closely aligned with Canadian values, such as the pursuit of social justice and the development of civil society. However, two barriers must be overcome before the diaspora's inputs can be viewed as truly representative and impartial, and only a process of engagement that is transparent, all-inclusive, and consciously seeks to bring together the various entities within the Sri Lankan diaspora can help to overcome them.

First, given the lack of dedicated resources for most grassroots groups, and little consistent opportunity for interaction with federal departments, engagement is often left up to larger umbrella organizations and policy-focused institutions. In addition to their community work, these large institutions have either actively engaged the Canadian federal government and are therefore seen as "citizen experts," or possess political connections that enhance their credibility. A common concern that results from this engagement is that it effectively shuts out the voices of other valuable grassroots groups even if they are constituent members of the umbrella organizations.

Second, there remains reluctance by the federal government to engage with any organizations that hold either real or perceived ties to the LTTE. As one federal employee stated "the [Canadian] government won't risk any defacing of its public image."[54] Given the complexity of the Sri Lankan community organizations, due diligence, trust-building and ongoing efforts to engage in consistent outreach are required.

Canada's Sri Lankan diaspora has deep-rooted connections to their homeland through family ties, humanitarian work, political affiliations, trade, and travel. If cultivated systematically and transparently, this transnational community's skill set and dedication could help to advance Canadian foreign policy in Sri Lanka and produce effective solutions that will ultimately benefit both countries and their citizens.

52   Interview with community association, July 2010
53   Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Government of Canada. "Sri Lanka Initiative—Applications for Family Class Members and Dependants of in-Canada Permanent Residence Applicants Affected by the Current Humanitarian Situation" (Operational Bulletin 119, June 3, 2009), http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/bulletins/2009/ob119.asp.
54   Interview with federal government employee, July 2010.

ADDITIONAL REFERENCES

Primary and secondary research—please refer to Appendix A

The Canadian Geographer, *Aid, conflict and migration: the Canada-Sri Lanka connection*, September 2003;

Cheran, Rudramoorthy, *Diaspora Circulation and Transnationalism as Agents for Change in the Post Conflict Zones of Sri Lanka,* September 2003

Magocsi, R. Paul Editor, *Encyclopedia of Canada's Peoples*, Multicultural History Society of Ontario-1999;

Wolfram Zunzer, *Diaspora Communities and Civil Conflict Transformation*, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, September 2004

APPENDIX A—PRIMARY AND SECONDARY RESEARCH

Interviews with Organizations (2010):

The following is a list of those organizations in the Sri Lankan diaspora in Canada that agreed to be interviewed for this paper. Others were invited to participate, but declined.

1. **Canada-Sri Lanka Business Council**
   - Their mission is to promote and assist in bilateral trade, investment, tourism, industrial co-operation and transfer of technology between Canada and Sri Lanka.

2. **Canadian Tamil Congress**
   - Their mission includes:
     - to uphold Canadian values of human rights, multiculturalism, religious and cultural diversity, gender equality, pluralism and volunteerism;
     - To work with various levels of governments in Canada to highlight/resolve issues impacting Tamil Canadians;
     - To champion equality, equality rights and equal opportunity for all diverse groups; and
     - To recognize and support the social, cultural and political aspirations of the Sri Lankan Tamils worldwide.
   - Website: http://www.canadiantamilcongress.ca/

3. **Jaffna Hindu Ladies College Alumni Association in Canada**
   - The association aims to bring together alumni from the Jaffna Hindu Ladies College (high school) in Sri Lanka and fundraises to support the college and its students.

4. **Ribbons for Rescue**
   - Ribbons for Rescue (RFR) was founded by five Sri Lankan youth after the devastating tsunami in 2004. After seeing a lack in youth mobilization for such catastrophes, RFR was created to bridge the gap. Engaging with different organizations and universities to strengthen their outreach, RFR was able to launch a massive blue and white ribbon campaign in the Toronto area, raising close to $30,000.
   - After the success of this fundraiser RFR again mobilized youth during other devastating disasters like Katrina, and the Pakistan earthquake in 2006.
   - RFR has worked with different aid groups such as the Red Cross, UNICEF and Doctors Without Borders.

5. **Sinhala Youth Club**
   - The Sinhala Youth Club was started in 2001 in order to bring together Canadian-Sinhalese youth in an effort to promote and enrich their culture.
   - A variety of events such as social meetings, sports and dances are geared towards youth to help them network within their culture and further enrich the Sinhala culture in Canada.
   - The Sinhalese Youth Club also organizes volunteer drives to help the Canadian community at large while providing an opportunity to understand the culture of Sri Lankan youth.

6. **Sri Lankans Without Borders**
   - Sri Lankan's Without Borders aims to inspire community dialogue, integration and personal growth. They provide opportunities for unity and solidarity, regardless of subcultural uniqueness or geographical positioning, based on a common set of shared values.

- They encourage Sri Lankans to open their minds and hearts to new possibilities by demonstrating that collectively and individually they are capable of making positive changes in the diaspora community as well as other Canadian and international communities.
- Website: www.srilankanswithoutborders.ca

7. **United Tamil Council of Canada**
   - United Tamil Council of Canada is driven by two core objectives:
     - To be a non-profit, non-partisan organization that strives to unite and be inclusive of Canadian Tamils of all background and represent them in the broader community; and
     - To work towards the social, economic and political empowerment of Canadian Tamils and represent their aspirations from a Canadian perspective on domestic and global issues.

INTERVIEWS WITH INDIVIDUALS (2010-2011):

1. **Amarnath Amarasingam, Doctoral candidate, Wilfrid Laurier University**
   a. Mr. Amarasingam is currently completing his dissertation entitled, Pain, Pride, and Politics: Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism in Canada.
   b. He is the author of, "Religion and Ethnicity Among Sri Lankan Tamil Youth in Ontario." Canadian Ethnic Studies. 40.2: 149-169. Available at: http://amarasingam.angelfire.com/TamilYouth.pdf.
   c. Other articles he has written include:
      i. "Canadians Shouldn't Forget Their Compassion." The *Province*. September 15, 2010. Available at: http://www.theprovince.com/news/story.html?id=3526331
      ii. "Why Refugees Turn to Smugglers." The *Toronto Star*. August 24, 2010. A9. Available at: http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/article/851509--why-refugees-turn-to-smugglers.

2. **Federal Government Employee**

3. **The Sri Lanka Reporter—Canadian, Sri Lankan Community Newspaper**
   a. The *Sri Lanka Reporter* is an independent newspaper and is one of the largest publications in Canada's ethnic press.
   b. In 2009, the publication completed 15 years as the Sri Lankan English newspaper with the largest circulation in Canada & U.S.
   It has won three awards from the National Ethnic Press & Media Council of Canada.
   c. The newspaper is issued free in Canada. Website: http://www.lankareporter.com/

4. **Various members of the Tamil, Sinhala, and Burgher communities**

SECONDARY RESEARCH:

Sinhalese Association of Canada
   - The Association raised funds for tsunami relief, with donations helping to build a house and contributing to the Mahavihara Disaster Fund.
   - It holds two main social events per year.
   - Works closely with the Buddhist Temples in and around Greater Toronto Area.

Sri Lanka Canada Friendship Association (Ontario)

Sri Lankan United National Association
   - The organization endeavors to promote, foster and actively maintain the social, cultural and economic ties that exist between Canada and Sri Lanka.
   - It functions as a channel for inter-community exchanges to improve the understanding and relations between Canada Sri Lanka.
   - It aims to uphold the sovereignty, territorial integrity and the national unity of both Canada and Sri Lanka.
   - It carries out educational and other programs to safeguard the democratic way of life, and further support and protect the Constitutional guarantees of equality and fundamental rights of all the citizens of both Canada and Sri Lanka.
   - An interview request was declined.

CASE STUDY #5:
THE SUDANESE DIASPORA IN CANADA[1]

Sean Verigin

NOTE: This case study was originally drafted in the Fall of 2010. Since then, there have been significant changes in "the Sudans" that are not reflected in this study. Most notably, a largely peaceful referendum was held among the people of Southern Sudan in January 2011 that resulted in their near-unanimous decision to establish an independent state of South Sudan. This referendum was carried out pursuant to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 under careful international monitoring that included a significant role for Canadians. Canada officially recognized the new state of South Sudan when it came into being on July 9, 2011. There has yet to be a comprehensive review undertaken of the specific role of the Sudanese diaspora(s) in Canada in the lead up to the January referendum and the subsequent establishment of an independent state. However, this case study does offer a helpful profile of the broader Sudanese community in Canada, including its size, organization and foreign policy priorities, just prior to the holding of the fateful referendum. —Eds.

I) DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF THE SUDANESE DIASPORA COMMUNITY

There have been two distinct waves of Sudanese immigration into Canada. The first wave, from the 1960s until the early 1980s, was slow in pace; on average, fewer than 100 Sudanese relocated during any given year, most often in pursuit of post-secondary education and professional placements.[2] The onset of protracted civil conflict in Sudan during the mid-1980s led to an upswell in the scale of immigration.[3] Since then, there has been a steady inflow of Sudanese immigrants to Canada, many seeking asylum from Africa's longest ongoing civil conflict.

These recent arrivals maintain strong ties with friends and extended family members in Sudan and elsewhere abroad. The majority of the Sudanese-Canadian population comprises first-generation immigrants who were either raised in Sudan or by Sudanese expatriates in neighbouring countries. Hence, the diaspora community is intimately connected to its cultural heritage and traditions, in addition to the ongoing hardships of relatives in Sudan. Even the youngest members of the diaspora maintain a close relationship with foreign relatives, particularly through forms of social networking.[4]

The diaspora provides financial remittances to assist friends and extended family members in Sudan. These remittances are made by all members of the community, including those with limited financial resources. It is also not uncommon for Sudanese-Canadians to remain connected to their country of origin through frequent return visits, as often as every two to five years.[5] Finally, many individuals are members of Canadian chapters of Sudanese political parties, such as the Sudanese Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM).

The community has undertaken charitable and humanitarian programs with the purpose of ameliorating living conditions in Sudan. For instance, Cuban-trained physicians of Sudanese origin participated in the establishment of the Sudanese Physician Reintegration Program (SPRP) as a means to upgrade their medical skills and as a mechanism to deliver medical supplies and services to under-served communities in Sudan. This project, which operates in partnership with the University of Calgary and Samaritan's Purse, has been celebrated by *The Lancet* for partially reversing the North-South brain drain phenomenon.[6]

The Sudanese diaspora also maintains close ties to Sudan through its own independent relief and development-related initiatives. The Southern Sudanese Association of Alberta (SHAMA), for example, is currently raising funds to build a primary school in the city of Wau; and the Darfurian sub-set of the Sudanese diaspora is at the forefront of awareness-building and fundraising projects related to the war-afflicted region of Darfur.

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1   The informational content of this report, which includes all transcriptions and statistical data, is a condensation of the findings and conclusions of a research project previously conducted by the Mosaic Institute. This report was commissioned by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). A public domain version of its full text, sans appendices, is available online at: http://mosaicinstitute.ca/uploaded/tiny_mce/File/Sudanese_Report.pdf
2   The Mosaic Institute, Profile of a Community: A 'Smart Map' of the Sudanese Diaspora in Canada (Toronto: The Mosaic Institute, 2009), 28.
3   Ibid. For instance, by the mid-2000s well in excess of 1,200 Sudanese were immigrating into Canada each year.
4   Ibid., 24.
5   Ibid.
6   Crutcher, Rodney A. et al. (2008). "Sudanese physicians' reintegration programme," The Lancet 372, no. 9641, 788-789.

There are competing accounts of the total population of the Sudanese diaspora in Canada. Internal counts conducted by Sudanese community organizations estimate a domestic population size of roughly 35,000 to 40,000 members.[7] However, official Census data from Statistics Canada finds that the number of Canadians who self-identify as ethnically Sudanese was only 12,640 in 2006.[8] A report by The Mosaic Institute from 2009 concludes that a middle-ground figure of 25,000 to 30,000 members is the most probable estimate.[9]

Demographic surveys conducted by Statistics Canada show that almost one-quarter of the population has received a post-secondary degree or equivalent diploma;[10] approximately three-quarters of these citizens received their education outside of Canada.[11] According to the 2006 Population Census, 81% of the Sudanese community is 54 years old or younger, and a slim majority of the population is under the age of 34.[12] The Sudanese population is clustered in urban centres, with the largest concentrations located in Toronto (29%), Calgary (21%), and Edmonton (8%).[13]

The Sudanese-Canadian diaspora is cross-cut by geographic, ethnic and religious identity cleavages. Of these markers, the North-South regional division remains the most enduring. The salience of these geographical categories is further evidenced due to their tight correlation with overlapping ethnic identity cleavages and religious affiliations. These regional dynamics can be enumerated thusly: Sudanese from the North are often descendants of the Nubian people who belong to the Nuba, Beja or Shaigia tribes and are typically Muslim; by comparison, Southerners tend to be from the Dinka, Nuer or Bari tribes and are typically Christian.

II) EXISTING ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND CAPACITY

Members of the Sudanese community have established an extensive network of community organizations in most major Canadian cities. On average, there are two Sudanese organizations in each city, divided along ethnoregional lines. The exception is the presence of a single multi-ethnic community organization in Winnipeg serving the city's entire Sudanese diaspora community.[14] In terms of operational capacity, these organizations are skeletal in structure, with limited formal organization and few financial resources. This can be attributed to the dual impacts of low income levels and recent arrival dates to Canada.

Most Sudanese community organizations tend to be inward-looking, focusing on the settlement and integration concerns of recent immigrants. These organizations stipulate in their constitutions and/or mandates a strictly apolitical orientation, and hence do not engage with Canada's humanitarian and development activities in Sudan. The relationship of the vast majority of Sudanese-Canadian organizations with federal officials is largely restricted to the funding they receive from Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) in order to deliver settlement and integration services.

Those members of the diaspora who are active in the public discussion surrounding Canada's official activities in Sudan have joined a number of domestic not-for-profit and advocacy organizations. One of the most prominent of these groups is the Darfur/Sudan Peace Network (DSPN). Formerly known as Save Darfur Canada, this Montreal-based NGO describes itself as "an information and networking resource for Darfur and Sudan advocates and grassroots groups across the country."[15] The DSPN is an umbrella organization that includes a national coalition of thirty likeminded member organizations and thousands of individuals throughout Canada. It operates as an information clearinghouse, networking platform, and central rallying point for interested individuals and organizations. The DSPN is well-established, with significant resources, an up-to-date website, and ongoing campaigns targeted at public officials in the federal government. This programming has included a national letter writing campaign that has sent over 51,000 messages to elected officials; a national postcard campaign that has sent over 32,000 letters to the office of the Prime Minister; and an e-campaign during the 2008 elections.[16] [NB: Unfortunately, the DSPN was disbanded in November 2011, though much of its work continues through the efforts of its former member organizations. Eds.]

The Darfur Association of Canada (DAC) is located in Hamilton, Ontario. Its leaders originate primarily from within the Darfuri sub-set of the Sudanese diaspora. The DAC focuses its projects on public education and profile-raising events, which often translates into public rallies. These serve both as a means to attract media attention and as a public platform to host prominent speakers.[17] In addition to the DAC, the Darfur Diaspora Association (DDA) conducts similar activities in Toronto, Ontario. Its

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7   Immigrant Culture and Arts Association, "Sudanese Community," http://www.diversehamilton.ca/africanCommunity/sudanese.html.

8   Statistics Canada, 2006 Census (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 2006).

9   The Mosaic Institute, supra, 27.

10   Ibid., 32.

11   Ibid.

12   Ibid., 31.

13   Ibid., 30.

14   Established in the mid-1990s and led by a Southerner, the Sudanese Association of Manitoba (SAM) is an optimistic symbol of unity for Sudanese-Canadians nationwide. It includes Northerners, Southerners, members of the Lost Boys and Girls of Sudan, in addition to various ethnic groups such as Darfurian and Nuba.

15   The Darfur/Sudan Peace Network, "Contacting the Darfur/Sudan Peace Network," http://sudan.peacenetwork.ca/contact_us.html.

16   The Darfur/Sudan Peace Network, "National Postcard Campaign," http://sudan.peacenetwork.ca/postcards.html.

17   Past speakers have included: Dr. Norman Epstein and Dr. Acol Dor, co-chairs of Canadians Against Slavery and Torture in Sudan; John Weiss, Professor of History at Cornell University; and Tarek Fatah, the founder and

members' research and publicize human rights abuses in southern Sudan. Both the DAC and the DDA publish press releases in order to raise public awareness, attract media coverage, and educate members of the Sudanese-Canadian population.

In spite of these efforts, the Ontario-based Darfuri associations are threadbare, weakly instituted, and lack sufficient financial resources or human capital to seriously advance their causes. At the time of this writing, both organizations operate as offline institutions without accessible websites. This digital divide presents a major impediment to the widespread diffusion of general information and campaigns.

III) ROSTER OF PRINCIPAL ISSUES

Many existing Sudanese-Canadian associations are explicitly non-political in their mandates—a fact that makes it difficult to gather systematic information about the foreign policy priorities of community members. The only known study to have surveyed the attitudes of Sudanese-Canadians is the 2009 *Smart Map* report conducted by the Mosaic Institute. This study profiles the normative commitments of 77 members of the community. Those surveyed were selected based on their perceived leadership or active involvement in the community. These respondents represent both Northerners and Southerners, a wide-range of ethnic categories, various faiths, and varying degrees of integration into Canadian society.

More than half of these respondents supported the normalization of diplomatic relations with Khartoum. Almost every respondent felt that President Omar Bashir's removal from office is a necessary precondition to establishing a lasting peace settlement.[18] However, respondents remained evenly divided as to whether or not Bashir's removal should include an indictment from the International Criminal Court (ICC). There was also a young and vocal minority of respondents who expressed their support for Southern autonomy. Echoing the appreciation that many respondents express for the Canadian model of ethnic coexistence, 78% felt that "Sudan's diversity is its strength."[19] There was equally strong support for the secularization of the Sudanese state.

Perhaps the most significant finding of the report was that the Sudanese diaspora community supports a proactive and engaged Canadian foreign policy toward Sudan. A large majority of respondents felt that Canada represents a positive influence in Sudan; correspondingly, 86% of respondents agreed that Canada should expand its overall involvement in Sudan.[20] Participants also overwhelmingly agreed that Canada has a "responsibility to protect" Sudanese civilians who are threatened by governmental negligence, incapacity, or state-sponsored violence. Indeed, 91% of respondents supported humanitarian intervention by the Government of Canada on behalf of non-combatants in Sudan.[21]

Some further insights into the political priorities and positions of the Sudanese-Canadian community can be learned by considering the substantive positions of the NGOs through which the Sudanese diaspora conducts most of its political advocacy. For instance, the Darfur/Sudan Peace Network has published a "Save Darfur Unity Statement". This is an official proclamation of the common concerns and policy priorities of its broad membership.[22] Key members include Amnesty International Canada, STAND Canada, the Darfur Association of Canada, and the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, among many others.[23] The DSPN declaration advocates increasing bilateral pressure on Khartoum in order to ensure its full compliance with the International Criminal Court. An official press release from the Darfur Association of Canada also supports this position.[24] In addition, the DSPN declaration calls for increasing Canadian funding to the UNAMID peacekeeping mission and for an extension of the forces' operational mandate in order to (1) include jurisdiction over the arrest warrants issued by the ICC, and (2) to provide UNAMID forces with the access and communication rights necessary to protect vulnerable Darfuri populations. In concert with community views, the Darfur Association of Canada advocates that the Government of Canada act in accordance with the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine.[25]

IV) CANADA'S ROLE IN SUDAN

Sudan remains a major overseas engagement for the Government of Canada. Since 2006, DFAIT has contributed more than $880 million to peacekeeping and humanitarian objectives in Sudan.[26] According to a publication by DFAIT, "Canada's engagement in Sudan reflects Canada's core values and foreign priorities of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule

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former President of the Muslim Canadian Congress.

18   The Mosaic Institute, supra, 54.

19   Ibid., 56.

20   Ibid., 47.

21   Ibid., 48.

22   Save Darfur Canada/Solidarité Darfour Canada, "Save Darfur Unity Statement," http://www.peacenetwork.ca/docs/unitystatement.pdf, (last modified February 2008).

23   Save Darfur Canada/Solidarité Darfour Canada, "Members of the Darfur/Sudan Peace Network," http://sudan.peacenetwork.ca/members.html (last modified July 29, 2009).

24   Darfur Association of Canada, "Toronto's Darfuri Communities Call for Canada to Act in Darfur, Sudan," July 29, 2008 , http://peacenetwork.ca/docs/DAC-press-release-29-07-08.pdf.

25   Darfur Association of Canada, p. 3.

26   Government of Canada, "Canada's Approach," http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/sudan-soudan/approach-approche.aspx (last modified July 19, 2011).

of law."[27] To this end, the Government of Canada has adopted a whole-of-government approach that brings together the three bilateral policy streams of aid, diplomacy, and security.

The provision of Canadian bilateral aid occurs through the CIDA. It focuses on humanitarian assistance and early recovery programs. CIDA allocates funds through multilateral initiatives such as the World Bank Multi-Donor Trust and the United Nations World Food Program. In response to human rights concerns, Canada is withholding government-to-government development co-operation.

Canada has full diplomatic relations with Sudan and maintains an Embassy in Khartoum, but with a chargé d'affaires rather than an Ambassador serving as Canada's senior representative in the country. Canadian efforts on the ground are aimed at the full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on January 9 2005; in order to facilitate this goal the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) has been deployed. Canada also participates in multilateral peacebuilding initiatives: via the Human Rights Council, as co-chair of "Friends of UNAMID," and in official support of the investigations led by the International Criminal Court.[28]

Canada's security engagement focuses on the provision of financial and material support to the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). This includes the deployment of Canadian forces personnel, in addition to military observers who provide oversight and training services to African Union forces. Canadian forces also attempt to mitigate violence and protect vulnerable populations. According to DFAIT, Canadian officials operate to ensure "the full, safe, unhindered access of humanitarian workers to populations in need."[29]

V) INTERFACE BETWEEN THE SUDANESE DIASPORA AND THE FOREIGN POLICY COMMUNITY

According to the Mosaic Institute's *Smart Map* report, the Sudan Task Force at DFAIT has undertaken extensive outreach activities to the Sudanese-Canadian community. These cross-national efforts have taken place in Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Hamilton, St. Catharines, Kitchener, London, Winnipeg and Calgary.[30] In September 2010, the Sudan Task Force sponsored a national conference for leaders from across the Sudanese-Canadian diaspora in Winnipeg.

The national conference addressed topics such as "Key Challenges to Development in Sudan", "Canada and Sudan after the 2011 Referendum", "Human Rights & Conflict—Darfur and Beyond", and "The Sudanese-Canadian Diaspora and Canada's Role in Sudan." Key panellists included senior officials from DFAIT and CIDA, in addition to citizen experts who represented a cross-section of the Sudanese-Canadian leadership. A detailed report of the proceedings of the Winnipeg conference was published in October 2010 and distributed both to all those organizations working on Sudan-related issues across the federal government and to NGOs working on Sudan-related issues across Canada.[31]

Beyond this initial conference, it should be noted that the *Smart Map* report recommended the creation of permanent or semi-permanent forums for the inclusion of Sudanese-Canadian citizen experts into the policy dialogue.[32] The report also suggested that the Sudan Task Force explore how to collaborate more closely on agenda-setting with existing forums, such as the Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group (SIARG). This is a well-established group of Canadian agencies with development programming related to Sudan. SIARG's broadly-based membership has close networks with likeminded non-profit organizations. As a result, it represents one of the most obvious launch-points for discussions related to Sudan and the expanded engagement of the Sudanese-Canadian diaspora.

VI) ASSESSMENT OF SUBSTANTIVE POLICY INPUTS

It is encouraging to note that the normative commitments held by the Sudanese-Canadian citizen experts surveyed in the *Smart Map* report and the policy positions advocated by Sudan-focused Canadian NGOs are consistent with the Government of Canada's official goals and commitments. This convergence of attitudes is evident in at least three policy areas: those of international law, humanitarian intervention, multilateral peacekeeping or peacebuilding.

27 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Canada's Engagement in Sudan: Priorities and Objectives," http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/sudan-soudan/assets/pdfs/Canadas-Engagement-in-Sudan_30Apr2010.pdf (last modified April 30, 2010).

28 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Canada Urges Sudan to Cooperate with International Criminal Court," www.canadainternational.gc.ca/sudan-soudan/news_releases-communiqués/2009-03-04.aspx?lang = eng (last modified March 4, 2009).

29 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Canada Urges Sudan to Cooperate with International Criminal Court," www.canadainternational.gc.ca/sudan-soudan/news_releases-communiqués/2009-03-04.aspx?lang = eng (last modified March 4, 2009).

30 The Mosaic Institute,supra, 2.

31 The Mosaic Institute, Sudanese-Canadians and the Future of Sudan: A Report on a Conference held in Winnipeg, September 2, 2010 (Toronto: The Mosaic Institute, 2010). This report can be accessed on-line at www.mosaicinstitute.ca/Publications.html, under "2010".

32 The Mosaic Institute, Profile of a Community: A 'Smart Map' of the Sudanese Diaspora in Canada, supra, 61.

Canada has a longstanding foreign policy commitment to the rule of international law, protection of human rights, and post-conflict justice & reconciliation. The Sudan/Darfur Peace Network's member organizations and the Darfur Association of Canada advocate for Canada to increase its bilateral pressure on President al-Bashir's regime in order to ensure full compliance with the rulings of the ICC. As a state party to the International Criminal Court, Canada has a mandate to uphold these rulings.

As one of the chief architects of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, Canada has established a clear commitment to the protection of vulnerable civilian populations. Indeed, the historical legacy of peacekeeping is central to Canada's national identity on the international stage. With this in mind, the Darfur Association of Canada has in the past called on the Government of Canada to invoke the R2P doctrine in the region of Southern Sudan. The respondents to the *Smart Map* report were equally vocal in their support for the presence of Canadian peacekeeping forces on the ground.

On the topic of multilateral peacekeeping, 87% of the respondents to the *Smart Map* report supported increasing Canada's financial support for UNAMID. As noted above, the Sudan/Darfur Peace Network also advocates for the extension of UNAMID's mandate to ensure the enforcement of the ICC's arrest warrants as well as to enhance the protection of isolated Darfuri populations. Increasing support for UNAMID would be consistent with Canada's commitment to the International Criminal Court and with its humanitarian principles.

Canada's key foreign policymaking priorities–in terms of peacebuilding activities–focus on the promotion of democracy abroad, building inclusive public institutions, and fostering the peaceful coexistence of multi-ethnic communities. The Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group shares these goals. It advocates strengthening the Sudanese civil society groups that have been weakened by decades of civil war, social upheaval and state hostility. Including a wider range of societal actors into the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) would advance Canada's policy goal of ensuring the full implementation and consolidation of a long-term CPA.

Given the convergence of attitudes between the Sudanese-Canadian community, Sudan-focused NGOS in Canada, and the Government of Canada, there is significant cause for optimism and greater collaboration on mutual policy areas. Policymakers can tap into this reservoir of expertise to enhance Canadian foreign policymaking by leveraging the value-added of knowledge transfers between Sudanese-Canadians and the foreign policy community. Nevertheless, there are limitations to the current research. It is possible that the views advanced by the highly educated, politically active "citizen experts" in the *Smart Map* may be only partly representative of the whole Sudanese diaspora community in Canada. Similar words of caution might also be attributed to the sampling of those Sudan-related NGOs under discussion.

VII) GAP ANALYSIS

From the perspective of facilitating policymaker outreach to the Sudanese-Canadian community, extant research is limited in scope, providing inconclusive analysis. A truly comprehensive research study could clarify many existing ambiguities, such as an accurate count of the Sudanese-Canadian diaspora.[33] It could also gauge the priorities of the community as a whole, and survey the skills and knowledge specific to individual community members. This would improve the foreign policy community's ability to draw on the knowledge and expertise of Sudanese-Canadians.

A crucial concluding proviso of the *Smart Map* report is that mutual exchange of information and expertise between the Sudanese-Canadian diaspora and the Canadian Government depends on the willingness of the Sudanese diaspora community to engage with and support the foreign policy establishment. A complicating factor is that many first-generation members of the community are highly suspicious of any efforts by the Government of Canada and third parties to survey their political views and investigate their organizations, fearing that such information could be used for malicious purposes. The establishment of a trust-based relationship with the Government of Canada remains a necessary precondition to systematic inclusion of inputs from the Sudanese diaspora community. Potential mechanisms to improve matters over the long term include building interpersonal relationships between public officials and community leaders (such as those citizen experts discussed in the study), and fostering a deeper integration of Sudanese diaspora members into Canadian society.

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33   Ibid., 60.

ORGANIZATIONAL PROFILES

Tapping our Potential: Diaspora Communities and Canadian Foreign Policy is a joint initiative of the following two organizations, both based in Toronto:

The **Mosaic Institute** (www.mosaicinstitute.ca) is an action-oriented think tank that harnesses the connections, knowledge and resources of Canada's ethnocultural communities to advance Canadian solutions and promote peace and development in conflict-ridden or underdeveloped parts of the world.

The premise guiding the work of the Mosaic Institute is that Canada—by virtue of its uncommon and arguably unrivalled commitment to promoting ethnocultural diversity within its borders—has fostered the creation of an experience-rich pool of experts and "thought leaders" from around the globe who call Canada home. These citizen experts, through their knowledge, resources and connections to the rest of the planet, have the potential to greatly enhance Canada's contribution to global peacebuilding, conflict resolution and economic and social development efforts.

The Institute seeks to provide Canadian leaders with well-informed ideas and fresh insights for advancing global peace and development. We also encourage ethnocultural communities that are in longstanding conflict with one another to come together as Canadians to advance the cause of peace in their countries of origin. Currently, the research and programming of the Mosaic Institute is focused on the Middle East; Armenia-Turkey; South Asia; and Sudan.

The **Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation** (www.gordonfoundation.ca) is an independent philanthropic foundation dedicated to the development of sound and innovative public policies. In 2004, the Foundation launched its Global Citizenship program, including a focus on diaspora and transnational communities.

At the outset, the focus of the Foundation's work in this area was to increase knowledge of the opportunities afforded by the engagement of Canada's diaspora and transnational communities in promoting Canada's role in the world and the implications for public policy. Over time, the program began work to strengthen the capacity of diaspora groups and initiatives to influence, shape and promote Canada's role in the world to further peace, development, human rights and good governance.

While the Foundation has recently decided to wind down its grant-making activities in this area, it is important to capture the rich knowledge that has been developed through the program and use it to advance the important goal of improving Canada's international work and foreign policy development through the inputs of transnational citizens with deep experience and knowledge of regions around the world.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

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Raphael Girard is a Public Policy and International Business Consultant who retired from the Canadian Government's Department of Foreign Affairs in August 2003. In his last overseas posting, he was Canada's Ambassador to Romania with concurrent accreditation to Bulgaria, Macedonia and Moldova. Previously he served in a number of senior posts in the

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John Monahan is the first Executive Director of the Mosaic Institute. He previously served as Director of the Province of Ontario's global network of trade and representation offices, and was the inaugural Director of the Ontario Investment and Trade Centre. From 2001 to 2005, John served as Consul (Economic Affairs-Ontario) at the Canadian Consulate-General in New York City. Before that, he practiced labour, employment and immigration law with Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP, and was an Immigration Policy Advisor and specialist in economic immigration for the Government of Ontario. John received his JD and BA (International Relations) degrees from the University of Toronto, and his Master of Public Administration degree from Dalhousie University. He also completed programs of study at the *Université des Sciences Humaines de Strasbourg* , and *l'Université Panthéon-Assas* (Paris). John speaks and writes extensively about pluralism, global citizenship, and Canada's role in the world.

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Suthamie Poologasingham completed her Bachelor of Arts at Mount Holyoke College in Massachusetts and a Masters of Business Immigration (2006) at York University's Schulich School of Business. Suthamie has extensive experience in working with the Sri Lankan diaspora in Canada. She was a Member of the Organizing Committee of the Mosaic Institute's Young Canadians' Peace Dialogue on Sri Lanka (2009-2011); a member of the Board of Sri Lankans Without Borders (SLWB); and Director of Youth Affairs for Homes of Hope Life Enrichment Centre. Suthamie was raised around the world as the daughter of a former Sri Lankan career diplomat. She is currently a management consultant based in Toronto.

Natasha Sawh is a program manager with the Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation, where she managed the Foundation's diaspora work under the former Global Citizenship program. With 15 years of experience working and volunteering in government, not-for-profit and philanthropic organizations, she has focused her work in the areas of education, international development, and civic engagement. She has a strong interest in working with youth and diasporic/transnational communities, including managing leadership programs with the Canadian Merit Scholarship Foundation and the Gordon Global Fellowship program. Her policy research experience includes positions at the Policy Research Initiative of the Privy Council Office in Ottawa and the Canada Millennium Scholarship Foundation's research department in Montreal. She holds degrees from McMaster University and McGill University in Globalization Studies and Philosophy, respectively.

Helen Tewolde is a Toronto-based researcher and development professional specializing in issues of human-rights based approaches to development and leadership capacity-building for diaspora organizations and individuals. She has led, designed and participated in various university and community-based research projects related to Canadian foreign policy in education and the role of diasporas and development, such as the UPEACE High Level Expert Forum, 2006 and York Centre for International Security Studies (YCISS) Junior Scholars' Award, 2007-2008. Helen received her education from McMaster University (Hons. B.A.) and Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto (M.A.) specializing in Comparative, International & Development Education.

Sean Verigin is currently completing a specialist degree at the Trudeau Centre for Peace & Conflict Studies at the University of Toronto with a focus on the political economy of human security. He has contributed to projects at Samara Canada and recently held an internship at the Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada. Sean previously interned at the Mosaic Institute, where he served as the Research Assistant on the 2009 study entitled *Profile of a Community: A 'Smart Map' of the Sudanese Diaspora in Canada*, which was undertaken for the Sudan Task Force of Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.